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Thursday, April 4, 2013

Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress



Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

This report presents policy and oversight issues for Congress arising from (1) maritime territorial disputes involving China in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) and (2) an additional dispute over whether China has a right under international law to regulate U.S. and other foreign military activities in its 200-nautical-mile maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

China is a party to multiple maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, including, in particular, disputes over the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, and the Senkaku Islands in the ECS. Maritime territorial disputes involving China in the SCS and ECS date back many years, and have periodically led to incidents and periods of increased tension. The disputes have again intensified in the past few years, leading to numerous confrontations and incidents, and heightened tensions between China and other countries in the region, particularly Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

In addition to maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, China is involved in a dispute, particularly with the United States, over whether China has a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within China’s EEZ. The dispute appears to be at the heart of multiple incidents between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace in 2001, 2002, and 2009.

The issue of whether China has a right under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to regulate foreign military activities in its EEZ is related to, but ultimately separate from, the issue of maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS. The two issues are related because China can claim EEZs from inhabitable islands over which it has sovereignty, so accepting China’s claims to islands in the SCS or ECS could permit China to expand the EEZ zone within which China claims a right to regulate foreign military activities.

The EEZ issue is ultimately separate from the territorial disputes issue because even if all the territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS were resolved, and none of China’s claims in the SCS and ECS were accepted, China could continue to apply its concept of its EEZ rights to the EEZ that it unequivocally derives from its mainland coast—and it is in this unequivocal Chinese EEZ that most of the past U.S.-Chinese incidents at sea have occurred.

China depicts its maritime territorial claims in the SCS using the so-called map of the nine-dash line that appears to enclose an area covering roughly 80% of the SCS. China prefers to discuss maritime territorial disputes with other parties to the disputes on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis, and has resisted U.S. involvement in the disputes. Some observers believe China is pursuing a policy of putting off a negotiated resolution of maritime territorial disputes so as to give itself time to implement a strategy of taking incremental unilateral actions that gradually enhance China’s position in the disputes and consolidate China’s de facto control of disputed areas. China’s maritime territorial claims in the SCS and ECS appear to be motivated by a mix of factors, including potentially large undersea oil and gas reserves, fishing rights, nationalism, and security concerns.

The United States does not take a position (i.e., is neutral) regarding competing territorial claims over land features in the SCS and ECS. The U.S. position is that territorial disputes should be resolved peacefully—without coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force—and that claims

of territorial waters and EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. officials have stated that the United States has a national interest in the preservation of freedom of navigation as recognized in customary international law of the sea and reflected in UNCLOS. The United States, like most other countries, believes that coastal states under UNCLOS do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. If China’s position on the issue—that coastal states do have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs—were to gain greater international acceptance under international law, it could substantially affect U.S. naval operations not only in the SCS and ECS, but around the world.

Maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China in the SCS and ECS raise a number of policy and oversight issues for Congress, including the following:


  • the risk that the United States might be drawn into a crisis or conflict over a territorial dispute involving China, particularly since the United States has bilateral defense treaties with Japan and the Philippines; 
  • the risk of future incidents between U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft arising from U.S. military survey and surveillance activities in China’s EEZ; 
  • the impact of maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China on the overall debate on whether the United States should become a party to UNCLOS; 
  • implications for U.S. arms sales and transfers to other countries in the region, particularly the Philippines, which currently has limited ability to monitor maritime activity in the SCS on a real-time basis, and relatively few modern ships larger than patrol craft in its navy or coast guard; 
  • implications for the stationing and operations of U.S. military forces in the region, and for U.S. military procurement programs; 
  • implications for interpreting the significance of China’s rise as an economic and military power, particularly in terms of China’s willingness to accept international norms and operate within an international rules-based order; 
  • the impact on overall U.S. relations with China and other countries in the region; and 
  • the effect on U.S. economic interests, including oil and gas exploration in the SCS and ECS by U.S. firms, and on international shipping through the SCS and ECS, which represents a large fraction of the world’s seaborne trade. 

Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. political and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region and U.S. military operations in both the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere.

Legislation in the 113
th Congress concerning maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China in the SCS and ECS includes H.R. 772.

Date of Report: March 25, 2013
Number of Pages: 89
Order Number: R42784
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Wednesday, April 3, 2013

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY WORKING DOG IN VIETNAM



This study investigates the contributions of the military working dogs in Vietnam to determine their significance to the United States' war effort.

There is limited written history concerning the use of the military working dogs in Vietnam. The methods and procedures employed in this study data relied extensively on personal military after action reports and histories to compile a historical account of the military working dog in Vietnam.

Date of Report: March 19, 2013
Number of Pages: 115
Order Number: G1323
Price: $5.95

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Department of Defense Energy Initiatives: Background and Issues for Congress



Moshe Schwartz
Specialist in Defense Acquisition

Katherine Blakeley
Analyst in Foreign Affairs

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs


The Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars per year on fuel, and is pursuing numerous initiatives for reducing its fuel needs and changing the mix of energy sources that it uses. DOD’s energy initiatives pose several potential oversight issues for Congress, and have been topics of discussion and debate at hearings on DOD’s proposed FY2013 budget.

