Coast Guard Deepwater Acquisition Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The term Deepwater refers to a collection of more than a dozen Coast Guard acquisition programs for replacing and modernizing the service's aging fleet of deepwater-capable ships and aircraft. Until April 2007, the Coast Guard pursued these programs as a single, integrated acquisition program that was known as the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) program or Deepwater program for short. The now-separated Deepwater acquisition programs include plans for, among other things, 91 new cutters, 124 new small boats, and 247 new or modernized airplanes, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The year 2007 was a watershed year for Deepwater acquisition. The management and execution of what was then the single, integrated Deepwater program was strongly criticized by various observers. House and Senate committees held several oversight hearings on the program. Bills were introduced to restructure or reform the program in various ways. Coast Guard and industry officials acknowledged certain problems in the program's management and execution and defended the program's management and execution in other respects. The Coast Guard announced a number of reform actions that significantly altered the service's approach to Deepwater acquisition (and to Coast Guard acquisition in general). Among these was the change from a single, integrated Deepwater acquisition program to a collection of separate Deepwater acquisition programs.

The Coast Guard's management of Deepwater acquisition programs, including implementation of recommendations made by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), is a topic of continuing congressional oversight. Additional oversight issues include cost growth in Deepwater acquisition programs and the execution of individual Deepwater acquisition efforts, particularly those for surface ships.

The Coast Guard's proposed FY2011 budget requests $1,112.5 million in acquisition funding for Deepwater programs, including $101.0 million for aircraft, $856.0 million for surface ships and boats, and $155.5 million for other items.


Date of Report: July 21, 2010
Number of Pages: 49
Order Number: RL33753
Price: $29.95



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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress

Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs

This CRS report discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration re-engaged with the top PRC leadership, including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP- 3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and aggressive naval confrontations (including in 2009).

In 2001, President Bush continued the policy of engagement with China, but the Pentagon skeptically reviewed and cautiously resumed mil-to-mil contacts. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in 2002, resumed the Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) with the PLA (first held in 1997) and, in 2003, hosted General Cao Gangchuan, a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Defense Minister. General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited China in January 2004, as the highest ranking U.S. military officer to do so since November 2000. Rumsfeld visited China in 2005, the first visit by a defense secretary since William Cohen's visit in 2000. In 2006, a CMC Vice Chairman, General Guo Boxiong, made the first visit to the United States by the highest ranking PLA commander after 1998.

Issues for the 111th Congress include whether the Obama Administration has complied with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursued contacts with the PLA that advances a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially the safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65). Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts have significant value for achieving U.S. objectives and whether the contacts have contributed to the PLA's warfighting capabilities that might harm U.S. security interests. Some have argued about whether the value that U.S. officials have placed on the contacts overly extends leverage to the PLA. Officials believe talks can serve U.S. interests that include conflict prevention and crisis management; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; strategic nuclear/space talks; counterterrorism; and accounting for POW/MIAs.

Policymakers could review the approach to mil-to-mil contacts. U.S. defense officials have reported inadequate cooperation from the PLA, including denials of port visits at Hong Kong and aid to U.S. Navy ships in distress (Thanksgiving 2007). The PLA has tried to use its suspensions of exchanges while blaming U.S. "obstacles" (including arms sales to Taiwan, legal restrictions on contacts with the PLA, and the Pentagon's reports to Congress on the PLA). The PRC's harassment of U.S. surveillance ships (in 2009) and increasing assertiveness in maritime areas have shown the limits to the results of mil-to-mil talks and PLA restraint. Still, at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2009, President Obama called for military contacts to diminish disputes with China. The NDAA for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) amended the requirement in P.L. 106- 65 for the report on PRC military power to expand the focus to security developments involving the PRC, add cooperative elements, and fold in another requirement to report on mil-to-mil contacts, including a new strategy for such contacts (but the report is late in 2010).


Date of Report: July 22, 2010
Number of Pages: 64
Order Number: RL32496
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Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy's ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers in recent years have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships.

The 10 most recently named aircraft carriers have been named for U.S. presidents (8 ships) and Members of Congress (2 ships). Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. An exception occurred on January 8, 2009, when the Secretary of the Navy announced that SSN-785, the 12th ship in the class, would be named for former Senator John Warner. Destroyers are named for U.S. naval leaders and heroes. Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) are being named for small and medium-sized cities. San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for U.S. cities. An exception occurred on April 23, 2010, when the Secretary of the Navy announced that LPD-26, the 10th ship in the class, would be named for the late Representative John P. Murtha. The Navy announced on June 27, 2008, that the first LHA-6 class amphibious assault ship would be named America, a name previously used for an aircraft carrier (CV-66) that served in the Navy from 1965 to 1996. Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class cargo and ammunition ships are being named for noted explorers and pioneers of various kinds. Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) are being named for American traits and values. An exception has occurred with JHSV- 4, the Navy's second JHSV (JHSVs 1 and 3 are to be operated by the Army), which the Secretary of the Navy announced on March 25, 2010, was being named for the city of Fall River, MA.

The Navy historically has only rarely named ships for living persons. At least 11 U.S. military ships since the 1970s have been named for persons who were living at the time the name was announced. Members of the public are sometimes interested in having Navy ships named for their own states or cities, for older U.S. Navy ships (particularly those on which they or their relatives served), for battles in which they or their relatives participated, or for people they admire. Citizens with such an interest sometimes contact the Navy, the Department of Defense, or Congress seeking support for their proposals.

Congress has long maintained an interest in how Navy ships are named, and has influenced the naming of certain Navy ships. The Navy suggests that congressional offices wishing to express support for proposals to name a Navy ship for a specific person, place, or thing contact the office of the Secretary of the Navy to make their support known. Congress may also pass legislation relating to ship names. Measures passed by Congress in recent years regarding Navy ship names have all been sense-of-the-Congress provisions. In the 111th Congress, H.Con.Res. 83 would express the sense of the Congress that that a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, either CVN-79 or CVN-80, should be named for former Senator Barry M. Goldwater; H.Res. 330 would express the sense of the House that the Secretary of the Navy should name an appropriate Navy ship in honor of Marine Corps General Clifton B. Cates; and H.Res. 1505 would express the sense of the House that the Secretary of the Navy should name the next appropriate naval ship in honor of World War II Medal of Honor recipient John William Finn. H.Res. 1022, introduced on January 20, 2010, and passed by the House on February 4, 2010, congratulates the Navy for honoring Medgar Evers by naming a naval ship for him. Section 1022 of the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) designates the historic Navy ship USS Constitution as "America's Ship of State."


