Federal Building and Facility Security

Shawn Reese
Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy

Lorraine H. Tong
Analyst in American National Government

The security of federal government buildings and facilities affects not only the daily operations of the federal government but also the health, well-being, and safety of federal employees and the public. Recent congressional action concerning the security of federal buildings includes P.L. 111-83 (FY2010 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security), which addressed the issue of the transfer of the Federal Protective Service from Immigration and Customs Enforcement to the National Protection and Programs Directorate. 

For the purposes of this report, federal facilities include any building leased or owned by the General Services Administration. In FY2007, the federal government's real property portfolio comprised 446,000 buildings with an area of 3.3 billion square feet and a replacement value of $772.8 billion. Federal courthouses and facilities are also discussed in this report. Additionally, it should be noted that many Members of Congress have state and district offices located in multitenant federal buildings. 

Security of federal facilities includes physical security assets such as closed-circuit television cameras, barrier material, and security guards (both federally employed and contracted). Federal facility security practices have been subject to criticism by government auditors and security experts. Elements that have received criticism include the use of private security guards, the management and security practices of the Federal Protective Service, and the coordination of federal facility security.


Date of Report: April 12, 2010
Number of Pages: 20
Order Number: R41138
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Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians

Susan G. Chesser
Information Research Specialist

This report collects statistics from a variety of sources on casualties sustained during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which began on October 7, 2001, and is ongoing. OEF actions take place primarily in Afghanistan; however, OEF casualties also includes American casualties in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen. 

Casualty data of U.S. military forces are compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency's press releases. Also included are statistics on those wounded but not killed. Statistics may be revised as circumstances are investigated and as records are processed through the U.S. military's casualty system. More frequent updates are available at DOD's website at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ under "Casualty Update." 

A detailed casualty summary of U.S. military forces that includes data on deaths by cause, as well as statistics on soldiers wounded in action, is available at the following DOD website: http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm. 

NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) does not post casualty statistics of the military forces of partner countries on the ISAF website at http://www.isaf.nato.int/. ISAF press releases state that it is ISAF policy to defer to the relevant national authorities to provide notice of any fatality. For this reason, this report uses fatality data of coalition forces as compiled by CNN.com and posted online at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2004/oef.casualties/index.html. 

Casualty data of Afghan civilians are reported quarterly by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). Deaths of Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army personnel are reported by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction in the quarterly reports to Congress that are required as part of P.L. 110-181. 

Because the estimates of Afghan casualties contained in this report are based on varying time periods and have been created using different methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using them and should look to them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact.


Date of Report: April 12 2010
Number of Pages: 5
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The Defense Base Act (DBA): The Federally Mandated Workers’ Compensation System for Overseas Government Contractors

Valerie Bailey Grasso
Specialist in Defense Acquisition

Baird Webel
Specialist in Financial Economics

Scott Szymendera
Analyst in Disability Policy

Many overseas federal contractors are covered by the Defense Base Act (DBA), which mandates that they provide workers' compensation insurance for their employees. As the U.S. military has increased operations in Iraq, the size of the DBA program has grown. Since September 2001, there have been 49,472 DBA cases, including 1,584 cases involving the deaths of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nearly $200 million in cash and medical benefits were paid to DBA claimants in 2008. 

Congress has become increasingly concerned with the costs involved in the DBA program because the federal government usually reimburses its contractors for their DBA premiums. The Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have seen some cost savings since adopting single-source models for their DBA insurance in which contractors for each agency are required to purchase insurance from a single company selected by the agency. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is currently testing such a model for its DBA system. For the rest of the Department of Defense (DOD), however, including the Army's large Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract, individual contractors are free to select their own DBA insurers and negotiate their own rates, and one contractor, KBR, has been criticized by DOD auditors for failing to demonstrate that it sought to control DBA premium costs when selecting an insurer. 

The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2009 (P.L. 110-417) includes a provision that requires DOD to change the way its contractors provide DBA coverage for their workers. In a report issued pursuant to this legislation, DOD concluded that making improvements to the current open-market DBA insurance system would best meet the criteria for reform recommended by Congress and the agency. The report also found advantages that could result from having the federal government self-insure, with third-party administration, for DBA costs. However, there may be limitations to the utility of this report as a guide for Congress in making overall changes to the DBA program. 

This report provides an overview of the DBA and the systems used to provide DBA insurance at DOS, USAID, DOD, and USACE. Also included are criticisms of the current DOD DBA policy raised by GAO and Army auditors as well as responses to those criticisms by DOD and USACE. The report concludes with a discussion of several DBA reform options suggested by the House of Representatives in recent legislation and analyzed by DOD. A list of acronyms used in this report is provided in the Appendix.



Date of Report: April 9 2010
Number of Pages: 32
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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The issue is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy's budget. Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides. 

In the absence of such a conflict, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere. 

China's naval modernization effort, which began in the 1990s, encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and surface ships. China's naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in areas such as doctrine and training. 

DOD and other observers believe that the near-term focus of China's military modernization effort has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. Some observers believe that China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is increasingly oriented toward pursuing additional goals, such asserting or defending China's claims in maritime territorial disputes, protecting China's sea lines of communications, displacing U.S. influence in the Pacific, and asserting China's status as a major world power. 

Placing an increased emphasis on U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities in coming years could lead to one more of the following: increasing activities for monitoring and understanding developments in China's navy, as well as activities for measuring and better understanding operating conditions in the Western Pacific; assigning a larger percentage of the Navy to the Pacific Fleet; homeporting more of the Pacific Fleet's ships at forward locations such as Hawaii, Guam, and Japan; increasing training and exercises in operations relating to countering Chinese maritime anti-access forces, such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations; and funding programs for developing and procuring highly capable ships, aircraft, weapons, and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems.


Date of Report: April 9, 2010
Number of Pages: 49
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Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal

Mark Holt
Specialist in Energy Policy


Management of civilian radioactive waste has posed difficult issues for Congress since the beginning of the nuclear power industry in the 1950s. Federal policy is based on the premise that nuclear waste can be disposed of safely, but proposed storage and disposal facilities have frequently been challenged on safety, health, and environmental grounds. Although civilian radioactive waste encompasses a wide range of materials, most of the current debate focuses on highly radioactive spent fuel from nuclear power plants. 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) calls for disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a deep geologic repository. NWPA established the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) in the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop such a repository and required the program's civilian costs to be covered by a fee on nuclear-generated electricity, paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund. Amendments to NWPA in 1987 restricted DOE's repository site studies to Yucca Mountain in Nevada. 

DOE submitted a license application for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 3, 2008, and NRC docketed the application September 8, 2008. The NRC license must be based on radiation exposure standards set by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which issued revised standards September 30, 2008. The State of Nevada strongly opposes the Yucca Mountain project, disputing DOE's analysis that the repository would meet EPA's standards. Risks cited by repository opponents include excessive water infiltration, earthquakes, volcanoes, and human intrusion. 

