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Thursday, December 30, 2010

Missile Defense and NATO’s Lisbon Summit


Steven A. Hildreth
Specialist in Missile Defense

Carl Ek
Specialist in International Relations


For several years, the United States and NATO have pursued parallel paths to develop a ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability to defend U.S. troops and European populations against potential ballistic attacks from countries such as Iran. At the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, alliance heads of state approved a plan to integrate existing NATO member BMD capabilities as part of the overall alliance defense posture. NATO officials have placed the estimated cost of the new territorial BMD system at 200 million euros (approximately $260 million), to be borne among all 28 member states over the next 10 years. Industry analysts, however, believe that the cost could be significantly higher. The Obama Administration’s program to deploy a regional BMD capability in Europe, called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), will now proceed with the NATO effort on an integrated basis.

The Lisbon Summit agreement is significant in that NATO officials identified territorial missile defense as a core alliance objective and adopted a formal NATO program in response. The agreement further outlined the development of territorial missile defense through an expansion of NATO’s ALTBMD (Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense) program and its integration with the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach. As a first step, alliance leaders tasked NATO staff “with developing missile defence consultation, and command and control arrangements” for NATO’s March 2011 Defense Ministerial. The next step will be to draft an implementation plan for missile defense for the June 2011 Defense Ministers meeting.

NATO decision makers took another significant step at Lisbon during the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting, at which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev endorsed cooperation between the alliance and Moscow in the area of missile defense. Many observers believe that Russia’s pledge to participate removes a major stumbling block to the development of a European territorial missile defense program.

Analysts have noted the distinct advantages for NATO in adopting missile defense as a core alliance objective. Some of these include increased protection against potentially devastating ballistic missile attacks into Europe, strengthened relations with the United States, economic benefits that might flow from this effort, and opportunities to engage Russia constructively. Some have also questioned, however, whether this alliance effort is really necessary or whether such an effort is technologically feasible. Some are also concerned over the degree to which the United States will have command and control decision-making authority relative to others, and whether the combined NATO-U.S. programs might cause problems with how Russia views potential challenges to its own nuclear deterrent forces.

Congress has taken an active interest in missile defense, and has largely given bipartisan support to the Bush and Obama Administrations’ plans to guard against the threat of Iranian ballistic missiles through the deployment of radar and interceptors in Europe. NATO’s adoption of such a capability, and its close integration with the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach, also will likely raise several issues that Members of Congress may choose to address, including command and control protocols, technology transfer, participation by Russia, and the extent to which European allies contribute to the common effort.



Date of Report: December 28, 2010
Number of Pages: 14
Order Number: R41549
Price: $29.95

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Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement

Jerome P. Bjelopera
Analyst in Organized Crime and Terrorism

Kristin M. Finklea
Analyst in Domestic Security


In the last two decades, organized crime has grown more complex, posing evolving challenges for U.S. federal law enforcement. These criminals have transformed their operations in ways that broaden their reach and make it harder for law enforcement to combat them. They have adopted more-networked structural models, internationalized their operations, and grown more tech savvy. They are a significant challenge to U.S. law enforcement.

Modern organized criminals often prefer cellular or networked structural models for their flexibility and avoid the hierarchies that previously governed more traditional organized crime groups such as the Cosa Nostra. Fluid network structures make it harder for law enforcement to infiltrate, disrupt, and dismantle conspiracies. Many 21
st century organized crime groups opportunistically form around specific, short-term schemes and may outsource portions of their operations rather than keeping it all “in-house.”

Globalization has revolutionized both licit and illicit commerce. Commercial and technological innovations have reduced national trade barriers, widened transportation infrastructure, and bolstered volumes of international business. The internet and extensive cellular telephone networks have fostered rapid communication. Integrated financial systems, which allow for easy global movement of money, are exploited by criminals to launder their illicit proceeds. Estimates suggest that money laundering annually accounts for between 2% and 5% of world GDP. Simultaneously, borders are opportunities for criminals and impediments to law enforcement.