Date of Report: July 21, 2010
Number of Pages: 19
Order Number: RS22478
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U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

Mary Beth Nikitin
Analyst in Nonproliferation

The United States and Russia signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on May 6, 2008. President Bush submitted the agreement to Congress on May 13. The agreement was withdrawn from congressional consideration by President George W. Bush on September 8, 2008, in response to Russia's military actions in Georgia. President Obama transmitted the proposed text of the agreement to Congress on May 10, 2010, along with the required Nuclear Proliferation Assessment (NPAS) and his determination that the agreement promotes U.S. national security. Congress has 30 days of continuous session for consultations with the administration, followed by an additional 60 days of continuous session to review the agreement. If not opposed by a joint resolution of disapproval or other legislation, then the agreement will be considered approved at the end of this time period.

This report discusses key policy issues related to the agreement, including future nuclear energy cooperation with Russia, U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, nonproliferation cooperation, and Russian policies toward Iran. These issues were also relevant to the debate when the agreement was being considered in the 110th Congress.


Date of Report: July 9, 2010
Number of Pages: 15
Order Number: RS34655
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Air Force KC-X Tanker Aircraft Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Jeremiah Gertler
Specialist in Military Aviation

On February 24, 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) released its Request for Proposals for a program to build 179 new KC-X aerial refueling tankers for the Air Force, a contract valued at roughly $35 billion.

Bidding closed on July 9, 2010, with three offerors submitting bids. The European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) offered a KC-X design based on the Airbus A330 airliner, to be built in Mobile, AL. Boeing offered a KC-X design based on its 767 airliner, to be built in Seattle, WA, and Wichita, KS. A team of the Ukranian airframe maker Antonov and U.S. Aerospace offered a variant of the An-124 freighter, with production location uncertain.

The KC-X acquisition program is a subject of intense interest because of the dollar value of the contract, the number of jobs it would create, the importance of tanker aircraft to U.S. military operations, and because DOD's attempts to acquire a new tanker over the past several years have ultimately failed. DOD's proposed new KC-X acquisition competition strategy poses several potential oversight issues for Congress, including the following: Has DOD adequately defined the required capabilities for the KC-X and established a fair and adequate framework for scoring and evaluating bids against those required capabilities? Should a June 30, 2010, World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling on commercial aircraft subsidies be taken into account in evaluating the KC-X bids? Should Boeing's pricing data for the 2007-2008 KC-X competition be shared with EADS in a manner equivalent to how Northrop/EADS's pricing data for the 2007-2008 competition was shared with Boeing? Should the Air Force be in charge of the new KC-X competition? 

FY2010 defense authorization bill: The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) authorizes the Administration's request for $439.6 million in Air Force research and development funding for the KC-X program. Section 1081 of the act amends Section 1081(a) of the FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008) to require the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of using commercial fee-for-service air refueling tanker aircraft for Air Force operations, unless the Secretary of Defense submits a notification that pursuing such a program is not in the national interest. Section 1082 provides the Secretary of the Air Force authority to use multiyear contracts to conduct the pilot program described in Section 1081 of the FY2008 defense authorization act. 

FY2010 DOD appropriations bill: In lieu of a conference report, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009, released an explanatory statement on a final version of H.R. 3326. This version was passed by the House on December 16, 2009, and by the Senate on December 19, 2009, and signed into law on December 19, 2009, as P.L. 111-118.

The bill establishes a Tanker Replacement Transfer Fund in the amount of $291.7 million. In lieu of a conference report on H.R. 3326, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009, released an explanatory statement on an intended final version of H.R. 3326. The explanatory statement provides $15 million for management of the tanker program. .


Date of Report: June 15, 2010
Number of Pages: 36
Order Number: RL34398
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Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

Coast Guard polar icebreakers perform a variety of missions supporting U.S. interests in polar regions. The Coast Guard's two heavy polar icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea—have exceeded their intended 30-year service lives. The Polar Star is not operational and has been in caretaker status since July 1, 2006. Congress in FY2009 and FY2010 provided funding to repair Polar Star and return it to service for 7 to 10 years; the Coast Guard expects the reactivation project to be completed in 2013. On June 25, 2010, the Coast Guard announced that Polar Sea had suffered an unexpected engine casualty and consequently will likely be unavailable for operation until at least January 2011. The United States, which has various interests in the polar regions, currently has no operational heavy polar icebreakers.

The Coast Guard's third polar icebreaker—Healy—entered service in 2000. Compared to Polar Star and Polar Sea, Healy has less icebreaking capability (it is considered a medium polar icebreaker), but more capability for supporting scientific research. The ship is used primarily for supporting scientific research in the Arctic.

A 2007 report from the National Research Council (NRC) on the U.S. polar icebreaking fleet states that "U.S. [polar] icebreaking capability is now at risk of being unable to support national interests in the north and the south." On July 16, 2008, Admiral Thad Allen, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, testified that "today, our nation is at a crossroads with Coast Guard domestic and international icebreaking capabilities. We have important decisions to make. And I believe we must address our icebreaking needs now." On May 3, 2010, he stated, "We need to have a serious discussion about icebreakers. It has not concluded. It's not even started, and you can see me be a little more vocal on that on the 26th of May [2010] because my change of command [i.e., the end of his term in office as Commandant of the Coast Guard] is the 25th of May."

The Coast Guard since 2008 has been studying how many polar icebreakers, with what capabilities, should be procured as replacements for Polar Star and Polar Sea. Following a decision to design and build one or more new polar icebreakers, the first replacement polar icebreaker might enter service in 8 to 10 years, by which time Polar Star and Polar Sea could be more than 40 years old. The Coast Guard estimated in February 2008 that new replacement ships might cost $800 million to $925 million each in 2008 dollars, and that the alternative of extending the service lives of Polar Sea and Polar Star for 25 years might cost about $400 million per ship.

