Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years.

The Navy in February 2006 presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of 313 ships, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. The Navy in subsequent years changed its desired quantities for certain ship types, and by mid-2011 the Navy’s desired fleet appeared to have grown to a total of 328 ships. In September 2011, the Navy began briefing congressional offices on a new 313-ship plan that incorporates some of the changes that the Navy made over the years to the 313-ship plan of February 2006 while staying within the overall total of 313 ships. Among other things, the 313-ship plan of September 2011 reduces the planned number of Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) to 10, compared to a previously planned total of 21.

Press reports in September and October 2011 state that the Navy, in response to anticipated reductions in planned levels of defense spending, is examining options for maintaining a fleet with considerably fewer than 300 ships; for retiring certain ships in the near term, well before the ends of their expected service lives; and for deferring or cancelling certain planned procurements.

The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests funding for the procurement of 10 new battle force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The 10 ships include two Virginia-class attack submarines, one DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one LPD-17 class amphibious ship, one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). The Navy’s five-year (FY2012- FY2016) shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress in conjunction with the Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget, includes a total of 55 new battle force ships, or an average of 11 per year. Of the 55 ships in the plan, 27, or almost half, are relatively inexpensive LCSs or JHSVs.

The Navy’s FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress in late May 2011, includes 276 ships. The FY2012 30-year plan does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the Navy’s 313-ship goal over the long run. Among other things, the Navy projects that the cruiser-destroyer and attack submarine forces would drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.

A June 2011 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on the cost of the Navy’s FY2012 30- year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan estimates that the plan would cost an average of $18.0 billion per year in constant FY2011 dollars to implement, or about 16% more than the Navy estimates. CBO’s estimate is about 7% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the first 10 years of the plan, about 10% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the second 10 years of the plan, and about 31% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the final 10 years of the plan. Some of the difference between CBO’s estimate and the Navy’s estimate, particularly in the latter years of the plan, is due to a difference between CBO and the Navy in how to treat inflation in Navy shipbuilding.

Issues for Congress include the appropriate future size and structure of the Navy in light of changes in strategic and budget circumstances, the sufficiency of the Navy’s FY2012 30-year shipbuilding plan for achieving and maintaining the Navy’s 313-ship goal, and the affordability of the FY2012 30-year shipbuilding plan.


Date of Report: November 28, 2011
Number of Pages: 39
Order Number: RL32665
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Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) since FY1998. Fourteen have been procured through FY2011, and another two are requested for FY2012. The eight boats to be procured in the five-year period FY2009-FY2013 (boats 11 through 18, in annual quantities of 1-1-2-2-2) are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement.

The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests $3,232.2 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of the 15th and 16th Virginia-class boats. The FY2012 budget estimates the combined procurement cost of these two boats at $5,142.8 million, and under Navy budget plans the boats are to receive a total of $1,910.5 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) and Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget also requests $1,524.8 million in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future years.

The Navy’s 30-year SSN procurement plan, if implemented, would not be sufficient to maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently over the long run. The Navy projects that the SSN force will fall below 48 boats starting in 2024, reach a minimum of 39 boats in 2030, and remain below 48 boats through 2041.

On September 1, 2011, it was reported that the Navy, in response to anticipated reductions in planned levels of defense spending, is considering a variety of budget-cutting options, but has identified attack submarines as a high priority and wants to preserve the two-per-year procurement rate for the Virginia-class program.

Potential issues for Congress regarding the Virginia-class program include the following: 

•         the Virginia-class procurement rate in coming years, particularly in the context of the projected SSN shortfall and the larger debate over future U.S. defense strategy and defense spending; 

•         the Navy’s plans for inserting new technologies into the Virginia-class design; 

•         whether the Navy should build at least some Virginia-class boats in future years with an additional mid-body section equipped with large-diameter vertical launch tubes suitable for cruise missiles, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and other payloads; and 

•         the reliability of in-service Virginia-class boats. 

The Navy’s Ohio replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine program is discussed in CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.