Organized criminals have expanded their technological “toolkits,” incorporating technologydriven fraud into their capabilities. Their operations can harm U.S. citizens without ever having a physical presence in the country. These illicit activities include cyber intrusions into corporate databases, theft of individual consumer credit card information, fencing of stolen merchandise online, and leveraging technology to aid in narcotics smuggling. Further, criminal organizations—which have historically burrowed into and exploited local ethnic communities— can now rely on internet connectivity and extensive, international transportation linkages to target localities around the globe.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been a shift in law enforcement attention and resources toward counterterrorism-related activities and away from traditional crime fighting activities including the investigation of organized crime. Although the effects of organized crime may not be seen in a consolidated attack resulting in the physical loss of life, they are far-reaching—impacting economic stability, public health and safety, as well as national security. One challenge facing law enforcement is that the federal investigation of organized crime matters has not historically been a centralized effort, and there is no single agency charged with investigating organized crime in the way the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been designated the lead investigative agency for terrorism. Further, resources to tackle this issue are divided among federal agencies and little consensus exists regarding the scope of the problem, the measurable harm caused by these groups, or how to tackle them. As such, Congress may exert oversight regarding the federal coordination of organized crime investigations. Policymakers may also debate the efficacy of current resources appropriated to combat organized crime.



Date of Report: December 23, 2010
Number of Pages: 42
Order Number: R41547
Price: $29.95

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Monday, December 27, 2010

“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”: Military Policy and the Law on Same-Sex Behavior

David F. Burrelli
Specialist in Military Manpower Policy

In 1993, new laws and regulations pertaining to homosexuality and U.S. military service came into effect reflecting a compromise in policy. This compromise, colloquially referred to as “don’t ask, don’t tell,” (DADT), holds that the presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in same-sex acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion which are the essence of military capability. Under this policy, but not the law, service members are not to be asked about nor allowed to discuss their “same-sex orientation.” The law itself does not prevent service members from being asked about their sexuality. This compromise notwithstanding, the issue has remained politically contentious.

Prior to the 1993 compromise, the number of individuals discharged for homosexuality was generally declining. Since that time, the number of discharges for same-sex conduct has generally increased until 2001. However, analysis of these data shows no statistically significant difference in discharge rates for these two periods.

On March 25, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced changes in the department’s enforcement of the 1993 law. Under these changes, Secretary Gates said only a general or flag officer would have the authority to separate someone who had engaged in homosexual conduct, that information provided by a third party must be given under oath, and that the information given to certain individuals—lawyers, psychotherapists, clergy, and domestic abuse counselors, for example—cannot be used in support of discharge proceedings. On October 11, 2010, the rules were again changed allowing only a select group of senior civilian leaders to have authority to discharge someone for violating the policy.

Language was also included in the House and Senate versions of the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136 and S. 3454) that would allow for the repeal of the 1993 law, following certain stipulations. The House passed this bill on May 28, 2010, and sent it to the Senate. On September 21, 2010, the Senate voted on a procedural motion to move S. 3454 forward. A cloture vote failed and the bill was not brought to the floor.

On September 9, 2010, Federal Judge Virginia A. Phillips ruled the 1993 law was unconstitutional. One month later, (October 12, 2010), Judge Phillips enjoined the Department of Defense “from enforcing or applying [DADT].” The Defense Department took steps to comply with the injunction, but on October 20, 2010, the Ninth Circuit granted a temporary stay of the injunction.

On November 30, 2010, the Comprehensive Review Working Group report was issued, followed by Senate Armed Service Committee hearings. Ten days later (December 9, 2010), the Senate again voted on a procedural motion to move S. 3454 forward. Again, this cloture vote failed. Since then, three bills have been introduced (S. 4022, S. 4023, and H.R. 6520) that would repeal the law and the DADT policy. On December 15, 2010, the House passed a stand-alone measure, identical to the language initially in the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act, to repeal Sec. 654, Title 10 USC, (DADT).