Potential policy issues for Congress regarding Coast Guard polar icebreaker modernization include the potential impact on U.S. polar missions of the United States currently having no operational heavy polar icebreakers; the numbers and capabilities of polar icebreakers the Coast Guard will need in the future; whether to provide these icebreakers through construction of new ships or service life extensions of Polar Star and/or Polar Sea; whether to accelerate the Coast Guard's current schedule for acquiring replacement ships; whether new ships should be nuclear powered; whether new ships should be funded entirely in the Coast Guard budget, or partly or entirely in some other part of the federal budget, such as the Department of Defense (DOD) budget, the National Science Foundation (NSF) budget, or both; and whether, as an interim measure, the Polar Star should be repaired and placed back into service.

The Coast Guard's proposed FY2011 budget does not request any funding in the service's Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) account for polar icebreaker sustainment or for acquisition of new polar icebreakers.


Date of Report: June 12, 2010
Number of Pages: 63
Order Number: RL34391
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Terrorist Material Support: A Sketch of 18U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B

Charles Doyle
Senior Specialist in American Public Law

The material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B, have been among the most frequently prosecuted federal anti-terrorism statutes. Section 2339A outlaws:

(1)(a) attempting to, (b) conspiring to, or (c) actually

(2)(a) providing material support or resources, or
(b) concealing or disguising
(i) the nature,
(ii) location,
(iii) source, or
(iv) ownership of material support or resources

(3) knowing or intending that they be used
(a) in preparation for,
(b) in carrying out,
(c) in preparation for concealment of an escape from, or
(d) in carrying out the concealment of an escape from

(4) an offense identified as a federal crime of terrorism. Section 2339B outlaws:
(1)(a) attempting to provide,
(b) conspiring to provide, or
(c) actually providing
(2) material support or resources
(3) to a foreign terrorist organization
(4) knowing that the organization
(a) has been designated a foreign terrorist organization, or
(b) engages, or has engaged, in "terrorism" or "terrorist activity."

The sections use a common definition for the term "material support or resources:" any service or tangible or intangible property. The Supreme Court recently held that the forms of material support in the challenge before it were not unconstitutionally vague nor was their proscription inconsistent with the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of association requirements. Violations of either section are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years. Although neither section creates a civil cause of action for victims, treble damages and attorneys fees may be available for some victims under 18 U.S.C. 2333. Section 2339B has two extraterritorial jurisdiction provisions. One is general (there is extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offense under this section) and the other descriptive (there is extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offender under this section if the offender is a U.S. national, etc.). Section 2339A has no such provisions, but is likely applicable at a minimum when an offender or victim is a U.S. national; the offense has an impact in the United States; the offense is committed against U.S. national interests; or the offense is universally condemned. This an abridged version of CRS Report R41333, Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339Bhttp://pennyhill.com/index.php?lastcat=14&catname=Criminal+Justice&viewdoc=R41333, without the footnotes, citations to authority, and appendices found in the longer report.


Date of Report: June 19, 2010
Number of Pages: 11
Order Number: R41334
Price: $29.95

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Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B

Charles Doyle
Senior Specialist in American Public Law

The material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B, have been among the most frequently prosecuted federal anti-terrorism statutes. Section 2339A outlaws:

(1)(a) attempting to,
(b) conspiring to, or
(c) actually

(2)(a) providing material support or resources, or
(b) concealing or disguising
(i) the nature,
(ii) location,
(iii) source, or
(iv) ownership
of material support or resources

(3) knowing or intending that they be used
(a) in preparation for,
(b) in carrying out,
(c) in preparation for concealment of an escape from, or
(d) in carrying out the concealment of an escape from

(4) an offense identified as a federal crime of terrorism.
Section 2339B outlaws:
(1)(a) attempting to provide,
(b) conspiring to provide, or
(c) actually providing

(2) material support or resources

(3) to a foreign terrorist organization

(4) knowing that the organization
(a) has been designated a foreign terrorist organization, or
(b) engages, or has engaged, in "terrorism" or "terrorist activity."

The sections use a common definition for the term "material support or resources:" any service or tangible or intangible property. The Supreme Court recently held that the forms of material support in the challenge before it were not unconstitutionally vague nor was their proscription inconsistent with the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of association requirements. Violations of either section are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years. Although neither section creates a civil cause of action for victims, treble damages and attorneys fees may be available for some victims under 18 U.S.C. 2333. Section 2339B has two extraterritorial jurisdiction provisions. One is general (there is extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offense under this section) and the other descriptive (there is extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offender under this section if the offender is a U.S. national, etc.). Section 2339A has no such provisions, but is likely applicable at a minimum when an offender or victim is a U.S. national; the offense has an impact in the United States; the offense is committed against U.S. national interests; or the offense is universally condemned. This report is available in an abridged version as CRS Report R41334, Terrorist Material Support: A Sketch of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B.


Date of Report: June 19, 2010
Number of Pages: 33
Order Number: R41333
Price: $29.95

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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years.

The Navy's FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006. Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. The Navy's report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force structure assessment (FSA). Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the 313-ship plan might be issued.

The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for the procurement of nine new battle force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The nine ships include two attack submarines, two destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one amphibious assault ship, one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV).

The Navy's five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 50 new battle force ships, or an average of 10 per year. Of the 50 ships in the plan, half are relatively inexpensive LCSs or JHSVs.

The Navy's FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships. The plan does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run. The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284 ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below 313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.

The Navy estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. A May 2010 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimates that the plan would require an average of $19.0 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars, or about 19% more than the Navy estimates. The CBO report states: "If the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it has over the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will not be able to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan." .


Date of Report: June 16, 2010
Number of Pages: 31
Order Number: RL32665
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress

Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces

Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations, and the Administration has given U.S. SOF greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide counterterrorism operations. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directs increases in SOF force structure, particularly in terms of increasing enabling units and rotary and fixed-wing SOF aviation assets and units. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Commander, Admiral Eric T. Olson, in commenting on the current state of the forces under his command, noted that SOF forces are deployed to more than 75 countries and 86% of these forces are in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. Admiral Olson also noted ongoing growth in SOF units and aviation assets and the effectiveness of Section 1208 authority, which provides funds for SOF to train and equip regular and irregular indigenous forces to conduct counterterrorism operations. USSOCOM's FY2011 budget request for $9.8 billion has been recommended by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees for full funding, and both committees have also recommended additional funding for unfunded requirements.

