Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy’s FY2013 budget submission calls for procuring nine Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers in FY2013-FY2017, in annual quantities of 2-1-2-2-2. The five DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2013-FY2015, and one of the two scheduled for procurement in FY2016, are to be of the current Flight IIA design. The Navy wants to begin procuring a new version of the DDG-51 design, called the Flight III design, starting with the second of the two ships scheduled for procurement in FY2016. The two DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2017 are also to be of the Flight III design. The Flight III design is to feature a new and more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The Navy this year is requesting congressional approval to use a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement for the nine DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2013-FY2017.

The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget requests $3,048.6 million to complete the procurement funding for the two DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2013. The Navy estimates the total procurement cost of these ships at $3,149.4 million, and the ships have received $100.7 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding. The FY2013 budget also requests $466.3 million in AP funding for DDG-51s to be procured in future fiscal years. Much of this AP funding is for Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) procurement of selected components of the nine DDG-51s to be procured under the proposed FY2013-FY2017 MYP arrangement. The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget also requests $669.2 million in procurement funding to help complete procurement costs for three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers procured in FY2007-FY2009, and $223.6 million in research and development funding for the AMDR.

A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released on January 24, 2012, discusses several potential oversight issues for Congress regarding the Navy’s plans for procuring DDG- 51s, particularly the Flight III version. Some of these issues were first raised in this CRS report; the GAO report developed these issues at length and added some additional issues. Potential FY2013 issues for Congress concerning destroyer procurement include the following:

• whether actions should be taken to mitigate the projected shortfall in cruisers and destroyers; 
• whether to approve the Navy’s request for a DDG-51 MYP arrangement beginning in FY2013, and if so, whether it should include Flight III DDG-51s; 
• the possibility of adding a tenth ship to the proposed DDG-51 MYP arrangement; 
• whether there is an adequate analytical basis for procuring Flight III DDG-51s in lieu of the previously planned CG(X) cruiser; 
• whether the Flight III DDG-51 would have sufficient air and missile capability to adequately perform future air and missile defense missions; 
• cost, schedule, and technical risk in the Flight III DDG-51 program; 
• whether the Flight III DDG-51 design would have sufficient growth margin for a projected 35- or 40-year service life; 
• whether the categorization of the Flight III DDG-51 program in the DOD acquisition process provides for a sufficient level of oversight for the program; and 
• schedule risk for recently procured Flight IIA DDG-51s.

Date of Report: July 2, 2012
Number of Pages: 62
Order Number: RL32109
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Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget defers the Navy’s plan to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) at Mayport, FL. The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget and the FY2013- FY2017 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) contain no funding for Military Construction (MilCon) projects required to homeport a CVN at Mayport. The Navy states: “Although the FY 2013 budget does not contain a construction project supporting the homeporting of a CVN in Mayport, FL, the Department [of the Navy] is committed to the requirement and policy to strategically disperse CVNs on each coast. This is a deferral at this time due to fiscal constraints.”

The Navy’s five Atlantic Fleet CVNs are all homeported at Norfolk, VA. The Navy wants to establish a second Atlantic Fleet CVN home port by homeporting a CVN at Mayport. Prior to the submission of the FY2013 budget, Navy plans called for having Mayport ready to homeport a CVN in 2019. Transferring a CVN from Norfolk to Mayport would shift from Norfolk to Mayport the local economic activity associated with homeporting a CVN, which some sources estimate as being worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year.

The Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport is an issue of strong interest to certain Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia. Certain Members of Congress from Florida have expressed support for the Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing (as have DOD and the Navy) that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are worth the costs associated with moving a CVN to Mayport. Certain Members of Congress from Virginia have expressed skepticism regarding, or opposition to, the Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are questionable or uncertain, and that the funding needed to implement the proposal could achieve greater benefits if it were spent on other Navy priorities.


Date of Report: July 2, 2012
Number of Pages: 73
Order Number: R40248
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The Navy Biofuel Initiative Under the Defense Production Act

Anthony Andrews
Specialist in Energy and Defense Policy

Kelsi Bracmort
Specialist in Agricultural Conservation and Natural Resources Policy

Jared T. Brown
Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy

Daniel H. Else
Specialist in National Defense

The Secretaries of Energy, Agriculture, and the Navy have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to “assist the development and support of a sustainable commercial biofuels industry.” The objective of the MOU is the construction or retrofitting of multiple domestic commercial or pre-commercial scale advanced drop-in biofuel plants and refineries. The MOU would support the Navy’s goal of deploying a “Green Strike Group” by the end of 2012, and “Great Green Fleet” by 2016 fueled in part with a 50/50 blend of hydrotreated renewable jet fuel (biofuel). The Navy proposes to use authority under the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA) to develop a domestic industrial capacity to supply biofuel. In its FY2013 Congressional Budget Request, the Department of Energy (DOE) requested authority to transfer funds to the DPA Fund, offering the justification that it will support the MOU with the technical expertise to move pilot-scale demonstration projects to larger-scale production in support of the Navy’s Green Fleet Goal. Agriculture, Energy, and the Navy expect to fund this initiative at $510 million in aggregate over three years.

