Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget, like the Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget, requests no funding for Military Construction (MilCon) projects required to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) at Mayport, FL. The Navy’s FY2013 budget deferred the Navy’s plan to homeport a CVN at Mayport, and the Navy’s FY2013-FY2017 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) contained no funding for MilCon projects required to homeport a CVN at Mayport. The Navy stated in its FY2013 budget submission: “Although the FY 2013 budget does not contain a construction project supporting the homeporting of a CVN in Mayport, FL, the Department [of the Navy] is committed to the requirement and policy to strategically disperse CVNs on each coast. This is a deferral at this time due to fiscal constraints.”

The Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are all homeported at Norfolk, VA. The Navy wants to establish a second Atlantic Fleet CVN home port by homeporting a CVN at Mayport. Prior to the submission of the FY2013 budget, Navy plans called for having Mayport ready to homeport a CVN in 2019. Transferring a CVN from Norfolk to Mayport would shift from Norfolk to Mayport the local economic activity associated with homeporting a CVN, which some sources estimate as being worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year.

The Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport is an issue of strong interest to certain Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia. Certain Members of Congress from Florida have expressed support for the Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing (as have DOD and the Navy) that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are worth the costs associated with moving a CVN to Mayport. Certain Members of Congress from Virginia have expressed skepticism regarding, or opposition to, the Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are questionable or uncertain, and that the funding needed to implement the proposal could achieve greater benefits if it were spent on other Navy priorities.


Date of Report: June 27, 2013
Number of Pages: 74
Order Number: R40248
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Foreign Surveillance and the Future of Standing to Sue Post-Clapper

Andrew Nolan
Legislative Attorney

Recent news accounts (and government responses to those news accounts) have indicated that the government is reportedly engaged in a surveillance program that gathers vast amounts of data, including records regarding the phone calls, emails, and Internet usage of millions of individuals. The disclosures to the media reportedly suggest that specific telecommunication companies have been required to disclose certain data to the government as part of the intelligence community’s surveillance efforts.

The recent controversy over the reports of government targeting efforts comes months after the Supreme Court ruled in a case called Clapper v. Amnesty International. In Clapper, the Court dismissed a facial constitutional challenge to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act on constitutional standing grounds. Specifically, the Clapper court found that the litigants, a group of attorneys and human rights activists who argued that their communications with clients could be the target of foreign intelligence surveillance, could not demonstrate they would suffer a future injury that was “certainly impending,” the requirement the majority of the Court found to be necessary to establish constitutional standing when asking a court to prevent a future injury.

Notwithstanding the Clapper decision, in light of the recent revelations about the government’s intelligence gathering methods, several lawsuits have been filed by individuals who are customers of the companies allegedly subject to court orders requiring the disclosure of data to the government. The litigants in these newly filed lawsuits would appear to have a stronger argument for how they have been injured than the plaintiffs in Clapper did. Notably, unlike the Clapper plaintiffs, the litigants in these new lawsuits have evidence that the government is actually using its authority to gather data that is pertinent to the plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs in these lawsuits may still have significant difficulties in establishing standing, as they have arguably not alleged that they have been specifically targeted by the government or injured in any concrete and particularized way by the government’s conduct. Moreover, gathering evidence to prove an injury will be difficult because of evidentiary privileges protecting the government information. As a consequence, litigation challenging the government surveillance programs that are the topic of recent media accounts may have the same difficulties found in the Clapper litigation.


Date of Report: June 14, 2013
Number of Pages: 15
Order Number: R43107
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Next Steps in Nuclear Arms Control with Russia: Issues for Congress

Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

In his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama stated that the United States would “engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals.” These reductions could include limits on strategic, nonstrategic and nondeployed nuclear weapons. Yet, arms control negotiations between the United States and Russia have stalled, leading many observers to suggest that the United States reduce its nuclear forces unilaterally, or in parallel with Russia, without negotiating a new treaty. Many in Congress have expressed concerns about this possibility, both because they question the need to reduce nuclear forces below New START levels and because they do not want the President to agree to further reductions without seeking the approval of Congress.

Over the years, the United States reduced its nuclear weapons with formal, bilateral treaties, reciprocal, but informal, understandings, and unilateral adjustments to its force posture. The role of Congress in the arms control process also depends on the mechanism used to reduce forces. If the United States and Russia sign a formal treaty, then the Senate must signal its advice and consent with a vote of two-thirds of its Members. The House and Senate would each need to pass legislation approving an Executive Agreement. But the President can reduce U.S. nuclear weapons in parallel with Russia, without seeking congressional approval, if the reductions are taken unilaterally, or as the result of a nonbinding political agreement.