Afghan-related issues include the impact of new command relationships as well as rules of engagement, which have limited SOF nighttime raids targeting insurgent leadership. These SOF raids have been characterized as being highly successful, even though on some occasions they have resulted in civilian casualties. U.S. SOF have been given the mission of training Afghan Civil Order Police. A more controversial mission involves up to 23 Special Forces Operational Detachments – Alphas (ODAs) training local militias in remote areas of Afghanistan to fill a security void. Potential issues for congressional consideration include how command relationships and rules of engagement are affecting special operations in Afghanistan and whether training police and militias is the best use of U.S. SOF.


Date of Report: July 16, 2010
Number of Pages: 14
Order Number: RS21048
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Conversion from the National Security Personnel System to Other Pay Schedules: Issues for Congress

Wendy R. Ginsberg
Analyst in Government Organization and Management

Most federal employees (59.1%) are paid on the General Schedule (GS), a pay scale that consists of 15 pay grades in which an employee's pay increases are to be based on performance and length of service. Some Members of Congress, citizens, and public administration scholars have argued that federal employee pay advancement should be more closely linked to job performance than it currently is on the GS. With these concerns in mind and with explicit congressional authorization, the Department of Defense (DOD) began developing the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) in 2003 as a unique pay scale attempting to more closely link employee pay to job performance.

NSPS was beset by criticisms since it went into effect in 2006. The system faced legal and political challenges from unions and employees who claimed it was inconsistently applied and caused undeserved pay inequities, among other concerns. On October 7, 2009, House and Senate conferees reported a version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 that included language to terminate NSPS. On October 8, 2009, the House agreed to the conference report. The Senate agreed to the conference report on October 22, 2009. On October 28, 2009, the President signed the bill into law (P.L. 111-84). DOD must now return employees currently enrolled in NSPS to the GS or to the pay system that previously applied to them or their position. If the employee's position did not exist prior to NSPS or if the previous pay scale was abolished during NSPS's lifetime, DOD must determine an appropriate pay scale for the employee. The return to the GS or other pay system must be completed by January 1, 2012, pursuant to the law.

NSPS was initially intended to cover all DOD employees, but had a total final enrollment of roughly 227,000 DOD employees or 31.7% of the department's 717,000-person workforce. DOD has announced that it anticipates that approximately 75% of employees in NSPS will be placed in the GS by September 30, 2010. The remaining 25% of employees—most of whom would be placed in pay scales other than the GS—may take longer to transition out of NSPS.

P.L. 111-84 included language preventing any employee from suffering a loss or decrease in pay as a result of the elimination of NSPS. Pursuant to statute, some transitioning employees have been placed on "retained pay," which allows them to maintain their NSPS rate of pay instead of transitioning to the GS pay rate assigned to their job's grade. In such cases, the GS rate of pay assigned to the employee's position may not reach the pay level the employee achieved under NSPS. Retained pay, pursuant to statute, requires that an employee receive half of the annual pay adjustment given to employees who are at the maximum payable rate for their GS grade (step 10). Some NSPS employees may argue that the cap on their annual pay increase amounts to a loss in pay, and, therefore, violates P.L. 111-84.

This report focuses on the transition of employees from NSPS to non-NSPS pay systems. It does not address the operation of NSPS or other pay schedules. The report discusses how the transition is scheduled to occur and analyzes congressional options for oversight or legislative action.


Date of Report: July 15, 2010
Number of Pages: 12
Order Number: R41321
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Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) at a rate of one per year for the past several years, and a total of 12 boats have been procured through FY2011. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget increases the procurement rate to two boats per year. The eight boats to be procured in the five-year period FY2009-FY2013 (boats 11 through 18) are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement.

The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests $3,441.5 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of the 13th and 14th Virginia-class boats. The FY2011 budget estimates the combined procurement cost of these two boats at $5,344.4 million, and the boats have received a total of $1,903.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) and Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget also requests $1,436.8 million in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future years, and $254.4 million in Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) purchases of long-leadtime items for Virginia-class boats to be procured under the FY2009-FY2013 MYP arrangement.


Date of Report: July 8, 2010
Number of Pages: 26
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Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy's FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring an 11th and final San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship in FY2012. The Navy estimates the procurement cost of this ship at $2,040.6 million. The ship received $184.0 million in FY2010 advance procurement funding, and the Navy plans to request the remaining $1,856.6 million of the ship's procurement cost in the FY2012 budget. Accordingly, the Navy's proposed FY2011 budget does not request any procurement or advance procurement funding for the LPD-17 program.

Some observers have suggested using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X), a new class of amphibious ships that the Navy plans to start procuring in FY2017 as replacements for the Navy's 12 aging Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships. Procuring a 12th LPD-17 in FY2014 or FY2015 might be consistent with a strategy of using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X) because it would keep the LPD-17 production line open until the start of LSD(X) procurement. Navy officials have mentioned the option of modifying the LPD-17 design as one possible approach for developing the LSD(X) design, but the Navy is also studying other possible approaches, including developing an all-new design. Navy plans do not call for procuring any LPD-17s beyond the 11th ship planned for FY2012.

Although the Navy's planned 313-ship fleet, first presented to Congress in February 2006, calls for a 31-ship amphibious force that includes 10 LPD-17s, Navy and Marine Corps officials agree that a 33-ship amphibious force that includes 11 LPD-17s would be needed to minimally meet the Marine Corps' goal of having an amphibious ship force with enough combined capacity to lift the assault echelons (AEs) of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). A 33-ship force would include 15 amphibious ships for each MEB, plus three additional ships to account for 10% to 15% of the amphibious ship force being in overhaul at any given time.

Marine Corps and Navy officials agree that a 38-ship amphibious force would more fully meet the Marine Corps' 2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift requirement. Such a force would include 17 amphibious ships for each MEB, plus four additional ships to account for 10% to 15% of the amphibious ship force being in overhaul at any given time. Although a 38-ship force would more fully meet the Marine Corps' lift requirement, the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to accept the operational risks associated with having a 33-ship force rather than a 38-ship force.