The Obama Administration "has determined that developing the Yucca Mountain repository is not a workable option and the Nation needs a different solution for nuclear waste disposal," according to the DOE FY2011 budget justification. As a result, no funding for Yucca Mountain or OCRWM is being requested for FY2011. DOE filed a motion with NRC to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application on March 3, 2010. DOE's withdrawal motion has drawn opposition from states that have defense-related and civilian waste awaiting permanent disposal. Further consideration of the withdrawal motion was suspended by NRC's licensing board April 6, 2010, pending a ruling on related federal court cases. 

Alternatives to Yucca Mountain are to be evaluated by the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, which held its first meeting March 25-26, 2010. Congress provided $5 million for the Commission in the FY2010 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. The Commission is to study options for temporary storage, treatment, and permanent disposal of highly radioactive nuclear waste, along with an evaluation of nuclear waste research and development programs and the need for legislation. A draft report is to be issued within 18 months and a final report within two years. 

DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) is to take over the remaining functions of OCRWM and "lead all future waste management activities," according to the FY2011 budget justification. Substantial funding has been requested for NE to conduct research on nuclear waste disposal technologies and options and to provide support for the Blue Ribbon Commission. 

Congress provided $198.6 million to OCRWM for FY2010 to continue the Yucca Mountain licensing process but terminate all development activities related to the proposed repository. DOE plans to reprogram the FY2010 funding toward shutting down the program. 


Date of Report: April 9, 2010
Number of Pages: 25
Order Number: RL33461
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TRICARE and VA Health Care: Impact of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act(P.L. 111-148)

Sidath Viranga Panangala
Specialist in Veterans Policy

Don J. Jansen
Analyst in Defense Health Care Policy

The 111th Congress recently passed, and the President signed into law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148; PPACA), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152; HCERA). In general, PPACA did not make any significant changes to the Department of Defense (DOD) TRICARE program or to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care system. However, many have sought clarification as to whether certain provisions in PPACA, such as a mandate for most individuals to have health insurance, or extending dependant coverage up to age 26, would apply to TRICARE and VA health care beneficiaries. 

To address some of these concerns, Congress has introduced and/or enacted legislation. The TRICARE Affirmation Act (H.R. 4887), passed by both the House and the Senate and received by the President, would affirm that TRICARE satisfies the minimum acceptable coverage requirement in PPACA. Similarly S. 3162 (passed by the Senate on March 26, 2010) and H.R. 5014 (introduced in the House on April 14, 2010) would, if enacted, clarify that the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs (CHAMPVA), Spina Bifida Health Care Program, and the Children of Women Vietnam Veterans Health Care Program meet the "minimum essential coverage" requirement under PPACA. In addition, the TRICARE Dependent Coverage Extension Act (H.R. 4923; S. 3201), if enacted, would extend certain PPACA provisions to TRICARE beneficiaries.


Date of Report: April 22, 2010
Number of Pages: 11
Order Number: R41198
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Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy's ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers in recent years have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. 

The 10 most recently named aircraft carriers have been named for U.S. presidents (8 ships) and Members of Congress (2 ships). Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. An exception occurred on January 8, 2009, when the Secretary of the Navy announced that SSN-785, the 12th ship in the class, would be named for former Senator John Warner. Destroyers are named for U.S. naval leaders and heroes. Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) are being named for small and medium-sized cities. San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for U.S. cities. An exception occurred on April 9, 2010, when the Secretary of the Navy announced that LPD-26, the 10th ship in the class, would be named for the late Representative John P. Murtha. The Navy announced on June 27, 2008, that the first LHA-6 class amphibious assault ship would be named America, a name previously used for an aircraft carrier (CV-66) that served in the Navy from 1965 to 1996. Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class cargo and ammunition ships are being named for noted explorers and pioneers of various kinds. Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) are being named for American traits and values. An exception has occurred with JHSV-4, the Navy's second JHSV (JHSVs 1 and 3 are to be operated by the Army), which the Secretary of the Navy announced on March 25, 2010, was being named Fall River. Fall River is a city in Massachusetts that is the location of Battleship Cove, a maritime museum and war memorial with several deactivated warships, including a post-World War II cruiser named Fall River. 

The Navy historically has only rarely named ships for living persons. At least 11 U.S. military ships since the 1970s have been named for persons who were living at the time the name was announced. 

Members of the public are sometimes interested in having Navy ships named for their own states or cities, for older U.S. Navy ships (particularly those on which they or their relatives served), for battles in which they or their relatives participated, or for people they admire. Citizens with such an interest sometimes contact the Navy, the Department of Defense, or Congress seeking support for their proposals. 

Congress has long maintained an interest in how Navy ships are named, and has influenced the naming of certain Navy ships. The Navy suggests that congressional offices wishing to express support for proposals to name a Navy ship for a specific person, place, or thing contact the office of the Secretary of the Navy to make their support known. Congress may also pass legislation relating to ship names. Measures passed by Congress in recent years regarding Navy ship names have all been sense-of-the-Congress provisions. In the 111th Congress, H.Con.Res. 83 would express the sense of the Congress that that a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, either CVN-79 or CVN-80, should be named for former Senator Barry M. Goldwater, and H.Res. 330 would express the sense of the House of Representatives that the Secretary of the Navy should name an appropriate Navy ship in honor of Marine Corps General Clifton B. Cates of Tiptonville, TN. Section 1022 of the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) designated the historic Navy ship USS Constitution as "America's Ship of State."


Date of Report: April 13, 2010
Number of Pages: 15
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Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress

Mary Beth Nikitin
Analyst in Nonproliferation

In an April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama pledged that his Administration would launch "a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years." To motivate world leaders to achieve this goal, the President hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders of 47 countries attended the summit, including many heads of state. Attendees represent a wide geographic range of states and nuclear capabilities, and include China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The summit resulted in a joint statement saying that international cooperative action is necessary to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. Summit attendees also pledged to improve nuclear security standards, bring international agreements into force, and share best practices. 

Nuclear security measures refer to a wide range of actions to prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material or sabotage at an installation or in transit. They could include physical protection measures, material control and accounting, personnel reliability screening, and training. A broader understanding of nuclear security also includes measures to prevent and detect illicit trafficking— cargo inspections, border security, and interdiction measures. 

The U.S. government has worked for more than a decade both domestically and in partnership with other countries to address this problem through multiple programs at the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also played a lead role in these efforts, particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 

Congress will continue to decide on funding for the U.S. domestic and international programs focused on nuclear material security and nuclear terrorism prevention. Congress is also likely to assess implementation of the administration's goal to secure nuclear materials by the end of 2013. The Obama Administration's FY2011 congressional budget request proposes overall increases in funding for nuclear security-related accounts, with the stated purpose of ramping up programs to meet the President's four-year goal.