Date of Report: November 29, 2011
Number of Pages: 28
Order Number: RL34418
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Coast Guard Deepwater Acquisition Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The term Deepwater has referred to more than a dozen separate Coast Guard acquisition programs for replacing and modernizing the service’s aging fleet of deepwater-capable ships and aircraft. Until April 2007, the Coast Guard pursued these programs as a single, integrated acquisition program that was known as the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) program or Deepwater program for short. Since April 2007, the Coast Guard has pursued them as separate acquisition programs. These acquisition programs include plans for, among other things, 91 new cutters, 124 new small boats, and 247 new or modernized airplanes, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2012 budget submission proposes to eliminate the use of “Deepwater” as a term for grouping or referring collectively to these acquisition programs. The budget submission states that “Consistent with the dissolution of Integrated CG Systems and the disaggregation of the Deepwater Acquisition into asset-based Acquisition Program Baselines, the proposed changes align projects that were formerly grouped under Integrated Deepwater Systems (IDS) with the existing authorized structure for Vessels, Aviation, Shore, Other Equipment, and Personnel and Management.”

The year 2007 was a watershed year for these acquisition programs. The management and execution of what was then the single, integrated Deepwater program was strongly criticized by various observers. House and Senate committees held several oversight hearings on the program. Bills were introduced to restructure or reform the program in various ways. Coast Guard and industry officials acknowledged certain problems in the program’s management and execution and defended the program’s management and execution in other respects. The Coast Guard announced a number of reform actions that significantly altered the service’s approach to Deepwater acquisition (and to Coast Guard acquisition in general). Among these was the change from a single, integrated Deepwater acquisition program to a collection of separate acquisition programs.

The Coast Guard’s management of these acquisition programs, including implementation of recommendations made by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), is a topic of continuing congressional oversight. Additional oversight issues include reporting of information to Congress on these programs; cost growth in, and budget planning for, these acquisition programs; a Coast Guard fleet mix analysis that could lead to changes in planned asset quantities; and execution of individual acquisition programs.

The Coast Guard’s FY2012 budget appears to request $975.5 million in acquisition funding for these programs, including $289.9 million for aircraft, $512.0 million for surface ships and boats, and $173.6 million for other items.


Date of Report: November 23, 2011
Number of Pages: 62
Order Number: RL33753
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Defense: FY2012 Budget Request, Authorization and Appropriations

Pat Towell
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget

President Obama’s FY2012 budget request, sent to Congress on February 14, 2011, included $670.9 billion in discretionary budget authority for the Department of Defense (DOD), of which $553.1 billion was for the so-called “base budget” of the department (that is, the cost of routine, peacetime operations excluding the cost of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan). The remaining $117.8 billion in the DOD budget request was to cover the cost of so-called “overseas contingency operations (OCO),” including operations in those two countries.

However, the Budget Control Act (BCA) enacted in early August set ceilings on FY2012 discretionary budget authority that would require a reduction of $35.7 billion from the total amount the Administration had requested for so-called “security agencies”—a category that includes the DOD base budget, the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security, and the Energy Department’s Nuclear National Security Agency, as well as the Department of State and various international activities funded by other federal agencies.

Before the BCA was enacted, the House had passed its version of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540), which would authorize $1.8 billion more than was requested for DOD in February. The bill was passed on May 26, 2011, by a vote of 322-96 after a floor debate highlighted by a relatively narrow vote (204-215) to reject an amendment by Representative McGovern that would have required the President to send Congress an accelerated plan for handing over security operations in Afghanistan to the government of that country. Also prior to the enactment of the BCA, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported on June 22, 2011 an initial version of the authorization act (S. 1253) which would have authorized $6.4 billion less that the Administration requested for FY2012, of which $5.9 billion would be cut from the base budget.

The version of the FY2012 DOD appropriations act (H.R. 2219) passed by the House on June 14, 2011, would reduce the President’s requested base budget by $8.9 billion. However, the bill would provide $842 million more than the President’s $117.8 billion OCO request. Thus the net reduction to the President’s request for H.R. 2219 as passed by the House would be $8.1 billion.