FY2011 issues for Congress include whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's proposed funding profile for procuring the 11th LPD-17, and whether to provide the Navy with any direction concerning the design of the LSD(X) or procurement of LPD-17s beyond the 11th ship. Congress's decisions on these issues will affect, among other things, Navy and Marine Corps funding requirements and capabilities, and the shipbuilding industrial base.


Date of Report: July 7, 2010
Number of Pages: 46
Order Number: RL34476
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Intelligence Issues for Congress

Richard A. Best Jr.
Specialist in National Defense

To address the challenges facing the U.S. intelligence community in the 21st century, congressional and executive branch initiatives have sought to improve coordination among the different agencies and to encourage better analysis. In December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) was signed, providing for a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with substantial authorities to manage the national intelligence effort. The legislation also established a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Making cooperation effective presents substantial leadership and managerial challenges. The needs of intelligence "consumers"—ranging from the White House to Cabinet agencies to military commanders—must all be met, using the same systems and personnel. Intelligence collection systems are expensive and some critics suggest there have been elements of waste and unneeded duplication of effort while some intelligence "targets" have been neglected.

The DNI has substantial statutory authorities to address these issues, but the organizational relationships remain complex, especially for Defense Department agencies. Members of Congress will be seeking to observe the extent to which effective coordination is accomplished.

International terrorism, a major threat facing the United States in the 21st century, presents a difficult analytical challenge, vividly demonstrated by the attempted bombing of a commercial aircraft approaching Detroit on December 25, 2009. Counterterrorism requires the close coordination of intelligence and law enforcement agencies, but there remain many institutional and procedural issues that complicate cooperation between the two sets of agencies.

Techniques for acquiring and analyzing information on small groups of plotters differ significantly from those used to evaluate the military capabilities of other countries. U.S. intelligence efforts are complicated by unfilled requirements for foreign language expertise. Whether all terrorist surveillance efforts have been consistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) has been a matter of controversy.

Intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was inaccurate and Members have criticized the performance of the intelligence community in regard to current conditions in Iraq, Iran, and other areas. Improved analysis, while difficult to mandate, remains a key goal. Better human intelligence, it is widely agreed, is also essential.

Intelligence support to military operations continues to be a major responsibility of intelligence agencies. The use of precision guided munitions depends on accurate, real-time targeting data; integrating intelligence data into military operations challenges traditional organizational relationships and requires innovative technological approaches. Stability operations now underway in Afghanistan may require very different sets of intelligence skills.


Date of Report: July 9, 2010
Number of Pages: 29
Order Number: RL33539
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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The issue is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy's budget.

Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.

China's naval modernization effort, which began in the 1990s, encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and surface ships. China's naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in areas such as maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, training, and exercises.

DOD and other observers believe that the near-term focus of China's military modernization effort has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a socalled anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. Some observers believe that China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is increasingly oriented toward pursuing additional goals, such as asserting or defending China's claims in maritime territorial disputes, protecting China's sea lines of communications, displacing U.S. influence in the Pacific, and asserting China's status as a major world power.

Placing an increased emphasis on U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities in coming years could lead to one more of the following: placing a relatively strong emphasis on programs for developing and procuring highly capable ships, aircraft, and weapons for defeating Chinese anti-access systems; assigning a larger percentage of the Navy to the Pacific Fleet (and, as a result, a smaller percentage to the Atlantic Fleet); homeporting more of the Pacific Fleet's ships at forward locations such as Hawaii, Guam, and Japan; increasing training and exercises in operations relating to countering Chinese maritime anti-access forces, such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations; and increasing activities for monitoring and understanding developments in China's navy, as well as activities for measuring and better understanding operating conditions in the Western Pacific.


Date of Report: July 9, 2010
Number of Pages: 58
Order Number: RL33153
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U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy

Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States faced a challenge in enlisting the full support of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the counterterrorism fight against Al Qaeda. This effort raised short-term policy issues about how to elicit cooperation and how to address PRC concerns about the U.S.-led war (Operation Enduring Freedom). Longer-term issues have concerned whether counterterrorism has strategically transformed bilateral ties and whether China's support was valuable and not obtained at the expense of other U.S. interests.

The extent of U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has been limited, but the tone and context of counterterrorism helped to stabilize—even if it did not transform—the closer bilateral relationship pursued by President George Bush in late 2001. China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), has not fought in the U.S.-led counterterrorism coalition. The Bush Administration designated the PRC-targeted "East Turkistan Islamic Movement" (ETIM) as a terrorist organization in August 2002, reportedly allowed PRC interrogators access to Uighur detainees at Guantanamo in September 2002, and held a summit in Texas in October 2002.

Since 2005, however, U.S. concerns about China's extent of cooperation in counterterrorism have increased. In September 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick acknowledged that "China and the United States can do more together in the global fight against terrorism" after "a good start," in his policy speech that called on China to be a "responsible stakeholder" in the world. The summits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2005 and 2006 raised U.S. concerns. Since the summer of 2007, U.S. officials have expressed more concern about China-origin arms that have been found in the conflict involving U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as part of the broader threat posed by Iran and its arms transfers.

Congress has oversight over the closer ties with China and a number of policy options. U.S. policy has addressed law-enforcement and intelligence ties; oppressed Uighur (Uyghur) people in western Xinjiang whom China claims to be linked to "terrorists"; detained Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay prison; Olympic security in August 2008; sanctions that ban exports of arms and security equipment; weapons nonproliferation; port security; military-to-military contacts; China's influence and support in Central Asia through the SCO; and China's arms transfers to Iran. Also, Congress has concerns about suspected PRC harassment of Uighurs and others in the United States, the President's efforts to transfer the Uighurs detained at Guantanamo, and efforts to seek China's counterterrorism cooperation (with U.S. assessments of mixed implications). The United States detained 22 Uighurs and rejected China's demand to take them while seeking a third country to accept them. In 2006, Albania accepted five of them. In June 2009, Bermuda accepted four. In November 2009, Palau accepted six. In February 2010, Switzerland accepted two Uighurs. The five Uighurs remaining in detention had been taken into custody in Pakistan. On February 26, 2010, the House passed H.R. 2701 (Reyes), with Section 351 which would require an unclassified summary of intelligence on any threats posed by the Uighurs who were detained at Guantanamo. Other relevant bills in the 111th Congress include: H.R. 2346 (P.L. 111- 32); H.Res. 417 (Baldwin); H.Res. 624 (Delahunt); H.Res. 774 (Hastings); H.Res. 953 (McGovern); H.R. 2294 (Boehner); S.Res. 155 (Brown); and S. 1054 (Inouye). The Obama Administration has proposed that China increase contributions and coordination in investments and assistance to help stabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan. With concerns about military operations in Central Asia, the United States also has concerns about dealing with China in its northwestern region of Xinjiang. On July 8, 2010, Norway arrested three men reportedly connected with the Turkistan Islamic Party (another name for ETIM) and Al Qaeda.