Date of Report: April 16, 2010
Number of Pages: 25
Order Number: R41169
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Homeland Security Department: FY2011President’s Request for Appropriations

Chad C. Haddal, Coordinator
Analyst in Immigration Policy

Jennifer E. Lake, Coordinator
Analyst in Domestic Security

This report describes the FY2011 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Administration requested a net appropriation of $45.0 billion in budget authority for FY2011. This amounts to a $1.1 billion, or a 2.4% increase from the $43.9 billion enacted for FY2010. Total budget authority requested by the Administration for DHS for FY2011 amounts to $52.6 billion as compared to $51.7 billion enacted for FY2010. 

Net requested appropriations for major agencies within DHS were as follows: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), $9,809 million; Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), $5,524 million; Transportation Security Administration (TSA), $5,729 million; Coast Guard, $9,867 million; Secret Service, $1,570 million; National Protection & Programs Directorate, $2,362 million; Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), $7,294 million; Science and Technology, $1,018 million; and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, $306 million.


Date of Report: April 15, 2010
Number of Pages: 72
Order Number: R41189
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Comparison of Rights in Military Commission Trials andTrials in Federal Criminal Court

Jennifer K. Elsea
Legislative Attorney


The Obama Administration's decision to try certain detainees and other terrorist suspects in federal criminal court, including those accused of conspiring to commit the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the man arrested after a failed aircraft bombing on Christmas day, and to try other detainees by military commission, has focused attention on the procedural differences between trials in federal court and those conducted under the Military Commissions Act, as recently amended. Some who are opposed to the decision argue that bringing detainees to the United States for trial poses a security threat and risks disclosing classified information, or could result in the acquittal of persons who are guilty. Others have praised the decision as recognizing the efficacy and fairness of the federal court system and have voiced confidence in the courts' ability to protect national security while achieving justice that will be perceived as such among U.S. allies abroad. Some continue to object to the planned trials of detainees by military commission, despite the amendments Congress enacted as Title XVIII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, P.L. 111-84, because they say it demonstrates a less than full commitment to justice or that it casts doubt on the strength of the government's case against those detainees. Seven bills have been introduced to prohibit federal trial or to require military commission trials for certain classes of suspected terrorists, or to authorize their detention, H.R. 4111, H.R. 4463, H.R. 4127, H.R. 4738, S. 2977, H.R. 4588, and H.R. 4556. One bill, H.R. 4415, would authorize the President to determine which persons are subject to detention or military commission trial as unlawful enemy combatants. One bill in the Senate, S. 2943, would require the Attorney General to consult with the Director of National Intelligence as well as the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security prior to proceeding against a terrorism suspect in the criminal justice system. 

This report provides a brief summary of legal issues raised by the choice of forum for trying accused terrorists and a table comparing selected military commissions rules under the Military Commissions Act, as amended, to the corresponding rules that apply in federal court. The table follows the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts, to facilitate comparison with safeguards provided in international criminal tribunals. For similar charts comparing military commissions as envisioned under the MCA, as passed in 2006, to the rules that had been established by DOD for military commissions and to general military courts-martial conducted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), see CRS Report RL33688, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: Analysis of Procedural Rules and Comparison with Previous DOD Rules and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, by Jennifer K. Elsea. For information about legislation with relevance to Guantanamo detainees, see CRS Report R40754, Guantanamo Detention Center: Legislative Activity in the 111th Congress, by Anna C. Henning.

Date of Report: April 6, 2010
Number of Pages: 29
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Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress

Jeremiah Gertler
Specialist in Military Aviation

A total of 223 C-17s have been procured through FY2010. The Administration's proposed FY2011 defense budget proposed to end C-17 procurement and did not request any funding for the procurement of additional C-17s. The Administration argues that enough C-17s have now been procured to meet future operational needs. Supporters of procuring additional C-17s in FY2011 believe additional C-17s will be needed to meet future operational needs. The issue of how much airlift capability will be needed in the future is currently being examined in a congressionally mandated study being done by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) and in a separate Department of Defense (DOD) study called the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which was due to be completed by the end of 2009. 

FY2010 defense authorization bill: The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) authorizes no funding for the procurement of additional C-17s. Section 137 of the act prohibits the Secretary of the Air Force from proceeding with a decision to retire C-5As in any number that would reduce the active inventory of C-5s below 111 until certain conditions are met, and require the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the issue of C-5 retirement. Section 138 requires the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Director of the Air National Guard, to submit to the congressional defense committees, at least 90 days before a C-5 airlift aircraft is retired, a report on the proposed force structure and basing of C-5 and C-17 aircraft. Section 139 amends 10 USC 8062(g)(1) to state that the Secretary of the Air Force shall maintain a total inventory of not less than 316 C-5s and C-17s. If the current force of 111 C-5s were retained, this provision would support a C-17 force of not less than 205 C-7s—the number procured through FY2008. 

FY2010 DOD appropriations bill: In lieu of a conference report, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009, released an explanatory statement on a final version of H.R. 3326. This version was passed by the House on December 16, 2009, and by the Senate on December 19, 2009, and signed into law on December 19, 2009, as P.L. 111-118. 

The explanatory statement includes $2,588.5 million for procurement of 10 C-17s in 2010, an increase of $2,500.0 million over the administration request. The budget for modification of in service C-17s is reduced in the statement by $17.4 million, from the request of $469.7 million to $352.3 million. As Congress decided to continue production, the Administration request for $91.4 million in post-production support was not funded. 

The explanatory statement provides for the rescission of $22.4 million from Air Force research and development funds for the C-17 without further explanation.


Date of Report: April 6, 2010
Number of Pages: 38
Order Number: RS22763
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Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy's FY2011 budget proposes canceling the CG(X) program as unaffordable and instead building an improved version of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyer called the Flight III version. This report provides background information on the CG(X) program as it existed prior to its proposed cancellation. For further discussion of the proposal to build Flight III DDG-51s in lieu of CG(X)s, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress


 
Date of Report: April 8 2010
Number of Pages: 34
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under current MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 20 at the end of FY2010 to 38 at the end of FY2015. MDA and Navy plans also call for an increasing portion of the Navy's BMD-capable Aegis ships to be equipped with newer and more capable versions of the Aegis BMD system. 

BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. The Administration's Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for BMD operations, announced in September 2009, calls for operating BMD-capable Aegis ships in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran. 

Some observers are concerned—particularly following the Administration's announcement of its intention to use Aegis-BMD ships to defend Europe against potential ballistic missile attacks— that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for BMD-capable Aegis ships are growing faster than the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships. They are also concerned that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for Aegis ships for conducting BMD operations could strain the Navy's ability to provide regional military commanders with Aegis ships for performing non- BMD missions. There is also some concern regarding the adequacy of planned numbers of SM-3 missiles—the interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships for conducting BMD operations. 

The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA's budget. The Navy's budget provides additional funding for the program. MDA's proposed FY2011 budget requests a total of $2,161.6 million for the Aegis BMD program. 

