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Thursday, March 31, 2011

Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress


Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests funding for the procurement of an 11th San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship. The Navy intends this ship to be the final ship in the class. The ship has received $184.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests the remaining $1,847.4 million needed to complete the ship’s estimated procurement cost of $2,031.4 million.

The Navy plans to begin procuring a new class of amphibious ship called the LSD(X) in FY2017. Some observers have suggested using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X). Navy officials do not stress this option and instead appear more interested in developing an all-new design for the LSD(X). If a decision were made to use the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X), then procuring a 12
th LPD-17 in FY2014 or FY2015 would help keep the LPD-17 production line open until the procurement of the first LSD(X) in FY2017, which in turn might help reduce LSD(X) production costs.

Issues for Congress include whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposed funding request for the 11
th LPD-17, whether to encourage or direct the Navy to use the LPD-17 design as the basis for the design of the LSD(X), and—particularly if the LPD-17 design is used as the basis for the LSD(X)—whether to fund the procurement of a 12th LPD-17 in FY2014 or FY2015.


Date of Report: March 16, 2011
Number of Pages: 55
Order Number: RL34476
Price: $29.95

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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress


Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 23 at the end of FY2011 to 41 at the end of FY2016, and the cumulative number SM-3 Aegis BMD interceptor missiles delivered to the Navy is scheduled to grow from 111 at the end of FY2011 to 341 at the end of FY2016.

Under the Administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD operations, BMD-capable Aegis ships will operate in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran. BMD-capable Aegis ships also operate in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran.

The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2012 budget requests a total of $2,380.3 million in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for Aegis Ashore sites that are to be part of the EPAA.

Some observers are concerned—particularly in light of the EPAA—that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for BMD-capable Aegis ships are growing faster than the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships. They are also concerned that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for Aegis ships for conducting BMD operations could strain the Navy’s ability to provide regional military commanders with Aegis ships for performing non-BMD missions.

Issues for Congress include whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA and Navy funding requests for the Aegis BMD program, and whether to provide MDA or the Navy with additional direction concerning the program. Options for Congress include, among other things, the following: accelerating the modification of Aegis ships to BMD-capable configurations, increasing procurement of new Aegis destroyers, increasing procurement of SM-3 missiles, and providing funding for integrating the SM-2 Block IV BMD interceptor missile into the 4.0.1 version of the Aegis BMD system.



Date of Report: March 17, 2011
Number of Pages: 71
Order Number: RL33745
Price: $29.95

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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress


Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

Procurement of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers resumed in FY2010 after a fouryear hiatus. Congress funded the procurement of one DDG-51 in FY2010, and the Navy requested funding for the procurement of two more DDG-51s in FY2011. The Navy’s FY2012 budget submission calls for procuring one DDG-51 in FY2012, and seven more in FY2013- FY2016.

DDG-51s to be procured through FY2015 are to be of the current Flight IIA design. The Navy wants to begin procuring a new version of the DDG-51 design, called the Flight III design, starting in FY2016. The Flight III design is to feature, among other design changes, a new and more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The Navy plans to begin preliminary design work on the Flight III DDG-51 in FY2012, and wants to use a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for DDG-51s to be procured from FY2013 through FY2016 or FY2017.

The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests $1,980.7 million in procurement funding for the DDG-51 planned for procurement in FY2012. This funding, together with $48.0 million in advance procurement funding that the Navy requested for the ship in its proposed FY2011 budget, would complete the ship’s total estimated procurement cost of $2,028.7 million. The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget also requests $100.7 million in advance procurement funding for two DDG-51s planned for procurement in FY2013, $453.7 million in procurement funding to help complete procurement costs for the three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers that were procured in FY2007 and FY2009, and $166.6 million in research and development funding for the AMDR.

FY2012 issues for Congress include the following: 
  • the potential impact of a year-long continuing resolution (CR) on the Navy’s ability to execute its planned procurement of two DDG-51s FY2011; 
  • the contract status of the second and third ships in the DDG-1000 program; 
  • whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposal to develop the Flight III DDG-51 design and start procuring it in FY2016; 
  • whether it would be appropriate for the Navy to use a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract beginning in FY2013 to procure one or more Flight III DDG- 51s; 
  • whether actions—such as adding DDG-51s to the Navy’s shipbuilding plan and/or extending the lives of existing Flight I/II DDG-51s beyond current Navy plans—should be taken to mitigate a shortfall in cruisers and destroyers that is projected to begin in the 2020s; and 
  • whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s FY2011 and FY2012 funding requests for procurement of DDG-51s, for completing DDG-1000 procurement costs, and for research and development work on the AMDR.

Date of Report: March 14, 2011
Number of Pages: 40
Order Number: RL32109
Price: $29.95

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Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications


Jennifer K. Elsea
Legislative Attorney

Richard F. Grimmett
Specialist in International Security

From the Washington Administration to the present, Congress and the President have enacted 11 separate formal declarations of war against foreign nations in five different wars. Each declaration has been preceded by a presidential request either in writing or in person before a joint session of Congress. The reasons cited in justification for the requests have included armed attacks on United States territory or its citizens and threats to United States rights or interests as a sovereign nation.