For more information, see CRS Report R40795, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”: A Legal Analysis, by Jody Feder.



Date of Report: December 16, 2010
Number of Pages: 27
Order Number: R40782
Price: $29.95

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Military Recruitment on High School and College Campuses: A Policy and Legal Analysis


David F. Burrelli
Specialist in Military Manpower Policy

Jody Feder
Legislative Attorney


In recent years, many academic institutions have enacted rules that protect individuals who are gay from discrimination on campus. As a result, some high schools and institutions of higher education have sought to bar military recruiters from their campuses and/or to eliminate Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs on campus in response to the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy, which prohibits homosexual conduct by members of the armed services. These efforts, however, have largely been thwarted due to several laws that bar giving federal funds to campuses that block access for military recruiters.

These laws include the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001, which amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) by requiring high schools that receive federal funds to provide certain student contact information to military recruiters upon request and to allow recruiters to have the same access to students as employers and colleges. This provision is different from similar Department of Defense (DOD) provisions that allow DOD to compile directory information on high school students for military recruitment purposes and that require colleges and universities that receive federal funds to give military recruiters the same access to students and campuses that is provided to other employers. Known as the Solomon Amendment, the latter provision was upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in the 2006 case Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR).

This report describes the various laws regarding military recruitment on high school and college campuses, as well as discusses the policy and legal issues that they may raise.



Date of Report: December 14, 2010
Number of Pages: 15
Order Number: R40827
Price: $29.95

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Tuesday, December 21, 2010

Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress


Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a relatively inexpensive Navy surface combatant equipped with modular “plug-and-fight” mission packages. The basic version of the LCS, without any mission packages, is referred to as the LCS sea frame. The Navy wants to field a force of 55 LCSs. The first two (LCS-1 and LCS-2) were procured in FY2005 and FY2006 and were commissioned into service on November 8, 2008, and January 16, 2010. Another two (LCS-3 and LCS-4) were procured in FY2009 and are under construction. Two more (LCS-5 and LCS-6) were procured in FY2010.

The Navy’s FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring 17 more LCSs in annual quantities of 2, 3, 4, 4, and 4. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests $1,231.0 million in procurement funding for the two LCSs that the Navy wants to procure in FY2011, and $278.4 million in FY2011 advance procurement funding for the 11 LCSs that the Navy wants to procure in FY2012-FY2014. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget also requests procurement funding to procure LCS module weapons and LCS mission packages, and research and development funding for the LCS program.

There are currently two very different LCS designs—one developed and produced by an industry team led by Lockheed, and another developed and produced by an industry team led by General Dynamics. LCS-1 and LCS-3 use the Lockheed design; LCS-2 and LCS-4 use the General Dynamics design.

On September 16, 2009, the Navy announced a proposed LCS acquisition strategy. Under the strategy, the Navy would hold a competition to pick a single design to which all LCSs procured in FY2010 and subsequent years would be built. (The process of selecting the single design for all future production is called a down select.) The winner of the down select would be awarded a contract to build 10 LCSs over the five-year period FY2010-FY2014, at a rate of two ships per year. The Navy would then hold a second competition—open to all bidders other than the shipyard building the 10 LCSs in FY2010-FY2014—to select a second shipyard to build up to five additional LCSs to the same design in FY2012-FY2014 (one ship in FY2012, and two ships per year in FY2013-FY2014). These two shipyards would then compete for contracts to build LCSs procured in FY2015 and subsequent years. Section 121(a) and (b) of the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) grant the Navy contracting and other authority needed to implement this LCS acquisition strategy. The Navy had earlier planned to make the down select decision and award the contract to build the 10 LCSs sometime this past summer, but the decision was delayed to as late as December 14. (The final bids submitted by the two LCS contractors were submitted on about September 15, and were valid for another 90 days, or until December 14.)

