U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress

Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs

This CRS report, updated as warranted, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration re-engaged with the top PRC leadership, including China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP- 3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and aggressive maritime confrontations (including in 2009).

Issues for Congress include whether the Obama Administration has complied with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursued contacts with the PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65). Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts have achieved results in U.S. objectives and whether the contacts have contributed to the PLA’s warfighting capabilities that might harm U.S. security interests. Some have argued about whether the value that U.S. officials place on the contacts overly extends leverage to the PLA. Some believe talks can serve U.S. interests that include conflict avoidance/crisis management; militarycivilian coordination; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; nuclear/missile/space/cyber talks; counterterrorism; and POW/MIA accounting.

In 2010 and 2011, the PLA criticized U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and claimed to “suspend” many U.S.-PRC military contacts. Then, in 2011, the PLA hosted Secretary Gates in January, and the PLA Chief of General Staff visited in May. In May 2012, General Liang Guanglie visited as the first PRC Defense Minister to do so since 2003. Defense Secretary Panetta visited in September.

Policymakers could review the approach to mil-to-mil contacts, given concerns about crises. U.S. officials have faced challenges in cooperation from the PLA. The PLA has tried to use its suspensions of exchanges while blaming U.S. “obstacles” (including arms sales to Taiwan, legal restrictions on contacts, and the Pentagon’s reports to Congress on the PLA). The PRC’s harassment of U.S. surveillance ships (in 2009) and increasing assertiveness in maritime areas have shown the limits to mil-to-mil talks and PLA restraint. Still, at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July 2009, President Obama called for military contacts to diminish disputes with China. The U.S. military seeks to expand cooperation with the PLA. The NDAA for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) amended P.L. 106-65 for the annual report on PRC military power to expand the focus to security developments involving the PRC, add cooperative elements, and fold in another report on mil-to-mil contacts. However, the Administration was late in submitting this report in 2010, 2011, and 2012. Enacted as P.L. 112-81 on December 31, 2011, the FY2012 NDAA required reporting on cyber threats but did not require a change back to the original title, while adding a requirement for a report from the Defense Secretary before any waiver of a ban on defense procurement from PLA companies. H.R. 4310 and S. 3254, NDAA for FY2013, would strengthen the annual reporting on military and security challenges and mil-to-mil engagement.


Date of Report: October 25, 2012
Number of Pages: 76
Order Number: RL32496
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Air Force F-22 Fighter Program

Jeremiah Gertler
Specialist in Military Aviation

Procurement of Air Force F-22 Raptor fighters began in FY1999, and a total of 195 (177 production aircraft, 16 test aircraft, and 2 development aircraft) were procured through FY2009. In the FY2010 budget, the Administration proposed to end F-22 procurement at 187, and Congress approved that termination. The F-22 assembly line in Marietta, GA, has been shut down, with its tools and equipment placed in storage.

Since 2010, operational issues have arisen. Following a November 2010 fatal crash of an F-22 in Alaska, Air the Force recorded at least 25 “physiological incidents” of F-22 pilots reporting hypoxia-like symptoms while flying, possibly indicating oxygen deprivation. Following a lengthy investigation and grounding of the F-22 fleet, the Air Force attributed the oxygen deprivation to “a ‘mosaic’ of interrelated cockpit equipment issues.” Following corrective actions, the F-22 fleet has returned to the air.

The Administration’s proposed FY2013 defense budget requests $283.9 million in FY2013 procurement funding for modification of in-service aircraft and $36.7 million to equip Air Logistics Centers to perform F-22 maintenance. The Administration’s proposed FY2013 defense budget also requests a new start program, funded at $140.1 million in research and development, for the Increment 3.2B software, and $371.7 million in FY2013 research and development funding for F-22A Squadrons.

The Senate Appropriations Committee markup of the FY2013 defense appropriation bill includes language prohibiting funds from being used to approve or license the sale of the F-22 to other countries. The bill does permit the Department of Defense to conduct studies and design activities to develop a future export version of the aircraft that protects classified and sensitive information. This language is similar to provisions passed by Congress each year since 1998.


Date of Report: October 25, 2012
Number of Pages: 27
Order Number: RL31673
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Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status

Mary Beth Nikitin, Coordinator
Specialist in Nonproliferation

Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation

Steven A. Hildreth
Specialist in Missile Defense

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in the hands of radical states and terrorists, represent a major threat to U.S. national security interests. Multilateral regimes were established to restrict trade in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile technologies, and to monitor their civil applications. Congress may consider the efficacy of these regimes in the 112th Congress. This report provides background and current status information on the regimes.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive multilateral and bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organizations and domestic agencies, and the domestic laws of participating countries. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, U.S. leadership has been crucial in developing the regime. While there is almost universal international agreement opposing the further spread of nuclear weapons, several challenges to the regime have arisen in recent years: India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998; North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and tested a nuclear explosive device in 2006 and 2009; Libya gave up a clandestine nuclear weapons program in 2004; Iran has been in non-compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations since 2005; and Syria was building a clandestine nuclear reactor with North Korean assistance until a 2007 Israeli military strike. The discovery of the nuclear black market network run by A.Q. Khan spurred new thinking about how to strengthen the regime, including greater restrictions on sensitive technology. After the terrorist attacks of 2001, the United States has focused more resources on preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD weapons and strengthened multilateral counterproliferation efforts. On the other hand, the extension of civil nuclear cooperation by the United States and other countries to India, a non-party to the NPT with nuclear weapons, has raised questions about what benefits still exist for non-nuclear-weapons states that remain in the treaty regime.