Date of Report: July 8, 2010
Number of Pages: 39
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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress

Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs

This CRS report discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration re-engaged with the top PRC leadership, including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP- 3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and aggressive naval confrontations (including in 2009).

In 2001, President Bush continued the policy of engagement with China, but the Pentagon skeptically reviewed and cautiously resumed mil-to-mil contacts. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in 2002, resumed the Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) with the PLA (first held in 1997) and, in 2003, hosted General Cao Gangchuan, a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Defense Minister. General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited China in January 2004, as the highest ranking U.S. military officer to do so since November 2000. Rumsfeld visited China in 2005, the first visit by a defense secretary since William Cohen's visit in 2000. In 2006, a CMC Vice Chairman, General Guo Boxiong, made the first visit to the United States by the highest ranking PLA commander after 1998.

Issues for the 111th Congress include whether the Obama Administration has complied with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursued contacts with the PLA that advances a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially the safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65). Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts have significant value for achieving U.S. objectives and whether the contacts have contributed to the PLA's warfighting capabilities that might harm U.S. security interests. Some have argued about whether the value that U.S. officials have placed on the contacts overly extends leverage to the PLA. Officials believe talks can serve U.S. interests that include conflict prevention and crisis management; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; strategic nuclear/space talks; counterterrorism; and accounting for POW/MIAs.

Policymakers could review the approach to mil-to-mil contacts. U.S. defense officials have reported inadequate cooperation from the PLA, including denials of port visits at Hong Kong and aid to U.S. Navy ships in distress (Thanksgiving 2007). The PLA has tried to use its suspensions of exchanges while blaming U.S. "obstacles" (including arms sales to Taiwan, legal restrictions on contacts with the PLA, and the Pentagon's reports to Congress on the PLA). The PRC's harassment of U.S. surveillance ships (in 2009) and increasing assertiveness in maritime areas have shown the limits to the results of mil-to-mil talks and PLA restraint. Still, at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2009, President Obama called for military contacts to diminish disputes with China. The NDAA for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) amended the requirement in P.L. 106- 65 for the report on PRC military power to expand the focus to security developments involving the PRC, add cooperative elements, and fold in another requirement to report on mil-to-mil contacts, including a new strategy for such contacts (but report is late in 2010).


Date of Report: July 6, 2010
Number of Pages: 65
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U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism

Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks gave new momentum to European Union (EU) initiatives to combat terrorism and improve police, judicial, and intelligence cooperation among its member states. Since the 2001 attacks, the EU has sought to speed up its efforts to harmonize national laws and bring down barriers among member states' law enforcement authorities so that information can be meaningfully shared and suspects apprehended expeditiously. Among other steps, the EU has established a common definition of terrorism and a common list of terrorist groups, an EU arrest warrant, enhanced tools to stem terrorist financing, and new measures to strengthen external EU border controls and improve aviation security.

As part of its drive to improve its counterterrorism capabilities, the EU has also made improving cooperation with the United States a top priority. Washington has largely welcomed these efforts, recognizing that they may help root out terrorist cells and prevent future attacks against the United States or its interests abroad. U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions. Contacts between U.S. and EU officials on police, judicial, and border control policy matters have increased substantially since 2001. A number of new U.S.-EU agreements have also been reached; these include information-sharing arrangements between the United States and EU police and judicial bodies, two new U.S.-EU treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance, and accords on container security and airline passenger data. In addition, the United States and the EU have been working together to clamp down on terrorist financing and to improve aviation and transport security.

Despite U.S.-EU strides to foster closer counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation, some challenges remain. Data privacy has been and continues to be a key sticking point. In February 2010, the European Parliament rejected a U.S.-EU agreement—known as the SWIFT accord— that would have continued allowing U.S. authorities access to financial data stored in Europe to help combat terrorism on the grounds that it did not contain sufficient protections to safeguard the personal data and privacy rights of EU citizens. For years, and for similar reasons, some Members of the European Parliament have also challenged a U.S.-EU agreement permitting airlines to share passenger name record (PNR) data with U.S. authorities. Although the European Parliament approved a revised U.S.-EU SWIFT agreement in July 2010, some observers worry that the Parliament may also initially reject the most recent U.S.-EU PNR agreement. Other points of U.S.-EU tension include issues related to balancing border security with legitimate transatlantic travel and commerce and terrorist detainee policies.

Nevertheless, both the United States and the EU appear committed to fostering closer cooperation in the areas of counterterrorism and other homeland security issues. Congressional decisions related to improving border controls and transport security, in particular, may affect how future U.S.-EU cooperation evolves. In addition, given the European Parliament's growing influence in many of these policy areas, Members of Congress may be able to help shape Parliament's views and responses through ongoing contacts and the existing Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD). This report examines the evolution of U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation and the ongoing challenges that may be of interest in the 111th Congress. For additional background, also see CRS Report RL31509, Europe and Counterterrorism: Strengthening Police and Judicial Cooperation, by Kristin Archick.


Date of Report: July 9, 2010
Number of Pages: 17
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FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues

Charles A. Henning, Coordinator
Specialist in Military Manpower Policy

David F. Burrelli
Specialist in Military Manpower Policy

Don J. Jansen
Analyst in Defense Health Care Policy

Lawrence Kapp
Specialist in Military Manpower Policy

Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the emerging operational role of the Reserve Components, further heighten interest in a wide range of military personnel policies and issues.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has selected a number of the military personnel issues considered in deliberations on the House-passed and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011. This report provides a brief synopsis of sections that pertain to personnel policy. It includes background information and a discussion of the issue, along with a table that contains an explanation of the bill (H.R. 5136) passed by the House on May 28, 2010. The table and the report will be updated upon passage in the Senate, again upon completion of the Conference Committee action, and a final edition will be released when the NDAA is signed into law. Where appropriate, other CRS products are identified to provide more detailed background information and analysis of the issue. For each issue, a CRS analyst is identified and contact information is provided.