FY2011 issues for Congress include whether to approve, reject, or modify the FY2011 MDA and Navy funding requests for the Aegis BMD program, and whether to provide MDA or the Navy with additional direction concerning the program. FY2011 options for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include, among other things, the following: accelerating the modification of Aegis ships to BMD-capable configurations, increasing procurement of new Aegis destroyers, increasing procurement of SM-3 missiles, and providing funding for integrating the SM-2 Block IV BMD interceptor missile into the 4.0.1 version of the Aegis BMD system.


Date of Report: April 8 2010
Number of Pages: 49
Order Number: RL33745
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years. 

The Navy's FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006. Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. The Navy's report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force structure assessment (FSA). Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the 313-ship plan might be issued. 

The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for the procurement of nine new battle force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The nine ships include two attack submarines, two destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one amphibious assault ship, one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). 

The Navy's five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 50 new battle force ships, or an average of 10 per year. Of the 50 ships in the plan, half are relatively inexpensive LCSs or JHSVs. 

The Navy's FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships. The Navy estimates that executing the plan would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. In past years, the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) estimate of the cost of implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan has been higher than the Navy's estimate, reinforcing concerns among some observers about the prospective affordability of the plan. CBO is now assessing the potential cost of the Navy's FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan. 

The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284 ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below 313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.


Date of Report: April 9 2010
Number of Pages: 17
Order Number: RL32665
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Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a relatively inexpensive Navy surface combatant equipped with modular "plug-and-fight" mission packages. The basic version of the LCS, without any mission packages, is referred to as the LCS sea frame. 

The Navy wants to field a force of 55 LCSs. The first two (LCS-1 and LCS-2) were procured in FY2005 and FY2006 and were commissioned into service on November 8, 2008, and January 16, 2010. Another two (LCS-3 and LCS-4) were procured in FY2009 and are under construction. Two more (LCS-5 and LCS-6) were procured in FY2010. 

The Navy's FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring 17 more LCSs in annual quantities of 2, 3, 4, 4, and 4. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests $1,231.0 million in procurement funding for the two LCSs that the Navy wants to procure in FY2011, and $278.4 million in FY2011 advance procurement funding for the 11 LCSs that the Navy wants to procure in FY2012-FY2014. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget also requests procurement funding to procure LCS mission packages, and research and development funding for the LCS program. There are currently two very different LCS designs—one developed and produced by an industry team led by Lockheed, and another developed and produced by an industry team led by General Dynamics. LCS-1 and LCS-3 use the Lockheed design; LCS-2 and LCS-4 use the General Dynamics design. 

On September 16, 2009, the Navy announced a proposed new LCS acquisition strategy. Under the strategy, the Navy would hold a competition to pick a single design to which all LCSs procured in FY2010 and subsequent years would be built. (The process of selecting the single design for all future production is called a down select.) The winner of the down select would be awarded a contract to build 10 LCSs over the five-year period FY2010-FY2014, at a rate of two ships per year. The Navy would then hold a second competition—open to all bidders other than the shipyard building the 10 LCSs in FY2010-FY2014—to select a second shipyard to build up to five additional LCSs to the same design in FY2012-FY2014 (one ship in FY2012, and two ships per year in FY2013-FY2014). These two shipyards would then compete for contracts to build LCSs procured in FY2015 and subsequent years. 

Section 121(a) and (b) of the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) grant the Navy contracting and other authority needed to implement this new LCS acquisition strategy. The Navy reportedly plans to make the down select decision and award the contract to build the 10 LCSs in the late spring or early summer of 2010. 

The issue for Congress for FY2011 is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's request for FY2011 procurement and advance procurement funding for the LCS program, and whether to provide any additional direction to the Navy regarding LCS acquisition strategy.


Date of Report: April 8 2010
Number of Pages: 45
Order Number: RL33741
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Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which are large, long-range missiles armed with multiple nuclear warheads. The SSBNs' basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their SLBMs, so as to deter a nuclear attack on the United States by another country. Navy SSBNs form one leg of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force, or "triad," which also includes land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and land based long-range bombers. The Navy currently operates 14 Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSBNs, the first of which is projected to reach the end of its service life in 2027. 

The Navy is currently conducting development and design work on a planned class of 12 next generation ballistic missile submarines, or SSBN(X)s, which the service wants to procure as replacements for the 14 Ohio-class boats. The SSBN(X) program, also known as the Ohio-class replacement program, received $497.4 million in research and development funding in the Navy's FY2010 budget, and the Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests an additional $672.3 million in research and development funding for the program. Navy plans call for procuring the first SSBN(X) in FY2019, with advance procurement funding for the boat beginning in FY2015. 

The Navy preliminarily estimates the procurement cost of each SSBN(X) at $6 billion to $7 billion in FY2010 dollars—a figure equivalent to roughly one-half of the Navy's budget each year for procuring new ships. Some observers are concerned that the SSBN(X) program will significantly compound a challenge the Navy faces concerning the affordability of its long-term shipbuilding program. These observers are concerned that procuring 12 SSBN(X)s during the 15- year period FY2019-FY2033, as called for in Navy plans, could lead to reductions in procurement rates for other types of Navy ships during those years. The Navy's report on its 30-year (FY2011- FY2040) shipbuilding plan states: "While the SSBN(X) is being procured, the Navy will be limited in its ability to procure other ship classes." 

Potential FY2011 issues for Congress include the following: 

• the accuracy of the Navy's preliminary estimate of the procurement cost of each SSBN(X); 

• the prospective affordability of the SSBN(X) program and its potential impact on other Navy shipbuilding programs; and 

• which shipyard or shipyards will build SSBN(X)s. 

Options for reducing the cost of the SSBN(X) program or its potential impact on other Navy shipbuilding programs include procuring fewer than 12 SSBN(X)s; reducing the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to be carried by each SSBN(X); designing the SSBN(X) to carry a smaller SLBM; stretching out the schedule for procuring SSBN(X)s and making greater use of split funding (i.e., two-year incremental funding) in procuring them; funding the procurement of SSBN(X)s in a part of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget other than the Navy's shipbuilding account; and increasing the Navy's shipbuilding budget. 

This report focuses on the SSBN(X) as a Navy shipbuilding program. CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf, discusses the SSBN(X) as an element of future U.S. strategic nuclear forces in the context of strategic nuclear arms control agreements.

 

Date of Report: April 8 2010
Number of Pages: 29
Order Number: R41129
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Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) at a rate of one per year for the past several years, and a total of 12 boats have been procured through FY2011. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget increases the procurement rate to two boats per year. The eight boats to be procured in the five-year period FY2009-FY2013 (boats 11 through 18) are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement. 

The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests $3,441.5 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of the 13th and 14th Virginia-class boats. The FY2011 budget estimates the combined procurement cost of these two boats at $5,344.4 million, and the boats have received a total of $1,903.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) and Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget also requests $1,436.8 million in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future years, and $254.4 million in Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) purchases of long-lead-time items for Virginia-class boats to be procured under the FY2009-FY2013 MYP arrangement.