On November 3, 2010, the Navy notified congressional offices that it was prepared to implement an alternative LCS acquisition strategy that would involve awarding 10-ship contracts to both LCS bidders. The Navy would need additional legislative authority from Congress to implement this dual-award strategy. The Navy stated on November 3 that if the additional authority were not granted by December 14, the Navy would proceed to announce its down select decision under the acquisition strategy announced on September 16, 2009. On December 13, it was reported that the two LCS bidders, at the Navy’s request, had extended the prices in their bids to December 30. The Navy’s proposed dual-award strategy poses a near-term issue for Congress of whether this strategy would be preferable to the down select strategy, and whether Congress should grant the Navy, by December 30, the additional legislative authority the Navy would need to implement the dual-award strategy.



Date of Report: December 16, 2010
Number of Pages: 78
Order Number: RL33741
Price: $29.95

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Reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy: Issues for Consideration


Kristin M. Finklea
Analyst in Domestic Security

The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has the responsibility for creating policies, priorities, and objectives for the federal Drug Control Program. This national program is aimed at reducing the use, manufacturing, and trafficking of illicit drugs and the reduction of drug-related crime and violence and of drug-related health consequences. The Director of ONDCP has primary responsibilities of (1) developing a comprehensive National Drug Control Strategy (Strategy) to direct the nation’s anti-drug efforts; (2) developing a National Drug Control Budget (Budget) to implement the National Drug Control Strategy, including determining the adequacy of the drug control budgets submitted by contributing Drug Control Program agencies; and (3) evaluating the effectiveness of the National Drug Control Strategy implementation by the various agencies contributing to the Drug Control Program. Authorization for ONDCP expired at the end of FY2010, but it has continued to receive appropriations. Congress, while continuously charged with ONDCP’s oversight, is now faced with its possible reauthorization.

In May 2009, Director R. Gil Kerlikowske called for an end to use of the term “war on drugs.” This is in part because while drug use was previously considered a law enforcement or criminal justice problem, it has transitioned to being viewed more as a public health problem. Indeed, the Obama Administration has indicated that a comprehensive strategy should include a range of prevention, treatment, and law enforcement elements. The 2010 National Drug Control Strategy outlines seven specific objectives—ranging from reducing the prevalence of youth engaged in illegal drug use to reducing the number of drug-related deaths—aimed at reducing both illicit drug use and its consequences.

In creating the National Drug Control Strategy, ONDCP consults with the various federal Drug Control Program agencies. ONDCP then reviews their respective drug budgets and incorporates them into the National Drug Control Budget, which is submitted to Congress as part of the annual appropriations process. In the FY2011 Budget, there are five priorities for which resources are requested across agencies: substance abuse prevention and substance abuse treatment (both of which are considered demand-reduction areas), and drug interdiction, domestic law enforcement, and international partnerships (the three of which are considered supply-reduction areas). The FY2011 request proposes to use 64.0% of the funds ($9.952 billion) for supply-side functions and 36.0% of the funds ($5.600 billion) for demand-side functions. There is currently a continuing resolution (P.L. 111-290) funding federal drug control activities at the FY2010 enacted level of almost $15.032 billion.

In considering ONDCP’s reauthorization, there are several issues that policymakers may deliberate. Congress may consider whether to authorize specific supply-reduction or demandreduction programs. Congress may also exercise oversight regarding ONDCP’s implementation of evidenced-based activities. Another issue up for debate is whether the Budget captures the full scope of the nation’s anti-drug activities. Further, ONDCP is creating a new Performance Reporting System (PRS) to evaluate annual progress toward each of the Drug Control Program’s strategic goals. Congress may exercise oversight regarding the new PRS.



Date of Report: December 10, 2010
Number of Pages: 14
Order Number: R41535
Price: $29.95

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