Each of the mechanisms for reducing nuclear forces can possess different characteristics for the arms control process. These include balance and equality, predictability, flexibility, transparency and confidence in compliance, and timeliness. Provisions in formal treaties can mandate balance and equality between the two sides’ forces. They can also provide both sides with the ability to predict the size and structure of the other’s current and future forces. Unilateral measures allow each side to maintain flexibility in deciding the size and structure of its nuclear forces. In addition, the monitoring and verification provisions included in bilateral treaties can provide each side with detailed information about the numbers and capabilities of the other’s nuclear forces, while also helping each side confirm that the other has complied with the limits and restrictions in the treaty. With unilateral reductions, the two sides could still agree to share information, or they could withhold information so that they would not have to share sensitive data about their forces.

It usually takes far longer to reduce nuclear forces through a bilateral arms control treaty than it takes to adopt unilateral adjustments to nuclear forces. The need to find balanced and equitable trades, limits acceptable to both sides, detailed definitions of systems limited by the treaty, and agreed procedures for monitoring and verification can slow the process of negotiations. In addition, it can take months or years for a treaty to enter into force, both because the legislatures must review and vote on the treaty and because other domestic or international events intervene. In contrast, the nations may be able to adopt and implement unilateral adjustments more quickly. .


Date of Report: June 19, 2013
Number of Pages: 37
Order Number: R43037
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Veterans’ Medical Care: FY2013 Appropriations

Sidath Viranga Panangala
Specialist in Veterans Policy

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospital and medical care. The VA provides these benefits through three major operating units: the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA).

This report focuses on funding for the VHA. The VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through the nation’s largest integrated health care system. Eligibility for VA health care is based primarily on previous military service, disability, and income. VA provides free inpatient and outpatient medical care to veterans for service-connected conditions and to low-income veterans for nonservice-connected conditions.

The President’s FY2013 budget request was submitted to Congress on February 13, 2012. The President’s budget requested $135.6 billion in budget authority for the VA as a whole. This included approximately $75 billion in mandatory funding and $61 billion in discretionary funding. For FY2013, the Administration requested $53.3 billion for VHA. This included $41.5 billion for the medical services account, $5.7 billion for the medical support and compliance account, $5.4 billion for the medical facilities account, and nearly $583 million for the medical and prosthetic research account. The total requested amount for VHA represents a 4.1% increase over the FY2012-enacted appropriations. Furthermore, as required by the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-81), the President’s budget requested $54.5 billion in advance appropriations for the three medical care accounts (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) for FY2014. On December 7, 2012, the President submitted a $235.6 million supplemental request for VA for costs associated with Hurricane Sandy.

Congress did not enact a regular Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill for FY2013 (MILCON-VA Appropriations bill) prior to the beginning of FY2013, and funded most of the VA (excluding the three medical care accounts: medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) through a six-month government-wide continuing resolution (P.L. 112-175). On January 29, 2013, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, was enacted as P.L. 113-2. This Act provided approximately $236.6 million for the VA.

On March 6, 2013, the House passed the Department of Defense, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (H.R. 933). The Senate passed an amended version of the bill on March 20, 2013, and the House agreed to the amended version the next day. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (H.R. 933; P.L. 113-6) was signed into law by the President on March 26, 2013. Division E of P.L. 113- 6 contained funding for the VA. P.L. 113-6 provides $133.9 billion in budget authority for the VA as a whole. This includes approximately $72.9 billion in mandatory funding and $61 billion in discretionary funding. For FY2013, funding for VHA is $53.3 billion. Furthermore, as required by the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-81), P.L. 113-6 provides $54.5 billion in advance appropriations for the three medical care accounts (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) for FY2014.


Date of Report: June 13, 2013
Number of Pages: 31
Order Number: R42518
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Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC): Background and Issues for Congress

Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces

On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a “more affordable and sustainable” vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles are intended to play a central role in future Marine amphibious operation.

The ACV is scheduled to enter service between FY2020 and FY2022 and the Marines currently plan on acquiring 573 ACVs. Total program and per vehicle costs have not yet been made public, with the Marines citing ongoing affordability and vehicle mix studies as the primary reason why definitive costs are not yet available.

On June 14, 2013, it was reported that Marine leadership had put the MPC program “on ice” due to budgetary pressures but the program might be resurrected some 10 years down the road. The Marines reportedly will continue to communicate with defense industry, so if the decision is made to restart the MPC program, it can be done in an expeditious and cost-efficient manner.

Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have recommended fully funding the Administration’s FY2014 ACV Budget Request of $136.967 million in Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding. The House Appropriations Committee recommended a $14 million cut to the Administration’s request due to program delay.

Potential issues for Congress include the possible operational impact of the deferment of the MPC as well as how feasible will it be to restart the MPC program after an extended delay? This report will be updated.


Date of Report: June 26, 2013
Number of Pages: 11
Order Number: R42723
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