U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress

Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation

India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India’s test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would “work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India” and would “also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,” in the context of a broader partnership with India.

U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 (P.L. 95-242). However, P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, allows the President to waive several provisions of the AEA. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress, in addition to other required documents, a written determination that P.L. 109-401’s requirements for U.S. nuclear cooperation with India to proceed had been met. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369, which approved the agreement, into law October 8, 2008. Then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India’s then-External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement two days later, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. Additionally, the United States and India signed a subsequent arrangement in July 2010 which governs “arrangements and procedures under which” India may reprocess U.S.- origin nuclear fuel in two new national reprocessing facilities, which New Delhi has not yet constructed.

The NSG, at the behest of the Bush Administration, agreed in September 2008 to exempt India from some of its export guidelines. That decision has effectively left decisions regarding nuclear commerce with India almost entirely up to individual governments. Since the NSG decision, India has concluded numerous nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign suppliers. However, U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India and may be reluctant to do so if New Delhi does not resolve concerns regarding its policies on liability for nuclear reactor operators and suppliers. Taking a step to resolve such concerns, India signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force, October 27, 2010. However, many observers have argued that Indian nuclear liability legislation adopted in August 2010 is inconsistent with the Convention.

The Obama Administration has continued with the Bush Administration’s policy regarding civil nuclear cooperation with India. According to a November 8, 2010, White House fact sheet, the United States “intends to support India’s full membership” in the NSG, as well as other multilateral export control regimes.


Date of Report: July 21, 2011
Number of Pages: 48
Order Number: RL33016
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress

Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces

The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps as a successor to the 11 different versions of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) that have been in service since 1985. On October 28, 2008, three awards were made for the JLTV Technology Development (TD) Phase, which is scheduled to conclude in the June 2011 timeframe to three industry teams: (1) BAE Systems, (2) the team of Lockheed Martin and General Tactical Vehicle, and (3) AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems. Once testing is completed and technology requirements established, a full and open competition was expected to be conducted in the late summer, 2011 for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase and the Department of Defense (DOD) planned to award two contracts for the EMD phase, which was scheduled to last 24 months.

In February 2011, it was announced that the award of the EMD contract would be delayed until January 2012 because the Army changed requirements for the JLTV. DOD had planned to award two contracts for the EMD phase, which was scheduled to last 24 months, but now plans for a 48- month-long EMD. In addition, the Category B variant was eliminated because it proved to be too heavy to meet the required transportability weight. Now there will be two variants—a Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) that can transport four passengers and carry 3,500 pounds and a Combat Support Vehicle (CSV) that can transport two passengers and carry 5,100 pounds.

The Marines have expressed reservations with the JLTV because, at its current estimated weight, it does not lend itself to Marine Corps expeditionary operations. The Marines do not rule out removing themselves from the program and modifying HMMWVs if developers cannot address their specific requirements. The Army is said to be “moving ahead” with the JLTV program, appearing less concerned than the Marines about transportability requirements. Some describe the Army and Marines as “striking out on a separate path” with the Army more concerned with survivability and the Marines concerned that heavier JLTVs could cause weight problems on the Navy’s amphibious ships.

DOD has not publically assigned a definitive cost to the JLTV program, suggesting that it is too early in the development process. Some analysts suggest that the JLTV program will cost well over $10 billion and possibly as much as $30 billion to $70 billion, depending on the final cost of the vehicles and the number procured. Currently, the per unit cost is estimated at about $320,000 per vehicle—a figure that the Marines believe is too high.

The FY2012 Budget Request for JLTVs is $172.1 million for Army Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $71.8 million for Marine Corps RDT&E, for a program total of $243.9 million. The House Armed Services Committee has recommended decreased funding levels—$147.1 million for the Army and $46.8 million for the Marine Corps. The House Appropriations also recommended cutting Army and Marine Corps JLTV funding by $25 million for each service and using these funds for HMMWV survivability initiatives.

Concerns have been expressed that DOD’s Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) All - Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) effort will clash with the JLTV. There are also concerns about overall JLTV program affordability and the Marine’s concerns with its weight and transportability. The Army’s decision to change JLTV survivability requirements has resulted in the delay of awarding EMD contracts and the doubling of the EMD phase to 48 months which could increase the program’s overall cost.


Date of Report: July 18, 2011
Number of Pages: 14
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Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80 are the first three ships in the Navy’s new Gerald R. Ford (CVN- 78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs).

CVN-78 was procured in FY2008 and was funded with congressionally authorized four-year incremental funding in FY2008-FY2011. The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget estimates the ship’s procurement cost at $11,531.0 million (i.e., about $11.5 billion) in then-year dollars. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requested $1,731.3 million in procurement funding as the final increment to complete this estimated procurement cost; the FY2011 Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R. 1473/P.L. 112-10 of April 15, 2011) reduced this request by $9.3 million.

CVN-79 is scheduled for procurement in FY2013, and has received advance procurement funding since FY2007. The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget estimates the ship’s procurement cost at $10,253.0 million (i.e., about $10.3 billion) in then-year dollars and requests $554.8 million in advance procurement funding for the ship.

On July 11, 2011, it was reported that the Navy, as a potential measure for reducing near-term funding requirements, is considering the option of deferring the scheduled procurement of CVN- 79 by two years, to FY2015. This option, if implemented, might substantially reduce FY2013 and FY2014 funding requirements for CVN-79. It could also increase the total procurement costs of CVN-79 and certain Virginia-class attack submarines, and have implications for the aircraft carrier industrial base and future aircraft carrier force levels.

CVN-80 is scheduled for procurement in FY2018, with advance procurement funding scheduled to begin in FY2014. The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget estimates the ship’s procurement cost at $13,494.9 million (i.e., about $13.5 billion) in then-year dollars.