In the past, Congress has found it in the interest of national defense preparedness for government to assure that a domestic industrial capacity exists to produce fuel. Congress set aside the (now depleted) Naval Oil Reserves and Oil Shale Reserves to provide for the Navy’s fuel requirements. Congress later promoted alternative fuel from coal through the U.S. Synthetic Liquid Fuels Act of 1944 to aid the execution of World War II, and to conserve and increase national oil resources. The act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to construct, maintain, and operate plants producing synthetic liquid fuel from coal, oil shale, and agricultural and forestry products. During the Korean War, the DPA authorized the President to have liquid fuels processed and refined for government use or resale, and to make improvements to government- or privately-owned facilities engaged in processing and refining liquid fuels when it would aid the national defense. In 1980, Congress amended the DPA to authorize the President’s purchase of synthetic fuels for national defense. Most recently, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the Secretary of Energy, in cooperation with the Secretaries of the Interior and Defense, to develop a program to accelerate the commercial development of strategic unconventional fuels, including but not limited to oil shale and tar sands resources within the United States. Except for exploiting the Naval Oil Reserve, policies that directed alternative fuel development for national defense interests have had to challenge newly discovered petroleum resources that presented clear economic advantages over alternative fuels.

Domestic crude oil production in the United States has increased over the past few years, reversing a decline that began in 1986. The United States is now a net exporter of refined petroleum products. Over the next 10 years, continued development of unconventional oil resources, in combination with the ongoing development of offshore resources in the Gulf of Mexico may push domestic crude oil production to a level not seen since 1994, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

An important policy question for Congress may be whether a domestic biofuel industry is necessary for national defense, and whether proceeding under the authority of the DPA offers the necessary stimulus. A domestic biofuel industry may satisfy concerns for a secure, domestic, alternative fuel source independent of unstable foreign petroleum suppliers. However, adding biofuel to the military’s supply chain does not relieve logistical issues with delivering fuel to forward operating areas, where fuel supply issues have been more about vulnerability than availability.


Date of Report: June 22, 2012
Number of Pages: 22
Order Number: R42568
Price: $29.95

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Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation

Mary Beth Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan’s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its “minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan.

Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclearrelated technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan’s security situation in recent years.

However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.

This report updates a previous version published November 30, 2011.


Date of Report: June 26, 2012
Number of Pages: 32
Order Number: RL34248
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Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2013 Appropriations

Daniel H. Else
Specialist in National Defense

Christine Scott
Specialist in Social Policy

Sidath Viranga Panangala
Specialist in Veterans Policy

The Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill provides funding for the planning, design, construction, alteration, and improvement of facilities used by active and reserve military components worldwide. It capitalizes military family housing and the U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program and finances the implementation of installation closures and realignments. It underwrites veterans benefit and health care programs administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), provides for the creation and maintenance of U.S. cemeteries and battlefield monuments within the United States and abroad, and supports the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Armed Forces Retirement Homes, and Arlington National Cemetery. The bill also funds advance appropriations for veterans’ medical services.

President Barack Obama submitted his request to Congress for FY2013 appropriations on February 13, 2012. For the appropriations accounts included in this bill, his request totaled $145.2 billion in new budget authority, divided into three major categories: Title I (military construction and family housing) at $11.2 billion; Title II (veterans affairs) at $135.6 billion; and Title III (related agencies) at $219.5 million. Of the total, $74.4 billion (49.9%) would be discretionary appropriations, with the remainder considered mandatory. On May 15, the House Committee on Appropriations reported a bill recommending appropriating $10.9 billion for Title I (less $235 million in funds rescinded from prior years), $135.4 billion for Title II, and $347 million for Title III.

Military construction funding amounts requested by the President and enacted by Congress have fallen off as the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) round has reached completion, although Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has requested statutory authority to carry out two new BRAC rounds in 2013 and 2015. Funding support for military family housing construction has also declined as the military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) continue their efforts to privatize formerly government-owned accommodations.

Funding for the VA between FY2012 and FY2013 in the Administration request, H.R. 5854, and S. 3215, reflects increases for mandatory veterans’ benefits and health care. The largest percentage increases between FY2012 and FY2013 are for mandatory benefits, primarily disability compensation and pension benefits.

The House Committee on Appropriations reported its FY2013 bill (H.R. 5854) on May 16, 2012 (H.Rept. 112-491) and passed the bill on May 31. The Senate received H.R. 5854 on June 5. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its bill (S. 3215) on May 22 (S.Rept. 112-168), and the bill was placed on the Legislative Calendar under General Orders.


Date of Report: July 5, 2012
Number of Pages: 32
Order Number: R42586
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