Some issues were addressed in the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act and discussed in CRS Report R40711, FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues, coordinated by Don J. Jansen. Those issues that were previously considered in CRS Report R40711 are designated with a "*" in the relevant section titles of this report.

This report focuses exclusively on the annual defense authorization process. It does not include appropriations, veterans' affairs, tax implications of policy choices or any discussion of separately introduced legislation.


Date of Report: July 9, 2010
Number of Pages: 23
Order Number: R41316
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress

Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces

Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations and the Administration has given U.S. SOF greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide counterterrorism operations. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directs increases in SOF force structure, particularly in terms of increasing enabling units and rotary and fixed-wing SOF aviation assets and units. The USSOCOM Commander, Admiral Eric T. Olson, in commenting on the current state of the forces under his command noted that SOF forces are deployed to more than 75 countries and 86% of these forces are in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. Admiral Olson also noted ongoing growth in SOF units and aviation assets and the effectiveness of Section 1208 authority, which provides funds for SOF to train and equip regular and irregular indigenous forces to conduct counterterrorism operations. USSOCOM's FY2011 budget request for $9.8 billion has been recommended by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees for full funding, and both committees have also recommended additional funding for unfunded requirements.

Afghan-related issues include the impact of new command relationships as well as rules of engagement, which have limited SOF nighttime raids targeting insurgent leadership. These SOF raids have been characterized as being highly successful, even though on some occasions they have resulted in civilian casualties. U.S. SOF have been given the mission of training Afghan Civil Order Police, who are responsible for manning checkpoints and interacting with locals. A more controversial mission involves up to 23 Special Forces Operational Detachments – Alphas (ODAs) training local militias in remote areas of Afghanistan to fill a security void. Potential issues for congressional consideration include how command relationships and rules of engagement are affecting special operations in Afghanistan and whether training police and militias is the best use of U.S. SOF.


Date of Report: July 9, 2010
Number of Pages: 14
Order Number: RS21048
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Homeland Security: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Border Surveillance

Chad C. Haddal
Specialist in Immigration Policy

Jeremiah Gertler
Specialist in Military Aviation

Congress has expressed a great deal of interest in using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to surveil the United States' international land border. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) utilizes advanced technology to augment its USBP agents' ability to patrol the border, including a fleet of six UAVs. This report examines the strengths and limitations of deploying UAVs along the borders and related issues for Congress.

UAVs come with several costs and benefits. One potential benefit of UAVs is that they could fill a gap in current border surveillance by improving coverage along remote sections of the U.S. borders. Moreover, the range of UAVs is a significant asset when compared to border agents on patrol or stationary surveillance equipment. Yet, despite potential benefits of using UAVs for homeland security, various problems encountered in the past may hinder UAV implementation on the border. There are concerns regarding the high accident rates of UAVs, which have historically been multiple times higher than that of manned aircraft. Inclement weather conditions can also impinge on a UAV's surveillance capability. Also, according to the CBP Inspector General, the costs of operating a UAV are more than double the costs of operating a manned aircraft.

Recent attention has focused on the expanding area of operations for CBP-operated UAVs. On June 23, 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) granted a certificate of authorization requested by CBP, clearing the UAV flights along the Texas border and Gulf region. Other requests have reportedly been delayed due to safety concerns, some of which stem from previous incidents. Despite safety concerns, some policymakers continue to call for the increased domestic use of UAVs. The Supplemental Appropriations Bill of FY2010 (H.R. 4899) would include $32 million for the acquisition of two additional UAVs by CBP.


Date of Report: July 8, 2010
Number of Pages: 10
Order Number: RS21698
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Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy's FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring an 11th and final San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship in FY2012. The Navy estimates the procurement cost of this ship at $2,040.6 million. The ship received $184.0 million in FY2010 advance procurement funding, and the Navy plans to request the remaining $1,856.6 million of the ship's procurement cost in the FY2012 budget. Accordingly, the Navy's proposed FY2011 budget does not request any procurement or advance procurement funding for the LPD-17 program.

Some observers have suggested using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X), a new class of amphibious ships that the Navy plans to start procuring in FY2017 as replacements for the Navy's 12 aging Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships. Procuring a 12th LPD-17 in FY2014 or FY2015 might be consistent with a strategy of using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X) because it would keep the LPD-17 production line open until the start of LSD(X) procurement. Navy officials have mentioned the option of modifying the LPD-17 design as one possible approach for developing the LSD(X) design, but the Navy is also studying other possible approaches, including developing an all-new design. Navy plans do not call for procuring any LPD-17s beyond the 11th ship planned for FY2012.

Although the Navy's planned 313-ship fleet, first presented to Congress in February 2006, calls for a 31-ship amphibious force that includes 10 LPD-17s, Navy and Marine Corps officials agree that a 33-ship amphibious force that includes 11 LPD-17s would be needed to minimally meet the Marine Corps' goal of having an amphibious ship force with enough combined capacity to lift the assault echelons (AEs) of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). A 33-ship force would include 15 amphibious ships for each MEB, plus three additional ships to account for 10% to 15% of the amphibious ship force being in overhaul at any given time.

Marine Corps and Navy officials agree that a 38-ship amphibious force would more fully meet the Marine Corps' 2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift requirement. Such a force would include 17 amphibious ships for each MEB, plus four additional ships to account for 10% to 15% of the amphibious ship force being in overhaul at any given time. Although a 38-ship force would more fully meet the Marine Corps' lift requirement, the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to accept the operational risks associated with having a 33-ship force rather than a 38-ship force.

FY2011 issues for Congress include whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's proposed funding profile for procuring the 11th LPD-17, and whether to provide the Navy with any direction concerning the design of the LSD(X) or procurement of LPD-17s beyond the 11th ship. Congress's decisions on these issues will affect, among other things, Navy and Marine Corps funding requirements and capabilities, and the shipbuilding industrial base. .