Date of Report: April 8 2010
Number of Pages: 24
Order Number: RL32418
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The FY2010 budget that the Navy submitted to Congress last year proposed ending procurement of Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers at three ships and resuming procurement of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers. Congress, as part of its action on the FY2010 defense budget, supported this proposal: the FY2010 budget funded the procurement of one DDG-51 (the first to be procured since FY2005), provided advance procurement funding for two DDG-51s the Navy wants to procure in FY2011, completed the procurement funding for the third DDG-1000 (which was authorized but only partially funded in FY2009), and provided no funding for procuring additional DDG-1000s. 

The Navy's FY2011 budget submission calls for procuring two DDG-51s in FY2011 and six more in FY2012-FY2015. The two DDG-51s that the Navy wants to procure in FY2011 received $577.2 million in FY2010 advance procurement funding. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests another $2,922.2 million in procurement funding for the two ships, so as to complete their estimated combined procurement cost of $3,499.2 million. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget also requests $48.0 million in advance procurement funding for the one DDG-51 that the Navy wants to procure in FY2012, and $186.3 million in procurement funding for DDG-1000 program-completion costs. 

The Navy's FY2011 budget also proposes terminating the Navy's planned CG(X) cruiser program as unaffordable. Rather than starting to procure CG(X)s around FY2017, as the Navy had previously envisaged, the Navy is proposing to build an improved version of the DDG-51, called the Flight III version, starting in FY2016. Navy plans thus call for procuring the current version of the DDG-51, called the Flight IIA version, in FY2010-FY2015, followed by procurement of Flight III DDG-51s starting in FY2016. Navy plans call for procuring 24 Flight III DDG-51s between FY2016 and FY2031. Flight III DDG-51s are to carry a smaller version of the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) that was to be carried by the CG(X). The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests $228.4 million in research and development funding for the AMDR. Detailed design work on the Flight III DDG-51 reportedly is to begin in FY2012 or FY2013. 

FY2011 issues for Congress include the following: 

• whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's proposal to develop the Flight III DDG-51 design and start procuring it in FY2016; 

• the potential impact on the DDG-1000 program of DOD's determination that the program has experienced a critical cost breach under the Nunn-McCurdy provision; 

• whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2011 funding request for procurement of Flight IIA DDG-51s, for DDG-1000 program-completion costs, and for research and development on the AMDR; and 

• whether to use multiyear procurement (MYP) for Flight IIA DDG-51s that the Navy wants to procure in FY2011-FY2015. 

Date of Report: April 8 2010
Number of Pages: 26
Order Number: RL32109
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U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress

Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation

India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," in the context of a broader partnership with India. 

U.S. nuclear cooperation is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, provides waivers of several provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. (2), 128, and 129). It requires that several steps occur before nuclear cooperation can proceed. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a written determination that these requirements had been met. That same day, the President submitted the text of the proposed agreement, which had not yet been signed. The President also submitted a written determination (also required by the AEA) "that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security." In addition, President Bush submitted several documents, including classified and unclassified versions of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, which is required by section 123 of the AEA. The Department of State also submitted a report required by P.L. 109- 401 on various aspects of the agreement. 

On September 27, 2008, the House passed H.R. 7081, which approved the agreement. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved identical legislation, S. 3548, September 23. The Senate passed H.R. 7081 October 1. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369 into law October 8. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement October 10, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. 

U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India. New Delhi had reportedly insisted that India and the United States conclude an agreement on a reprocessing facility in India before New Delhi would sign contracts with U.S. nuclear firms. However, the countries announced March 29 that they had concluded the agreement. The Administration must submit the subsequent arrangement to Congress, but has not yet done so. The proposed arrangement shall not take effect if Congress adopts a joint resolution of disapproval. 

It is worth noting that U.S. firms will likely be very reluctant to engage in nuclear trade with India if the government does not become party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force.


Date of Report: April 8 2010
Number of Pages: 47
Order Number: RL33016
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80 are the first three ships in the Navy's new Gerald R. Ford (CVN- 78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs). 

CVN-78 was procured in FY2008 and is being funded with congressionally authorized four-year incremental funding in FY2008-FY2011. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $11,531.0 million (i.e., about $11.5 billion) in then-year dollars, and requests $1,731.3 million in procurement funding as the final increment to complete this estimated procurement cost. 

CVN-79 is scheduled for procurement in FY2013, and has received advance procurement funding since FY2007. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $10,413.1 million (i.e., about $10.4 billion) in then-year dollars and requests $908.3 million in advance procurement funding for the ship. 

CVN-80 is scheduled for procurement in FY2018, with advance procurement funding scheduled to begin in FY2014. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $13,577.0 million (i.e., about $13.6 billion) in then-year dollars. 

On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced a number of recommendations he was making for the FY2010 defense budget. One of these was to shift procurement of carriers to five-year intervals. This recommendation effectively deferred the scheduled procurement of CVN-79 from FY2012 to FY2013, and the scheduled procurement of CVN-80 from FY2016 to FY2018. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on April 6, 2009, that shifting carrier procurement to five-year intervals would put carrier procurement on "a more fiscally sustainable path." 

Potential oversight issues for Congress for FY2011 for the CVN-78 program include the following: 

• Did shifting carrier procurement to five-year intervals put carrier procurement on a more fiscally sustainable path? 

• Where do the estimated procurement costs of CVNs 78, 79, and 80 stand in relation to the unit procurement cost caps for the CVN-78 program that were established by Section 122 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006)? 

• What is the likelihood that the estimated procurement costs of CVNs 78, 79, and 80 will increase from the estimates shown in the FY2011 budget?


Date of Report: April 8, 2010
Number of Pages: 20
Order Number: RS20643
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Veterans Benefits: Federal Employment Assistance

Christine Scott
Specialist in Social Policy

There are federal employment and training programs and policies specifically targeted to help veterans seeking employment in the civilian economy. Transition assistance programs are operated by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Department of Labor (DOL) to assist service members as they prepare to leave the military. DOL operates grant programs to states to provide outreach and assistance to veterans in finding civilian employment. In addition, the federal government has policies (including veterans preference) that assist veterans in obtaining jobs with the federal government and federal contractors. This report provides a brief overview of these federal programs and policies.


Date of Report: April 9, 2010
Number of Pages: 10
Order Number: RS22666
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DOD Leases of Foreign-Built Ships: Background for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

Prior to the enactment of the FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008), 10 U.S.C. §2401 stated DOD may not lease a vessel or aircraft for a period of more than five years unless it is specifically authorized by law to make such a lease. Operating under this provision, the Department of Defense (DOD) in recent years used lease options and renewals to lease some foreign-built cargo ships for total periods of almost 10 years—a length of time that some observers argue effectively circumvented a legal requirement that U.S. military ships be built in U.S. shipyards. These observers, particularly the American Shipbuilding Association (ASA), proposed reducing the current five-year legal limit on ship leases to two years for foreign-built ships. DOD opposed the idea, arguing that its ship leases are the most cost-effective way to meet its needs for the ships in question. 

