Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations

Pat Towell, Coordinator
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget

The President’s FY2011 budget request, released February 1, 2010, included $733.3 billion in new budget authority for national defense. In addition to $548.9 billion for the regular (non-war) operations of the Department of Defense (DOD), the request included $159.3 billion for ongoing military operations, primarily funding the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, bringing the total DOD request for FY2011 to $708.3 billion. The balance of the national defense request amounts to $25.1 billion for defense-related activities by agencies other than DOD.

The President also requested supplemental appropriations for FY2010 totaling $33.6 billion. This included $33.0 billion for war costs and $655 million to pay DOD’s share of the cost of humanitarian relief operations in Haiti, struck on January 12, 2010, by a devastating earthquake.

The $548.9 billion requested for DOD’s so-called “base budget”—that is, all activities other than war costs—is $18.2 billion higher than the amount appropriated for DOD non-war costs in FY2010. By DOD’s estimate, this 3.4% increase would amount to a “real” increase of 1.8% in “purchasing power, after taking into account the cost of inflation. The budget request would continue the Administration’s policy of increasing the share of DOD’s budget invested in capabilities for counterinsurgency and other unconventional types of combat, including helicopters, special operations forces, and unmanned vehicles.

The budget includes no funding to continue production of the C-17 cargo plane or to continue development of the F-136 alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, two programs Congress has funded in recent years over the objections of the Bush and Obama Administrations.

On May 28, 2010, the House passed H.R. 5136, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011. As reported by the committee (H.Rept. 111-491), the bill would authorize $725.9 billion for DOD and other defense-related activities, a reduction of $2.7 million from the Administration’s request for programs covered by that legislation. The House bill would add to the budget $485 million to continue development of the alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), despite warnings by Defense Secretary Robert H. Gates that he would recommend a veto of any bill that would continue that project. The bill included no funds for the procurement of additional C-17s. An amendment adopted by the House would repeal a 1993 law that, in effect, bars from military service those who are openly homosexual.

On June 4, 2010, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 3454; S.Rept. 111-201), which would authorize $725.7 billion for DOD and other defense-related activities, a reduction of $240.7 million from the Administration’s request. The committee bill would repeal the “don’t ask, don’t tell” law and it would not add funds for either the JSF alternate engine or the C-17.

In July, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees each set funding ceilings for their respective Defense subcommittees that would cut the requested FY2011 DOD base budget by $7 billion in the case of the House and by $8.1 billion in case of the Senate. Each Defense Subcommittee complied with the required reduction in the base budget request. On July 27, 2010, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee approved a draft FY2011 DOD Appropriations bill that would provide $513.3 billion for the base budget, a reduction of $7 billion. The full Senate Appropriations Committee approved September 16 a draft FY2011 DOD bill that would provide $512.2 billion for the base budget, a reduction of $8.1 billion.


Date of Report: November 23, 2010
Number of Pages: 92
Order Number: R41254
Price: $29.95

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Long-Term Unemployment and Recessions

Gerald Mayer
Analyst in Labor Policy

Linda Levine
Specialist in Labor Economics

The recession that began in the United States in December 2007 and officially ended in June 2009 was one of the deepest and the longest since the Great Depression. One feature that distinguishes the recent recession from its postwar predecessors is the historically high percentage of workers who have been unemployed for more than six months (the long-term unemployed). This report analyzes the trend in long-term unemployment over the postwar period and offers explanations for its unusually high incidence during the most recent postwar recession. It compares the individual, job, and household characteristics of the long-term unemployed during the latest recession (2007-2009) with the long-term unemployed at the end of the two previous recessions (1990-1991 and 2001).

Long-term unemployment varies across individuals based on demographic and job characteristics. In each of the last three recessions, older unemployed workers were more likely than younger workers to have been unemployed for over six months. While an equal share of unemployed men and women were unemployed for over half a year during the last two recessions, unemployed women were less likely than men to have been out of work for 27 or more weeks at the end of the 1990-1991 recession. Unlike the two previous recessions, in 2009, unemployed workers with less than a high school education were more likely than unemployed workers with more education to have been out of work for at least six months. Also, in 2009, workers laid off from the financial activities and information industries were the most likely to have been jobless longer than 26 weeks. Workers displaced from management, business, and financial occupations were most at risk of long-term unemployment during recent recessions.

Unemployment affects both the individuals who are without work and their families. Households of the long-term unemployed have lower earnings and income than other households (where households include married couples, single parents, and single individuals). In 2009, the most recent year for which data are available, the long-term unemployed were more likely than all unemployed workers to live in households with incomes below the official poverty line. They were more likely than other unemployed workers to receive benefits from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp program) or be covered by Medicaid. In 2009, only 1.6% of the long-term unemployed received public assistance.

Slightly over half (55%) of the long-term unemployed had some type of health insurance coverage at some time during 2009, compared to a larger majority (83%) of employed workers. Although a small majority (58%) of the long-term unemployed were homeowners in 2009, they were less likely than employed workers (71%) to own their own homes.

As the economy recovers and employers increase hiring to meet the growing demand for goods and services, many currently unemployed workers will be able to find new jobs. However, finding work may be more difficult for the long-term unemployed if, for example, employers believe that their skills have deteriorated during their lengthy time away from the workplace. The long-term unemployed displaced from industries in which restructuring has occurred may also have a hard time finding new jobs in other industries, especially if the jobs require skills different from those they possess. Policies to encourage employers to hire the long-term unemployed include wage and training subsidies. Offering wage insurance and reemployment bonuses to unemployed workers may encourage them to accept jobs sooner than they otherwise might have.