By some accounts, DOD is the largest organizational user of petroleum in the world. Even so, DOD’s share of total U.S. energy consumption is fairly small. DOD is by far the largest U.S. government user of energy. The amount of money that DOD spends on petroleum-based fuels is large in absolute terms, but relatively small as a percentage of DOD’s overall budget. DOD’s fuel costs have increased substantially over the last decade, to about $17 billion in FY2011. Petroleum-based liquid fuels are by far DOD’s largest source of energy, accounting for approximately two-thirds of DOD energy consumption. When DOD’s fuel use is divided by service, the Air Force is the largest user; when divided by platform type, aircraft are the largest user.

According to DOD, currently about 75% of DOD’s energy use is operational energy and about 25% is installation energy. Operational energy is defined in law as “the energy required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military operations.” Installation energy is not defined in law, but in practice refers to energy used at installations, including non-tactical vehicles, that does not fall under the definition of operational energy.

DOD’s reliance on fuel can lead to financial, operational, and strategic challenges and risks. Financial challenges and risks relate to the possibility of a longer-term trend of increasing costs for fuel, and to shorter-term volatility in fuel prices. Operational challenges and risks relate to (1) the diversion of resources to the task of moving fuel to the battlefield; (2) the negative impact of fuel requirements on the mobility of U.S. forces and the combat effectiveness of U.S. equipment, and (3) the vulnerability of fuel supply lines to disruption. Strategic challenges and risks relate to getting fuel to the overseas operating area, and ensuring the global free flow of oil.

As part of its FY2013 budget submission, DOD has requested more than $1.4 billion for operational energy initiatives in FY2013. DOD’s office of Operational Energy Plans and Programs, headed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Operational Energy Plans and Programs (ASD (OEPP)), is responsible for developing DOD policy for operational energy and alternative fuels, and for coordinating operational energy efforts across the services.

Congress has been concerned with energy policy since the 1970s, and has passed legislation relating to federal government energy use, including DOD installation energy use. Congress has set specific energy-reduction targets for DOD installation energy, but not for operational energy.

Potential oversight issues for Congress regarding DOD’s energy initiatives include:


  • DOD’s coordination of operational energy initiatives being pursued by the military services. 
  • DOD’s efforts to gather reliable data and develop metrics for evaluating DOD’s energy initiatives. 
  • DOD’s estimates of future fuel costs.
  • DOD’s role in federal energy initiatives. 
  • The Navy’s initiative to help jumpstart a domestic advanced biofuels industry. 
  • The potential implications for DOD energy initiatives of shifts in U.S. military strategy.

Date of Report: March 28, 2013
Number of Pages: 77
Order Number: R42558
Price: $29.95

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Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress



Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

Moshe Schwartz
Specialist in Defense Acquisition


Multiyear procurement (MYP) and block buy contracting (BBC) are special contracting mechanisms that Congress permits the Department of Defense (DOD) to use for a limited number of defense acquisition programs. Compared to the standard or default approach of annual contracting, MYP and BBC have the potential for reducing weapon procurement costs by several percent.

Under annual contracting, DOD uses one or more contracts for each year’s worth of procurement of a given kind of item. Under MYP, DOD instead uses a single contract for two to five years’ worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. DOD needs congressional approval for each use of MYP. There is a permanent statute governing MYP contracting—10 U.S.C. 2306b. Under this statute, a program must meet several criteria to qualify for MYP.

Compared with estimated costs under annual contracting, estimated savings for programs being proposed for MYP have ranged from less than 5% to more than 15%, depending on the particulars of the program in question, with many estimates falling in the range of 5% to 10%. In practice, actual savings from using MYP rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify because of cost growth during the execution of the contract due to changes in the program independent of the use of MYP rather than annual contracting.

BBC is similar to MYP in that it permits DOD to use a single contract for more than one year’s worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. BBC is also similar to MYP in that DOD needs congressional approval for each use of BBC. BBC differs from MYP in the following ways:


  • There is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC. 
  • There is no requirement that BBC be approved in both a DOD appropriations act and an act other than a DOD appropriations act. 
  • Programs being considered for BBC do not need to meet any legal criteria to qualify for BBC, because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that establishes such criteria. 
  • A BBC contract can cover more than five years of planned procurements. 
  • Economic order quantity (EOQ) authority—the authority to bring forward selected key components of the items to be procured under the contract and purchase the components in batch form during the first year or two of the contract—does not come automatically as part of BBC authority because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that includes EOQ authority as an automatic feature. 
  • BBC contracts are less likely to include cancellation penalties. 

Potential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used, and whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute that governs the use of MYP.


Date of Report: March 27, 2013
Number of Pages: 25
Order Number: R41909
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Tuesday, April 2, 2013

The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community



The function of intelligence as an activity of the U.S. Government is often regarded as a product of the Cold War. Indeed, much of what is known today as the Intelligence Community was created and developed during the Cold War period. But intelligence has been a function of the Government since the founding of the Republic. While it has had various incarnations over time, intelligence has historically played a key role in providing support to U.S. military forces and in shaping the policies of the United States toward other countries.


Date of Report: March 12, 2013
Number of Pages: 32
Order Number: G1321
Price: $5.95

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