Section 1011 of the FY2008 defense authorization act amended 10 U.S.C. §2401 to permit the Secretary of a military department to lease a vessel for a period of greater than two years, but less than five years, only if the Secretary provides a notification of the lease to the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations committees (including a detailed description of its terms, a justification for entering it rather than purchasing the vessel, a determination that entering into it is the most cost-effective option, and a plan for meeting the requirement upon the lease's completion), and a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress has expired. 

The explanatory statement on the final version of the FY2010 DOD appropriations act (H.R. 3326/P.L. 111-118 of December 19, 2009) directed the Navy to update its March 2008 report on the leasing of foreign-built ships and address impacts on American seafarers, sealift capabilities, and naval shipbuilding. .


Date of Report: March 30, 2010
Number of Pages: 10
Order Number: RS22454
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Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Department of Defense (DOD) is placing an increased planning and budgeting emphasis on irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as counterinsurgency operations. In addition, counterterrorism (CT) operations have been a DOD area of emphasis since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of IW and CT activities, and has taken some steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. The Navy's IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW activities, specific Navy IW budget priorities, and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets. 


Date of Report: March 31, 2010
Number of Pages: 14
Order Number: RS22373
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Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. The Navy states that while it "has attempted to be systematic in naming its ships, like all institutions it has been subject to evolutionary change, and the name sources of the Navy's ships have not been immune to this change." There have been exceptions to the Navy's ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers in recent years have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. 

The 10 most recently named aircraft carriers have been named for U.S. presidents (8 ships) and Members of Congress (2 ships). Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. An exception occurred on January 8, 2009, when the Secretary of the Navy announced that SSN-785, the 12th ship in the class, would be named for former Virginia Senator John Warner. Destroyers are named for U.S. naval leaders and heroes. Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) are being named for small and medium-sized cities. San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for U.S. cities. The Navy announced on June 27, 2008, that the first LHA-6 class amphibious assault ship would be named America, a name previously used for an aircraft carrier (CV-66) that served in the Navy from 1965 to 1996. Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class cargo and ammunition ships are being named for noted explorers. Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) are being named for American traits and values. An exception has occurred with JHSV- 4, the Navy's second JHSV (JHSVs 1 and 3 are to be operated by the Army), which the Secretary of the Navy announced on March 25, 2010, was being named Fall River. Fall River is a city in Massachusetts that is the location of Battleship Cove, a maritime museum and war memorial with several deactivated warships, including a post-World War II cruiser named Fall River. 

The Navy historically has only rarely named ships for living persons. At least 11 U.S. military ships since the 1970s have been named for persons who were living at the time the name was announced. 

Members of the public are sometimes interested in having Navy ships named for their own states or cities, for older U.S. Navy ships (particularly those on which they or their relatives served), for battles in which they or their relatives participated, or for people they admire. Citizens with such an interest sometimes contact the Navy, the Department of Defense, or Congress seeking support for their proposals. 

Congress has long maintained an interest in how Navy ships are named, and has influenced the naming of certain Navy ships. The Navy suggests that congressional offices wishing to express support for proposals to name a Navy ship for a specific person, place, or thing contact the office of the Secretary of the Navy to make their support known. Congress may also pass legislation relating to ship names. Measures passed by Congress in recent years regarding Navy ship names have all been sense-of-the-Congress provisions. 

In the 111th Congress, H.Con.Res. 83 would express the sense of the Congress that that a nuclearpowered aircraft carrier, either CVN-79 or CVN-80, should be named the U.S.S. Barry M. Goldwater, and H.Res. 330 would express the sense of the House of Representatives that the Secretary of the Navy should name an appropriate Navy ship in honor of Marine Corps General Clifton B. Cates of Tiptonville, TN. Section 1022 of the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) designates the historic Navy ship USS Constitution as "America's Ship of State."


Date of Report: March 29, 2010
Number of Pages: 14
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The Military Commissions Act of 2009:Overview and Legal Issues

Jennifer K. Elsea
Legislative Attorney

On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order (M.O.) pertaining to the detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens in the war against terrorism. Military commissions pursuant to the M.O. began in November 2004 against four persons declared eligible for trial, but the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld invalidated the military commissions as improper under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). To permit military commissions to go forward, Congress approved the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), conferring authority to promulgate rules that depart from the strictures of the UCMJ and possibly U.S. international obligations. Military commissions' proceedings were reinstated and resulted in three convictions. 

Upon taking office in 2009, President Obama temporarily halted military commissions to review their procedures as well as the detention program at Guantánamo Bay in general, pledging to close the prison facilities there by January 2010, a deadline that passed unmet. The Secretary of Defense was also required to take steps to ensure that all proceedings before military commissions and the United States Court of Military Commission Review were halted, although some pretrial proceedings continued to take place. One case was moved to a federal district court. 

In May, 2009, the Obama Administration announced that it was considering restarting the military commission system with some changes to the procedural rules. Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA 2009) as part of the Department of Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2010, P.L. 111-84, to provide some reforms the Administration supported and to make other amendments to the Military Commissions Act, as described in this report. The plan to transfer five "high value detainees" to New York for trial in federal court, announced in November, 2009, has been placed on hold due to resistance from Congress and some New York officials. (See H.R. 4738, S. 2977, H.R. 4588, H.R. 4556, H.R. 4463, and H.R. 4127) 

This report provides a background and analysis comparing military commissions as envisioned under the revised MCA to those established by the MCA 2006. After reviewing the history of the implementation of military commissions in the "global war on terrorism," the report provides an overview of the procedural safeguards provided in the MCA. Finally, the report provides two tables comparing the MCA as amended by the MCA 2009 to the original MCA enacted in 2006 and to general courts-martial. The first table describes the composition and powers of the military tribunals, as well as their jurisdiction. The second table, which compares procedural safeguards in courts-martial to the MCA as enacted and as amended, follows the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts as well as CRS Report R40932, Comparison of Rights in Military Commission Trials and Trials in Federal Criminal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea, to facilitate comparison with safeguards provided in federal court and international criminal tribunals. For pending legislation about military commissions, see CRS Report R40754, Guantanamo Detention Center: Legislative Activity in the 111th Congress, by Anna C. Henning. .


