Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80 are the first three ships in the Navy’s new Gerald R. Ford (CVN- 78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs).

CVN-78 was procured in FY2008. The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget estimates the ship’s procurement cost at $12,323.2 million (i.e., about $12.3 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received advance procurement funding in FY2001-FY2007 and was fully funded in FY2008- FY2011 using congressionally authorized four-year incremental funding. The Navy did not request any procurement funding for the ship in FY2012, and is not requesting any procurement funding for the ship in FY2013. The Navy plans to request $449 million in procurement funding in FY2014 and $362 million in procurement funding in FY2015 for the ship to cover $811 million in cost growth on the ship.

CVN-79 is scheduled to be procured in FY2013. The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget estimates CVN-79’s procurement cost at $11,411.0 million (i.e., about $11.4 billion) in then-year dollars, and requests $608.2 million in procurement funding for the ship. The ship received advance procurement funding in FY2007-FY2012, and the Navy wants to fully fund the ship in FY2013- FY2018 using six-year incremental funding. The FY2013 budget proposes to lengthen the construction period for the ship by two years, so that the ship is delivered in September 2022, rather than in September 2020, as projected under the FY2012 budget. Although the ship is being procured in FY2013, the new delivery date of September 2022 is what in the past might have been expected for a carrier procured in FY2015.

CVN-80 is scheduled to be procured in FY2018. The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget estimates the ship’s procurement cost at $13,874.2 million (i.e., about $13.9 billion) in then-year dollars. Under the Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget, the ship is to receive advance procurement funding in FY2016-FY2017 and be fully funded in FY2018-FY2023 using six-year incremental funding. The FY2013 budget proposes to lengthen the construction period for the ship by two years, so that the ship is delivered in 2027, rather than in 2025, as projected under the FY2012 budget. Although the ship is being procured in FY2018, the new delivery date of 2027 is what in the past might have been expected for a carrier procured in FY2020.

The Navy states that lengthening the construction periods of CVNs 79 and 80 by two years will not temporarily reduce the carrier force to less than 11 ships, but will instead eliminate some instances of when the carrier force would have temporarily numbered 12 ships.

Oversight issues for Congress for the CVN-78 program include the following: the potential impact of an FY2013 year-long continuing resolution (CR) and a sequester on FY2013 funding on the procurement of CVN-79; cost growth in the CVN-78 program; where the estimated procurement costs of CVNs 78, 79, and 80 now stand in relation to the legislated procurement cost caps for the ships, and whether the cost caps should be amended; whether to procure CVN- 79 and CVN-80 together in a two-ship block buy; and CVN-78 program issues that were raised in a December 2012 report from the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E).


Date of Report: March 27, 2013
Number of Pages: 43
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Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget requests $3,217.6 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of the 17th and 18th Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines. The FY2013 budget estimates the combined procurement cost of these two boats at $5,107.9 million, and the ships have received a total of $1,890.3 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) and Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget also requests $874.9 million in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future years. The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget defers the scheduled procurement of one Virginia-class boat from FY2014 to FY2018.

The two Virginia-class boats requested for procurement in FY2013 are the final two in a group of eight covered by a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement for the period FY2009-FY2013. The Navy this year is requesting congressional approval for a new MYP arrangement that would cover the next nine Virginia-class boats scheduled for procurement in FY2014-FY2018 (in annual quantities of 1-2-2-2-2).

The Department of Defense (DOD) announced in January 2012 that it wants to build Virginiaclass boats procured in FY2019 and subsequent years with an additional mid-body section, called the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), that contains four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes that the boats would use to store and fire additional Tomahawk cruise missiles or other payloads, such as large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Building Virginia-class boats with the VPM might increase their unit procurement costs by about 15%-20%, and would increase the total number of torpedo-sized weapons (such as Tomahawks) that they could carry by about 76%.

The Navy’s FY2013 30-year SSN procurement plan, if implemented, would not be sufficient to maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently over the long run. The Navy projects under that plan that the SSN force would fall below 48 boats starting in FY2022, reach a minimum of 43 boats in FY2028-FY2030, and remain below 48 boats through FY2034.

Potential issues for Congress regarding the Virginia-class program include the following:

• the impact of the sequestration of FY2013 funding on the Virginia-class program; 
• whether to approve the Navy’s request for a new MYP arrangement for the Virginia-class program for FY2014-FY2018; 
• whether to restore procurement of a second Virginia-class boat in FY2014—an issue that could have implications for Virginia-class AP funding in FY2013; 
• the Virginia-class procurement rate more generally in coming years, particularly in the context of the projected SSN shortfall and the larger debate over future U.S. defense strategy and defense spending; and 
• Virginia-class program issues raised in a December 2011 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). 

The Navy’s Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine program is discussed in CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.


Date of Report: March 27, 2013
Number of Pages: 34
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy’s FY2013 budget submission calls for procuring nine Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers in FY2013-FY2017, in annual quantities of 2-1-2-2-2. The five DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2013-FY2015, and one of the two scheduled for procurement in FY2016, are to be of the current Flight IIA design. The Navy wants to begin procuring a new version of the DDG-51 design, called the Flight III design, starting with the second of the two ships scheduled for procurement in FY2016. The two DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2017 are also to be of the Flight III design. The Flight III design is to feature a new and more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The Navy for FY2013 is requesting congressional approval to use a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement for the nine DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2013-FY2017.

The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget requests $3,048.6 million to complete the procurement funding for the two DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2013. The Navy estimates the total procurement cost of these ships at $3,149.4 million, and the ships have received $100.7 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding. The FY2013 budget also requests $466.3 million in AP funding for DDG-51s to be procured in future fiscal years. The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget also requests $669.2 million in procurement funding to help complete procurement costs for three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers procured in FY2007-FY2009, and $223.6 million in research and development funding for the AMDR.