Date of Report: July 1, 2010
Number of Pages: 44
Order Number: RL34476
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under current MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 20 at the end of FY2010 to 38 at the end of FY2015. MDA and Navy plans also call for an increasing portion of the Navy's BMD-capable Aegis ships to be equipped with newer and more capable versions of the Aegis BMD system.

BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. The Administration's Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for BMD operations, announced in September 2009, calls for operating BMD-capable Aegis ships in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran.

Some observers are concerned—particularly following the Administration's announcement of its intention to use Aegis-BMD ships to defend Europe against potential ballistic missile attacks— that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for BMD-capable Aegis ships are growing faster than the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships. They are also concerned that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for Aegis ships for conducting BMD operations could strain the Navy's ability to provide regional military commanders with Aegis ships for performing non- BMD missions. There is also some concern regarding the adequacy of planned numbers of SM-3 missiles—the interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships for conducting BMD operations.

The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA's budget. The Navy's budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA's proposed FY2011 budget requests a total of $2,161.6 million for the Aegis BMD program. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests a total of $457.0 million for BMD-related efforts.

FY2011 issues for Congress include whether to approve, reject, or modify the FY2011 MDA and Navy funding requests for the Aegis BMD program, and whether to provide MDA or the Navy with additional direction concerning the program. FY2011 options for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include, among other things, the following: accelerating the modification of Aegis ships to BMD-capable configurations, increasing procurement of new Aegis destroyers, increasing procurement of SM-3 missiles, and providing funding for integrating the SM-2 Block IV BMD interceptor missile into the 4.0.1 version of the Aegis BMD system. .


Date of Report: July 1, 2010
Number of Pages: 65
Order Number: RL33745
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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The issue is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy's budget.

Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.

China's naval modernization effort, which began in the 1990s, encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and surface ships. China's naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in areas such as maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, training, and exercises.

DOD and other observers believe that the near-term focus of China's military modernization effort has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a socalled anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. Some observers believe that China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is increasingly oriented toward pursuing additional goals, such as asserting or defending China's claims in maritime territorial disputes, protecting China's sea lines of communications, displacing U.S. influence in the Pacific, and asserting China's status as a major world power.

Placing an increased emphasis on U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities in coming years could lead to one more of the following: placing a relatively strong emphasis on programs for developing and procuring highly capable ships, aircraft, and weapons for defeating Chinese anti-access systems; assigning a larger percentage of the Navy to the Pacific Fleet (and, as a result, a smaller percentage to the Atlantic Fleet); homeporting more of the Pacific Fleet's ships at forward locations such as Hawaii, Guam, and Japan; increasing training and exercises in operations relating to countering Chinese maritime anti-access forces, such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations; and increasing activities for monitoring and understanding developments in China's navy, as well as activities for measuring and better understanding operating conditions in the Western Pacific.


Date of Report: June 24, 2010
Number of Pages: 58
Order Number: RL33153
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U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy

Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States faced a challenge in enlisting the full support of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the counterterrorism fight against Al Qaeda. This effort raised short-term policy issues about how to elicit cooperation and how to address PRC concerns about the U.S.-led war (Operation Enduring Freedom). Longer-term issues have concerned whether counterterrorism has strategically transformed bilateral ties and whether China's support was valuable and not obtained at the expense of other U.S. interests.

The extent of U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has been limited, but the tone and context of counterterrorism helped to stabilize—even if it did not transform—the closer bilateral relationship pursued by President George Bush in late 2001. China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), has not fought in the U.S.-led counterterrorism coalition. The Bush Administration designated the PRC-targeted "East Turkistan Islamic Movement" (ETIM) as a terrorist organization in August 2002, reportedly allowed PRC interrogators access to Uighur detainees at Guantanamo in September 2002, and held a summit in Texas in October 2002.

Since 2005, however, U.S. concerns about China's extent of cooperation in counterterrorism have increased. In September 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick acknowledged that "China and the United States can do more together in the global fight against terrorism" after "a good start," in his policy speech that called on China to be a "responsible stakeholder" in the world. The summits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2005 and 2006 raised U.S. concerns. Since the summer of 2007, U.S. officials have expressed more concern about China-origin arms that have been found in the conflict involving U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as part of the broader threat posed by Iran and its arms transfers.

Congress has oversight over the closer ties with China and a number of policy options. U.S. policy has addressed law-enforcement ties; oppressed Uighur (Uyghur) people in western Xinjiang whom China claims to be linked to "terrorists"; detained Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay prison; Olympic security in August 2008; sanctions that ban exports of arms and security equipment; weapons nonproliferation; port security; military-to-military contacts; China's influence and support in Central Asia through the SCO; and China's arms transfers to Iran. Also, Congress has concerns about suspected PRC harassment of Uighurs and others in the United States, the President's efforts to transfer the Uighurs detained at Guantanamo since soon after the war began in Afghanistan in late 2001, and efforts to seek China's further counterterrorism cooperation (with U.S. assessments of mixed implications). The United States detained 22 Uighurs and rejected China's demand to take them while seeking a third country to accept them. In 2006, Albania accepted five of them. In June 2009, Bermuda accepted four. In November 2009, Palau accepted six. In February 2010, Switzerland accepted two Uighurs. The five Uighurs remaining in detention had been taken into custody in Pakistan. On February 26, 2010, the House passed H.R. 2701 (Reyes), with Section 351 which would require an unclassified summary of intelligence on any threats posed by the Uighurs who were detained at Guantanamo. Other relevant legislation in the 111th Congress includes: H.R. 2346 (P.L. 111-32); H.Res. 417 (Baldwin); H.Res. 624 (Delahunt); H.Res. 774 (Hastings); H.R. 2294 (Boehner); S.Res. 155 (Brown); S. 1054 (Inouye). The Obama Administration has proposed that China increase investments and assistance to help stabilize Afghanistan (and Pakistan) as well as possible cooperation in a military supply route into northern Afghanistan. While there has been no progress in this option, the United States has concerns about dealing with China in the northwestern region of Xinjiang.


Date of Report: June 29, 2010
Number of Pages: 38
Order Number: RL33001
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