Date of Report: April 6, 2010
Number of Pages: 56
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Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background and Issues for Congress

Jeremiah Gertler
Specialist in Military Aviation

The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests about $1.8 billion for the procurement of 22 F/A- 18E/F Super Hornet strike fighters and about $1.0 billion for the procurement of 12 EA-18G Growler electric attack aircraft. The FY2011 Navy budget does not request a new multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement for procuring F/A-18E/Fs and EA-18Gs in FY2011-FY2015. Some Members of Congress are interested in the option of procuring additional F/A-18E/Fs in FY2011 to make a start toward mitigating a projected Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall. Some Members are also interested in approving a new MYP arrangement for procuring Super Hornets and Growlers in FY2011-FY2015, to further mitigate the shortfall and reduce the collective procurement cost of the aircraft. 

FY2010 defense authorization bill: The conference report on the FY2010 defense authorization bill authorizes increasing by $512.3 million the Administration's FY2010 procurement funding request for the F/A-18E/F program, so as to support the procurement in FY2010 of 18 F/A- 18E/Fs—9 more than the Administration requested—and recommends increasing by $108 million the Administration's FY2010 advance procurement funding request for procuring F/A-18E/Fs in future fiscal years, with the additional $108.0 million to be used for economic order quantity purchases for a new MYP arrangement. Section 128 of the bill provides conditional authority for entering into an MYP arrangement for procuring F/A-18E/Fs and EA-18Gs. Section 131 requires a report on the procurement of "4.5 generation" fighters, including F/A-18s that are equipped with certain features. 

FY2010 DOD appropriations bill: In lieu of a conference report, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009, released an explanatory statement on a final version of H.R. 3326. This version was passed by the House on December 16, 2009, and by the Senate on December 19, 2009, and signed into law on December 19, 2009, as P.L. 111-118. 

The explanatory statement includes $1,504.5 million in Navy procurement for 18 F/A-18E/Fs in 2010, an increase of nine aircraft and $495 million over the Administration's request. Advance procurement meets the Administration's request of $51.4 million. 

EF-18G procurement and advance procurement are set at the Administration's requested levels: $1,611.8 million for 22 Growlers in FY2010, and $20.6 million in Growler advance procurement. 

The explanatory statement also adds $4 million to Navy research and development funding for F/A-18 countermeasures improvement, and a $9 million decrease to the same account to account for a delay in an infrared search and track system contract. 

Title VIII, section 8011 of H.R. 3326 authorizes the use of funds for multiyear procurement of F- 18 variants. .




Date of Report: April 5 2010
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Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background and Issues for Congress

Jeremiah Gertler
Specialist in Military Aviation

The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests about $1.8 billion for the procurement of 22 F/A- 18E/F Super Hornet strike fighters and about $1.0 billion for the procurement of 12 EA-18G Growler electric attack aircraft. The FY2011 Navy budget does not request a new multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement for procuring F/A-18E/Fs and EA-18Gs in FY2011-FY2015. Some Members of Congress are interested in the option of procuring additional F/A-18E/Fs in FY2011 to make a start toward mitigating a projected Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall. Some Members are also interested in approving a new MYP arrangement for procuring Super Hornets and Growlers in FY2011-FY2015, to further mitigate the shortfall and reduce the collective procurement cost of the aircraft. 

FY2010 defense authorization bill: The conference report on the FY2010 defense authorization bill authorizes increasing by $512.3 million the Administration's FY2010 procurement funding request for the F/A-18E/F program, so as to support the procurement in FY2010 of 18 F/A- 18E/Fs—9 more than the Administration requested—and recommends increasing by $108 million the Administration's FY2010 advance procurement funding request for procuring F/A-18E/Fs in future fiscal years, with the additional $108.0 million to be used for economic order quantity purchases for a new MYP arrangement. Section 128 of the bill provides conditional authority for entering into an MYP arrangement for procuring F/A-18E/Fs and EA-18Gs. Section 131 requires a report on the procurement of "4.5 generation" fighters, including F/A-18s that are equipped with certain features. 

FY2010 DOD appropriations bill: In lieu of a conference report, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009, released an explanatory statement on a final version of H.R. 3326. This version was passed by the House on December 16, 2009, and by the Senate on December 19, 2009, and signed into law on December 19, 2009, as P.L. 111-118. 

The explanatory statement includes $1,504.5 million in Navy procurement for 18 F/A-18E/Fs in 2010, an increase of nine aircraft and $495 million over the Administration's request. Advance procurement meets the Administration's request of $51.4 million. 

EF-18G procurement and advance procurement are set at the Administration's requested levels: $1,611.8 million for 22 Growlers in FY2010, and $20.6 million in Growler advance procurement. 

The explanatory statement also adds $4 million to Navy research and development funding for F/A-18 countermeasures improvement, and a $9 million decrease to the same account to account for a delay in an infrared search and track system contract. 

Title VIII, section 8011 of H.R. 3326 authorizes the use of funds for multiyear procurement of F-18 variants.


Date of Report: April 5 2010
Number of Pages: 37
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Jeremiah Gertler
Specialist in Military Aviation

The largest procurement program in the Department of Defense (DOD), the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), also called the Lightning II, is a new aircraft being procured in different versions for the United States Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. Current DOD plans call for acquiring a total of 2,456 JSFs. Hundreds of additional F-35s are expected to be purchased by several U.S. allies, eight of which are cost-sharing partners in the program. 

The F-35 promises significant advances in military capability. Like many high-technology programs before it, reaching that capability has put the program above its original budget and behind the planned schedule. 

The administration's proposed FY2011 defense budget requested about $6.8 billion in procurement funding for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. This would fund the procurement of 23 F-35As for the Air Force, 13 F-35Bs for the Marine Corps, and seven F-35Cs for the Navy. 

The administration's proposed FY2011 defense budget also proposed terminating the F-35 alternate engine program, which is intended to develop the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 engine as an alternative to the Pratt and Whitney F135 engine that currently powers the F-35. The F-35 alternate engine program has emerged as a major item of debate on the FY2011 defense budget. 

FY2010 defense authorization act: The conference report on the FY2010 defense authorization act authorizes funding for procuring a total of 30 F-35s in FY2010, as requested. The report authorizes $430 million in Air Force and Navy research and development funding for continued development of the F136 alternate engine, and $130 million in Air Force advance procurement funding to begin F136 procurement. Section 131 of the act requires a report on the procurement of "4.5"-generation fighters that is to include, among other things, "a discussion regarding the availability and feasibility of procuring F-35 aircraft to proportionally and concurrently recapitalize the Air National Guard during fiscal years 2015 through fiscal year 2025." Section 217 requires future DOD budgets to provide separate line items for the F-35B and F-35C within the Navy aircraft procurement account and the Navy research and development account. Section 244 requires, for the period 2010-2015, an annual Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

report on the status of the F-35 program. FY2010 DOD appropriations bill: The explanatory statement on the final version of H.R. 3326 includes $6,840.5 million for 30 F-35s in 2010. Additionally, the statement contains $430 million in Navy and Air Force research and development funding for continued development of the F136 alternate engine, and $35 million in Air Force procurement funding designated for the alternate engine program.