Congress and the President have also enacted authorizations for the use of force rather than formal declarations of war. Such measures have generally authorized the use of force against either a named country or unnamed hostile nations in a given region. In most cases, the President has requested the authority, but Congress has sometimes given the President less than what he asked for. Not all authorizations for the use of force have resulted in actual combat. Both declarations and authorizations require the signature of the President in order to become law.

In contrast to an authorization, a declaration of war in itself creates a state of war under international law and legitimates the killing of enemy combatants, the seizure of enemy property, and the apprehension of enemy aliens. While a formal declaration was once deemed a necessary legal prerequisite to war and was thought to terminate diplomatic and commercial relations and most treaties between the combatants, declarations have fallen into disuse since World War II. The laws of war, such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions, apply to circumstances of armed conflict whether or not a formal declaration or authorization was issued.

With respect to domestic law, a declaration of war automatically triggers many standby statutory authorities conferring special powers on the President with respect to the military, foreign trade, transportation, communications, manufacturing, alien enemies, etc. In contrast, no standby authorities appear to be triggered automatically by an authorization for the use of force, although the executive branch has argued, with varying success, that the authorization to use force in response to the terrorist attacks of 2001 provided a statutory exception to certain statutory prohibitions.

Most statutory standby authorities do not expressly require a declaration of war to be actualized but can be triggered by a declaration of national emergency or simply by the existence of a state of war; however, courts have sometimes construed the word “war” in a statute as implying a formal declaration, leading Congress to enact clarifying amendments in two cases. Declarations of war and authorizations for the use of force waive the time limitations otherwise applicable to the use of force imposed by the War Powers Resolution.

This report provides historical background on the enactment of declarations of war and authorizations for the use of force and analyzes their legal effects under international and domestic law. It also sets forth their texts in two appendices. The report includes an extensive listing and summary of statutes that are triggered by a declaration of war, a declaration of national emergency, and/or the existence of a state of war. The report concludes with a summary of the congressional procedures applicable to the enactment of a declaration of war or authorization for the use of force and to measures under the War Powers Resolution.



Date of Report: March 17, 2011
Number of Pages: 112
Order Number: RL31133
Price: $29.95

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Wednesday, March 30, 2011

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress


Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces

The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps as a successor to the 11 different versions of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) that have been in service since 1985. On October 28, 2008, three awards were made for the JLTV Technology Development (TD) Phase, which is scheduled to conclude in the June 2011 timeframe to three industry teams: (1) BAE Systems, (2) the team of Lockheed Martin and General Tactical Vehicle, and (3) AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems. Once testing is completed and technology requirements established, a full and open competition was expected to be conducted in the late summer, 2011 for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase and the Department of Defense (DOD) planned to award two contracts for the EMD phase, which was scheduled to last 24 months.

In February 2011, it was announced that the award of the EMD contract would be delayed until January 2012 because the Army changed requirements for the JLTV. DOD had planned to award two contracts for the EMD phase, which was scheduled to last 24 months, but now plans for a 48- month-long EMD. In addition, the Category B variant was eliminated because it proved to be too heavy to meet the required transportability weight. Now there will be two variants—a Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) that can transport four passengers and carry 3,500 pounds and a Combat Support Vehicle (CSV) that can transport two passengers and carry 5,100 pounds.

The Marines have expressed reservations with the JLTV because, at its current estimated weight, it does not lend itself to Marine Corps expeditionary operations. The Marines do not rule out removing themselves from the program and modifying HMMWVs if developers cannot address their specific requirements. The Army is said to be “moving ahead” with the JLTV program, appearing less concerned than the Marines about transportability requirements. Some describe the Army and Marines as “striking out on a separate path” with the Army more concerned with survivability and the Marines concerned that heavier JLTVs could cause weight problems on the Navy’s amphibious ships.

DOD has not publically assigned a definitive cost to the JLTV program, suggesting that it is too early in the development process. Some analysts suggest that the JLTV program will cost well over $10 billion and possibly as much as $30 billion to $70 billion, depending on the final cost of the vehicles and the number procured. Currently, the per unit cost is estimated at about $320,000 per vehicle—a figure that the Marines believe is too high.

The FY2011 Budget Request for JLTVs is $172.1 million for Army Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $71.8 million for Marine Corps RDT&E, for a program total of $243.9 million.

Concerns have been expressed that DOD’s Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) All - Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) effort will clash with the JLTV. There are also concerns about overall JLTV program affordability and the Marine’s concerns with its weight and transportability. The Army’s decision to change JLTV survivability requirements has resulted in the delay of awarding EMD contracts and the doubling of the EMD phase to 48 months which could increase the program’s overall cost.



Date of Report: March 10, 2011
Number of Pages: 11
Order Number: RS22942
Price: $29.95

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