Date of Report: November 22, 2010
Number of Pages: 30
Order Number: R41179
Price: $29.95

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Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which are large, long-range missiles armed with multiple nuclear warheads. The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their SLBMs, so as to deter a nuclear attack on the United States by another country. Navy SSBNs form one leg of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force, or “triad,” which also includes land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and landbased long-range bombers. The Navy currently operates 14 Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSBNs, the first of which is projected to reach the end of its service life in 2027.

The Navy is currently conducting development and design work on a planned class of 12 nextgeneration ballistic missile submarines, or SSBN(X)s, which the service wants to procure as replacements for the 14 Ohio-class boats. The SSBN(X) program, also known as the Ohio-class replacement program (ORP), received $497.4 million in research and development funding in the Navy’s FY2010 budget, and the Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests an additional $672.3 million in research and development funding for the program. Navy plans call for procuring the first SSBN(X) in FY2019, with advance procurement funding for the boat beginning in FY2015.

The Navy in February 2010 preliminarily estimated the procurement cost of each SSBN(X) at $6 billion to $7 billion in FY2010 dollars—a figure equivalent to roughly one-half of the Navy’s budget each year for procuring new ships. In September 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) stated that the Navy was working to reduce the average unit procurement cost of ships 2 through 12 in the program to $5 billion in FY2010 dollars. Some observers are concerned that procuring 12 SSBN(X)s during the 15-year period FY2019-FY2033, as called for in Navy plans, could lead to reductions in procurement rates for other types of Navy ships during those years. Potential FY2011 issues for Congress include the following: 

• • the accuracy of the Navy’s preliminary estimate of the procurement cost of each SSBN(X); 
• • the prospective affordability of the SSBN(X) program and its potential impact on other Navy shipbuilding programs; 
• • the impact of UK preferences for the design of its new SSBNs on U.S. consideration of SSBN(X) design options; and 
• • the question of which shipyard or shipyards will build SSBN(X)s. 

Options for reducing the cost of the SSBN(X) program or its potential impact on other Navy shipbuilding programs include procuring fewer than 12 SSBN(X)s; reducing the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to be carried by each SSBN(X); designing the SSBN(X) to carry a smaller SLBM; stretching out the schedule for procuring SSBN(X)s and making greater use of split funding (i.e., two-year incremental funding) in procuring them; funding the procurement of SSBN(X)s in a part of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget other than the Navy’s shipbuilding account; and increasing the Navy’s shipbuilding budget.

This report focuses on the SSBN(X) as a Navy shipbuilding program. CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf, discusses the SSBN(X) as an element of future U.S. strategic nuclear forces in the context of strategic nuclear arms control agreements.


Date of Report: November 22, 2010
Number of Pages: 41
Order Number: R41129
Price: $29.95

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Military Uniform Procurement: Questions and Answers

Valerie Bailey Grasso
Specialist in Defense Acquisition

Military uniforms are procured through the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), an agency of the Department of Defense (DOD). DLA is DOD’s largest combat support agency, providing worldwide logistics support for the United States (U.S.) military services, civilian agencies, and foreign countries. With headquarters in Fort Belvoir, Virginia, DLA operates three supply centers including DLA Troop Support [formerly Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP)] in Philadelphia, PA.

DLA Troop Support is responsible for procuring nearly all of the food, clothing, and medical supplies used by the military, about 90% of the construction materiel used by troops in the field as well as repair parts for aircraft, combat vehicles, and other weapons system platforms. Within DLA Troop Support, the Clothing and Textile (C&T) Directorate supplies more than 8,000 different items ranging from uniforms to footwear and equipment. According to DLA Troop Support’s website, sales of goods exceeded $14.5 billion during 2009.

Legislative initiatives which may affect the procurement of military uniforms include S. Amdt 4640 to S. 3454, the proposed FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act, which would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, not later than February 28, 2011, that presents an analysis of alternatives for the procurement of fire-resistant and fire-retardant fibers and materials for the production of military products (like uniforms). Congress has determined that vehicle and aircraft fires remain a significant force protection and safety threat, whether they occur during ongoing combat operations or while training for future deployment. Given the high probability that these types of injuries will continue to occur, this amendment seeks to determine if there are advanced fiber products that may provide greater protection against burn injuries to members of the Armed Forces. It should be noted that the Secretary of Defense’ Report to Congress is due prior to the issuance of a similar report from the Comptroller General’s (CG) report.


Date of Report: November 23, 2010
Number of Pages: 6
Order Number: RS20550
Price: $19.95

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The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions

Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee have both held hearings on the treaty. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a Resolution of Ratification for the treaty, by a vote of 14-4, on September 16, 2010. It has sent the treaty to the floor of the Senate for debate and an eventual vote. To approve ratification of the treaty, the full Senate must approve the Resolution of Ratification by a two-thirds vote.

New START provides the parties with seven years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber.

New START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty’s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.

The monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side’s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.

New START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force.

The Obama Administration and outside analysts argue that New START will strengthen strategic stability and enhance U.S. national security. They contend that New START will contribute to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals by convincing other nations that the United States is serious about its obligations under the NPT. This might convince more nations to cooperate with the United States in pressuring nations who are seeking their own nuclear weapons.

Critics, however, question whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. Some also consider the U.S.-Russian arms control process to be a distraction from the more important issues on the nonproliferation agenda.


Date of Report: November 24, 2010
Number of Pages: 34
Order Number: R41219
Price: $29.95

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