Date of Report: April 2, 2010
Number of Pages: 45
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North Korea’s 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications

Jonathan Medalia
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced that it had conducted its second underground nuclear test. Unlike its first test, in 2006, there is no public record that the second one released radioactive materials indicative of a nuclear explosion. How could North Korea have contained these

As background, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would ban all nuclear explosions. It was opened for signature in 1996. Entry into force requires ratification by 44 states specified in the treaty, including the United States and North Korea. As of April 2010, 151 states, including 35 of the 44, had ratified. North Korea has not signed the CTBT. President Clinton signed it in 1996; in 1999, the Senate voted not to consent to its ratification. In 2009, President Obama pledged to press for its ratification.

The treaty establishes a verification mechanism, including an International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect nuclear tests. Three IMS technologies detect waves that pass through the oceans (hydroacoustic), Earth (seismic), or atmosphere (infrasound); a fourth detects radioactive material from a nuclear test. Scientists concur that only the latter proves that an explosion was nuclear. Some believe that deep burial and other means can contain radioactive effluents. Another view is that containment is an art as much as a science. The United States learned to improve containment over several decades. Yet by one estimate, North Korea contained over 99.9% of the radioactive effluents from its 2009 test. It might have done so by application of lessons learned from its 2006 test or the U.S. nuclear test experience, use of a higher-yield device, release of material below the detection threshold, good luck, or some combination. Alternatively, the 2009 event may have been a nonnuclear explosion designed to simulate a nuclear test.

Containment could be of value to North Korea. It could keep radioactive fallout from China, Japan, Russia, or South Korea, averting an irritant in relations with them. It could prevent intelligence services from gathering material that could reveal information about the weapon that was tested. It could permit North Korea to host nuclear tests by other nations, such as Iran; while such tests would be detected by seismic means, they could not be attributed to another nation using technical forensic means if effluents, especially particles, were contained.

An issue for Congress is how containment could affect CTBT prospects. Supporters might argue that explosion-like seismic signals without detected radioactive material would lead to calls for an onsite inspection. Opponents might claim that only detection of radioactive material proves that a nuclear explosion occurred. Both would note that inspections could not be required unless the treaty entered into force, supporters to point to a benefit of the treaty and opponents to note that North Korea could block inspections by not ratifying the treaty. Congress may also wish to consider options to improve monitoring capability, such as supporting further research on test signatures, improving the capability of monitoring systems, and deploying more monitoring equipment. This report may be updated, especially if North Korea conducts another test.

Related CRS reports include CRS Report RL34256, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, which summarizes open-source information on that nation's nuclear weapons program, including fissile material and warhead estimates, and assesses developments toward denuclearization; and CRS Report R40684, North Korea's Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, which analyzes possible economic effects on North Korea of sanctions and vessel inspections that Resolution 1874 puts in place.

 
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Date of Report: April 2, 2010
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Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees: Major Court Rulings

Jennifer K. Elsea
Legislative Attorney

Michael John Garcia
Legislative Attorney

As part of the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the United States has captured and detained numerous persons believed to have been part of or associated with enemy forces. Over the years, federal courts have considered a multitude of petitions by or on behalf of suspected belligerents challenging aspects of U.S. detention policy. Although the Supreme Court has issued definitive rulings concerning several legal issues raised in the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, many others remain unresolved, with some the subject of ongoing litigation.

This report discusses major judicial opinions concerning suspected enemy belligerents detained in the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The report addresses all Supreme Court decisions concerning enemy combatants. It also discusses notable circuit court opinions addressing issues of ongoing relevance to U.S. detention policy. The report also addresses a few notable decisions by federal district courts that are the subject of ongoing habeas litigation. Finally, it describes a few federal court rulings in criminal cases involving persons who were either involved in the 9/11 attacks or were captured abroad by U.S. forces during operations against Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated entities.

Many of the rulings discussed in this report are discussed in greater detail in other CRS products, including CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia; CRS Report RL34536, 
Boumediene v. Bush: Guantanamo Detainees' Right to Habeas Corpus, by Michael John Garcia; and CRS Report RS21884, The Supreme Court 2003 Term: Summary and Analysis of Opinions Related to Detainees in the War on Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea.

 
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Date of Report: April 1, 2010
Number of Pages: 21
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Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy's five Atlantic Fleet nuclear powered aircraft carriers (CVNs) are all homeported at Norfolk, VA. The Department of Defense's (DOD's) final report on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released on February 1, 2010, endorses the Navy's desire to establish a second Atlantic Fleet CVN home port by homeporting a CVN at Mayport, FL. The report states: "To mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster, the U.S. Navy will homeport an East Coast carrier in Mayport, Florida."

Transferring a CVN from Norfolk to Mayport would shift from Norfolk to Mayport the local economic activity associated with homeporting a CVN, which some sources estimate as being worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year.

DOD's proposal to homeport a CVN at Mayport has become an issue of strong interest to certain Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia. Certain Members of Congress from Florida have expressed support for DOD's proposal to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing (as do DOD and the Navy) that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy's Atlantic Fleet CVNs are worth the costs associated with moving a CVN to Mayport. Certain Members of Congress from Virginia have expressed skepticism regarding, or opposition to, the proposal, arguing that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy's Atlantic Fleet CVNs are questionable or uncertain, and that the funding needed to implement the proposal could achieve greater benefits if it were spent on other Navy priorities.

The Navy estimates the nonrecurring cost of transferring a CVN to Mayport at $589.7 million, including $490.7 in Military Construction (MilCon) funding for construction work at Mayport to make Mayport capable of homeporting a CVN, and $99 million in other one-time costs. The $490.7 million in MilCon funding includes $46.3 million in dredging costs that the Navy requested in its FY2010 budget. Congress, as part of its action on the FY2010 defense budget, approved the request for $46.3 million for dredging. The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) states:

The conference agreement includes authorization for $46.3 million for channel and turning basin dredging at Naval Station (NS) Mayport, Florida. The Navy requested this project in order to allow a nuclear aircraft carrier to enter Naval Station Mayport on a temporary basis with an embarked air wing, full stores, and under any tidal conditions. The conferees authorize funding for this project based on the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations' assurances that the dredging is needed for current operational considerations to permit the use of Mayport as a transient dock and is ''required irrespective of the final decision on aircraft carrier homeporting at Mayport.''

The conferees emphasize that the inclusion of an authorization for dredging at NS Mayport is not an indication of conferee support for the establishment of an additional homeport for nuclear aircraft carriers on the east coast, or intended to influence the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review, which may include a recommendation on the establishment of a second east coast homeport for nuclear aircraft carriers. Furthermore, the conferees note that this funding is provided solely to permit use of Mayport as a transient port, and that any potential designation of Mayport as a nuclear carrier homeport will require future authorizations from the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (Page 870) 

The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests about $2 million in MilCon planning and design funding for the project to establish a CVN homeport at Mayport.

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Date of Report: April 1, 2010
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