Oversight issues for Congress for the CVN-78 program include the potential for cost growth and technical and design issues that were raised in a December 2010 report from the Department of Defense (DOD) Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E).


Date of Report: July 21, 2011
Number of Pages: 31
Order Number: RS20643
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The Interplay of Borders, Turf, Cyberspace, and Jurisdiction: Issues Confronting U.S. Law Enforcement

Kristin M. Finklea
Analyst in Domestic Security

Savvy criminals constantly develop new techniques to target U.S. persons, businesses, and interests. Individual criminals as well as broad criminal networks exploit geographic borders, criminal turf, cyberspace, and law enforcement jurisdiction to dodge law enforcement countermeasures. Further, the interplay of these realities can potentially encumber policing measures. In light of these interwoven realities, policy makers may question how to best design policies to help law enforcement combat ever-evolving criminal threats.

Criminals routinely take advantage of geographic borders. They thrive on their ability to illicitly cross borders, subvert border security regimens, and provide illegal products or services. Many crimes—particularly those of a cyber nature—have become increasingly transnational. While criminals may operate across geographic borders and jurisdictional boundaries, law enforcement may not be able to do so with the same ease. Moreover, obstacles such as disparities between the legal regimens of nations (what is considered a crime in one country may not be in another) and differences in willingness to extradite suspected criminals can hamper prosecutions. The law enforcement community has, however, expanded its working relationships with both domestic and international agencies.

Globalization and technological innovation have fostered the expansion of both legitimate and criminal operations across physical borders as well as throughout cyberspace. Advanced, rapid communication systems have made it easier for criminals to carry out their operations remotely from their victims and members of their illicit networks. In the largely borderless cyber domain, criminals can rely on relative anonymity and a rather seamless environment to conduct illicit business. Further, in the rapidly evolving digital age, law enforcement may not have the technological capabilities to keep up with the pace of criminals.

Some criminal groups establish their own operational “borders” by defining and defending the “turf” or territories they control. Similarly, U.S. law enforcement often remains constrained by its own notions of “turf”—partly defined in terms of competing agency-level priorities and jurisdictions. While some crimes are worked under the jurisdiction of a proprietary agency, others are not investigated under such clear lines. These investigative overlaps and a lack of data and information sharing can hinder law enforcement anti-crime efforts.

U.S. law enforcement has, particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, increasingly relied on intelligence-led policing, enhanced interagency cooperation, and technological implementation to confront 21st century crime. For instance, enforcement agencies have used formal and informal interagency agreements as well as fusion centers and task forces to assimilate information and coordinate operations. Nonetheless, there have been notable impediments in implementing effective information sharing systems and relying on up-to-date technology. Congress may question how it can leverage its legislative and oversight roles to bolster U.S. law enforcement’s abilities to confront modern-day crime. For instance, Congress may consider whether federal law enforcement has the existing authorities, technology, and resources—both monetary and manpower—to counter 21st century criminals. Congress may also examine whether federal law enforcement is utilizing existing mechanisms to effectively coordinate investigations and share information.


Date of Report: July 19, 2011
Number of Pages: 41
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Veterans and Homelessness

Libby Perl
Specialist in Housing Policy

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought renewed attention to the needs of veterans, including the needs of homeless veterans. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) reported that in FY2008 it assessed more than 1,500 veterans who served in the Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom theater of operations for participation in its Health Care for Homeless Veterans Program. Both male and female veterans have been overrepresented in the homeless population, and as the number of veterans increases due to these conflicts, there is concern that the number of homeless veterans could rise commensurately. The current economic downturn also has raised concerns that homelessness could increase among all groups, including veterans.

Congress has created numerous programs that serve homeless veterans specifically, almost all of which are funded through the Veterans Health Administration. These programs provide health care and rehabilitation services for homeless veterans (the Health Care for Homeless Veterans and Domiciliary Care for Homeless Veterans programs), employment assistance (Homeless Veterans Reintegration Program and Compensated Work Therapy program), and transitional housing (Grant and Per Diem program) as well as other supportive services. The VA also works with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to provide permanent supportive housing to homeless veterans through the HUD-VA Supported Housing Program (HUD-VASH). In the HUD-VASH program, HUD funds rental assistance through Section 8 vouchers while the VA provides supportive services. In addition, two newly enacted programs focus on homelessness prevention through supportive services: the VA’s Supportive Services for Veteran Families program and a VA and HUD homelessness prevention demonstration program.

Several issues regarding veterans and homelessness have become prominent, in part because of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. One issue is ending homelessness among veterans. In November 2009, the VA announced a plan to end homelessness within five years. Both the VA and HUD have taken steps to increase housing and services for homeless veterans. Funding for VA programs has increased in recent years (see Table 4) and Congress has appropriated funds to increase available units of permanent supportive housing through the HUD-VASH program. In each of the FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010 HUD appropriations acts, Congress provided funds sufficient to support more than 10,000 new vouchers per year, which have been distributed to housing authorities in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam. The FY2011 Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-10) provided an additional $50 million for HUD-VASH, which funded 6,790 vouchers.

A second issue is the concern that veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan who are at risk of homelessness may not receive the services they need. Efforts are being made to coordinate services between the VA and Department of Defense to ensure that those leaving military service transition to VA programs. In addition, concerns have risen about the needs of female veterans, whose numbers are increasing. Women veterans face challenges that could contribute to their risks of homelessness. They are more likely to have experienced sexual trauma than women in the general population and are more likely than male veterans to be single parents. Few homeless programs for veterans have the facilities to provide separate accommodations for women and women with children.


Date of Report: July 14, 2011
Number of Pages: 45
Order Number: RL34024
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