The chemical and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation regimes contain three elements: the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Australia Group. The informal Australia Group coordinates export controls on CBW-related materials and technology. The CWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons, and mandates the destruction of existing chemical weapon arsenals. The BWC bans the development, production, and stockpiling of biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes.”

The missile nonproliferation regime is founded not on a treaty, but an informal agreement created in 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR’s goal is to limit the spread of missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The MTCR guidelines have been modified over time to include missile systems designed for the delivery of chemical and biological weapons. The regime, which has no enforcement organization, is thought to have been instrumental in blocking several missile programs, but has been unable to stop missile development in North Korea and Iran.


Date of Report: October 25, 2012
Number of Pages: 48
Order Number: RL31559
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Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Coast Guard’s program of record (POR) calls for procuring eight National Security Cutters (NSCs), 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and 58 Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) as replacements for 90 aging Coast Guard cutters and patrol craft. The NSC, OPC, and FRC programs have a combined estimated acquisition cost of about $21.1 billion, and the Coast Guard’s proposed FY2013 budget requests a total of $852 million in acquisition funding for the three programs.

NSCs are the Coast Guard’s largest and most capable general-purpose cutters. They have an estimated average procurement cost of about $684 million per ship. The first three are now in service, and the fourth and fifth are under construction. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2013 budget requests $683 million for the NSC program, including $658 million to complete the funding for the sixth NSC.

OPCs are to be smaller, less expensive, and in some respects less capable than NSCs. They have an estimated average procurement cost of about $484 million per ship. The first OPC is to be procured in FY2017. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2013 budget requests $30 million for the OPC program.

FRCs are considerably smaller and less expensive than OPCs. They have an estimated average procurement cost of about $73 million per boat. A total of 18 have been funded through FY2012. The first entered service on April 14, 2012; the second was delivered to the Coast Guard on May 26, 2012; and the third is scheduled to be delivered by the end of FY2012. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2013 budget requests $139 million for the FRC program.

Potential oversight issues for Congress regarding the NSC, OPC, and FRC programs include the following:

• the absence of funding in the Coast Guard’s FY2013 five-year (FY2013-FY2017) capital investment plan for the seventh and eighth NSCs; 
• hull corrosion and leaks in the third NSC; 
• the Coast Guard’s proposal to restructure the use of FY2012 FRC acquisition funding so as to procure four FRCs in FY2012 rather than six, and to defer the procurement of the other two FY2012-funded FRCs to FY2013; 
• delays, cost growth, and testing issues in the FRC program; 
• the Coast Guard’s acquisition strategy for the OPC; 
• the potential for using multiyear procurement (MYP) in acquiring new cutters; 
• the adequacy of the Coast Guard’s planned NSC, OPC, and FRC procurement quantities; 
• whether eight NSCs, 25 OPCs, and 58 FRCs is the best mix of cutters that could be procured for roughly the same total amount of acquisition funding; and 
• the adequacy of information available to Congress to support review and oversight of Coast Guard procurement programs, including cutter procurement programs.

Date of Report: October 25, 2012
Number of Pages: 62
Order Number: R42567
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Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget requests $564.9 million for continued research and development work on the Ohio replacement program (ORP), a program to design and build a new class of 12 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace the Navy’s current force of 14 Ohioclass SSBNs. The Ohio replacement program is also known as the SSBN(X) program.

Under the Navy’s FY2012 budget, the first Ohio replacement boat was scheduled to be procured in FY2019, and Ohio replacement boats were to enter service on a schedule that would maintain the Navy’s SSBN force at 12 boats. The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget defers the procurement of the first Ohio replacement boat by two years, to FY2021. As a result of this deferment, the Navy’s SSBN force will drop to 11 or 10 boats for the period FY2029-FY2041.

The Navy in 2011 estimated the average procurement cost of boats 2 through 12 in the Ohio replacement program at $5.6 billion each in FY2010 dollars, and is working to reduce that figure to a target of $4.9 billion each in FY2010 dollars. Even with this cost-reduction effort, observers are concerned about the impact the Ohio replacement program will have on the Navy’s ability to procure other types of ships at desired rates in the 2020s and early 2030s.

Potential oversight issues for Congress for the Ohio replacement program include the following:

• the reasons for deferring the start of SSBN(X) procurement by two years, to FY2021, the cost and operational impact of this decision, and whether it would be feasible and cost effective to restore the start of procurement to FY2019, as planned under the FY2012 budget; 
• the plan to design the SSBN(X) with 16 SLBM tubes rather than 20; 
• the likelihood that the Navy will be able to reduce the average procurement cost of boats 2-12 in the program to the target figure of $4.9 billion each in FY2010 dollars; 
• the accuracy of the Navy’s estimate of the procurement cost of each SSBN(X); 
• the prospective affordability of the Ohio replacement program and its potential impact on funding available for other Navy shipbuilding programs; and 
• the question of which shipyard or shipyards will build SSBN(X)s. 

This report focuses on the Ohio replacement program as a Navy shipbuilding program. CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf, discusses the SSBN(X) as an element of future U.S. strategic nuclear forces in the context of strategic nuclear arms control agreements.


Date of Report: October 25, 2012
Number of Pages: 44
Order Number: R41129
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