The first legislative action that applied the BCA-mandated spending reduction to FY2012 defense funding legislation was taken by the Senate Appropriations Committee on September 7, 2011, when it adopted discretionary spending ceilings for each of its 12 subcommittees that required the Defense Subcommittee to cut $25.9 billion from the President’s request for programs funded by the DOD Appropriations bill. On September 15, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported an amended version of the House-passed DOD Appropriations bill (H.R. 2219) that would cut $29.3 billion from the Administration request. That reduction included $5.0 billion that was cut from the budget request for war costs to take account of President Obama’s announcement on June 22, 2011 that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan would be reduced by 33,000 by the end of FY2012.

The Senate Armed Services Committee approved on November 15, 2011 a revised version of the FY2012 defense authorization bill (S. 1867) that would reduce the FY2012 national defense authorization by an additional $21 billion, on top of the reduction of more than $6 billion that would have been made by the committee’s earlier bill (S. 1253). All told, S. 1867—which the Senate began to debate on November 17—would cut $27.3 billion from the Administration’s FY2012 national defense authorization request.


Date of Report: November 25, 2011
Number of Pages: 80
Order Number: R41861
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Law Enforcement Use of Global Positioning (GPS) Devices to Monitor Motor Vehicles: Fourth Amendment Considerations

Alison M. Smith
Legislative Attorney

As technology continues to advance, what was once thought novel, even a luxury, quickly becomes commonplace, even a necessity. Global Positioning System (GPS) technology is one such example. Generally, GPS is a satellite-based technology that discloses the location of a given object. This technology is used in automobiles and cell phones to provide individual drivers with directional assistance. Just as individuals are finding increasing applications for GPS technology, state and federal governments are as well. State and federal law enforcement use various forms of GPS technology to obtain evidence in criminal investigations. For example, federal prosecutors have used information from cellular phone service providers that allows real-time tracking of the locations of customers’ cellular phones. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1958 (P.L. 90-351) regulates the interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications. As such, it does not regulate the use of GPS technology affixed to vehicles and is beyond the scope of this report. However, bills introduced in the 112th Congress, such as S. 1212 and H.R. 2168, would address circumstances under which law enforcement may obtain, use, or disclose GPS data.

The increased reliance on GPS technology raises important societal and legal considerations. Some contend that law enforcement’s use of such technology to track motor vehicles’ movements provides for a safer society. Conversely, others have voiced concerns that GPS technology could be used to reveal information inherently private. Defendants on both the state and federal levels are raising Fourth Amendment constitutional challenges, asking the courts to require law enforcement to first obtain a warrant before using GPS technology.

Subject to a few exceptions, the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant before conducting a search or making a seizure. Courts continue to grapple with the specific issue of whether law enforcement’s use of GPS technology constitutes a search or seizure, as well as the broader question of how the Constitution should address advancing technology in general. The Supreme Court may provide some answers in United States v. Jones (131 S.Ct. 3064 (2011)) when it addresses the issue of whether law enforcement’s use of GPS technology in connection with motor vehicles falls within the Fourth Amendment’s purview. Lower federal courts have arrived at varying conclusions. Several district and circuit courts of appeals have concluded that law enforcement’s current use of GPS technology does not constitute a search, and is thus permissible, under the Constitution. One circuit court has found the duration of GPS tracking to be constitutionally significant. State legislatures and state courts have approached the issue in various ways. Some states have enacted laws requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant before using GPS technology. Some state courts have resolved the question under their own constitutions. Other state courts have relied on Supreme Court precedent, such as United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), to derive an answer.

This report discusses the basics of GPS technology, society’s reliance on it, and some of the related legal and privacy implications. In addition, the report examines legislative and judicial responses on both federal and state levels.


Date of Report: November 22, 2011
Number of Pages: 15
Order Number: R41663
Price: $29.95

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