Potential FY2013 issues for Congress concerning destroyer procurement include the following:

• the potential impact of a year-long continuing resolution (CR) and sequester on the DDG-51 program in FY2013; 
• whether actions should be taken to mitigate the projected shortfall in cruisers and destroyers; 
• whether to approve the Navy’s request for a DDG-51 MYP arrangement beginning in FY2013, and if so, whether it should include Flight III DDG-51s; 
• the possibility of adding a 10th ship to the proposed DDG-51 MYP arrangement; 
• whether there is an adequate analytical basis for procuring Flight III DDG-51s in lieu of the previously planned CG(X) cruiser; 
• whether the Flight III DDG-51 would have sufficient air and missile capability to adequately perform future air and missile defense missions; 
• cost, schedule, and technical risk in the Flight III DDG-51 program; 
• whether the Flight III DDG-51 design would have sufficient growth margin for a projected 35- or 40-year service life; and 
• schedule risk for recently procured Flight IIA DDG-51s.

Date of Report: March 27, 2013
Number of Pages: 67
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Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

This report presents policy and oversight issues for Congress arising from (1) maritime territorial disputes involving China in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) and (2) an additional dispute over whether China has a right under international law to regulate U.S. and other foreign military activities in its 200-nautical-mile maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

China is a party to multiple maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, including, in particular, disputes over the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, and the Senkaku Islands in the ECS. Maritime territorial disputes involving China in the SCS and ECS date back many years, and have periodically led to incidents and periods of increased tension. The disputes have again intensified in the past few years, leading to numerous confrontations and incidents, and heightened tensions between China and other countries in the region, particularly Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

In addition to maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, China is involved in a dispute, particularly with the United States, over whether China has a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within China’s EEZ. The dispute appears to be at the heart of multiple incidents between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace in 2001, 2002, and 2009.

The issue of whether China has a right under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to regulate foreign military activities in its EEZ is related to, but ultimately separate from, the issue of maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS. The two issues are related because China can claim EEZs from inhabitable islands over which it has sovereignty, so accepting China’s claims to islands in the SCS or ECS could permit China to expand the EEZ zone within which China claims a right to regulate foreign military activities.

The EEZ issue is ultimately separate from the territorial disputes issue because even if all the territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS were resolved, and none of China’s claims in the SCS and ECS were accepted, China could continue to apply its concept of its EEZ rights to the EEZ that it unequivocally derives from its mainland coast—and it is in this unequivocal Chinese EEZ that most of the past U.S.-Chinese incidents at sea have occurred.

China depicts its maritime territorial claims in the SCS using the so-called map of the nine-dash line that appears to enclose an area covering roughly 80% of the SCS. China prefers to discuss maritime territorial disputes with other parties to the disputes on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis, and has resisted U.S. involvement in the disputes. Some observers believe China is pursuing a policy of putting off a negotiated resolution of maritime territorial disputes so as to give itself time to implement a strategy of taking incremental unilateral actions that gradually enhance China’s position in the disputes and consolidate China’s de facto control of disputed areas. China’s maritime territorial claims in the SCS and ECS appear to be motivated by a mix of factors, including potentially large undersea oil and gas reserves, fishing rights, nationalism, and security concerns.

The United States does not take a position (i.e., is neutral) regarding competing territorial claims over land features in the SCS and ECS. The U.S. position is that territorial disputes should be resolved peacefully—without coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force—and that claims
of territorial waters and EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. officials have stated that the United States has a national interest in the preservation of freedom of navigation as recognized in customary international law of the sea and reflected in UNCLOS. The United States, like most other countries, believes that coastal states under UNCLOS do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. If China’s position on the issue—that coastal states do have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs—were to gain greater international acceptance under international law, it could substantially affect U.S. naval operations not only in the SCS and ECS, but around the world.

Maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China in the SCS and ECS raise a number of policy and oversight issues for Congress, including the following:

• the risk that the United States might be drawn into a crisis or conflict over a territorial dispute involving China, particularly since the United States has bilateral defense treaties with Japan and the Philippines; 
• the risk of future incidents between U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft arising from U.S. military survey and surveillance activities in China’s EEZ; 
• the impact of maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China on the overall debate on whether the United States should become a party to UNCLOS; 
• implications for U.S. arms sales and transfers to other countries in the region, particularly the Philippines, which currently has limited ability to monitor maritime activity in the SCS on a real-time basis, and relatively few modern ships larger than patrol craft in its navy or coast guard; 
• implications for the stationing and operations of U.S. military forces in the region, and for U.S. military procurement programs; 
• implications for interpreting the significance of China’s rise as an economic and military power, particularly in terms of China’s willingness to accept international norms and operate within an international rules-based order; 
• the impact on overall U.S. relations with China and other countries in the region; and 
• the effect on U.S. economic interests, including oil and gas exploration in the SCS and ECS by U.S. firms, and on international shipping through the SCS and ECS, which represents a large fraction of the world’s seaborne trade. 

Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. political and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region and U.S. military operations in both the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere.

Legislation in the 113th Congress concerning maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China in the SCS and ECS includes H.R. 772.

Date of Report: March 25, 2013
Number of Pages: 89
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THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY WORKING DOG IN VIETNAM

This study investigates the contributions of the military working dogs in Vietnam to determine their significance to the United States' war effort.

There is limited written history concerning the use of the military working dogs in Vietnam. The methods and procedures employed in this study data relied extensively on personal military after action reports and histories to compile a historical account of the military working dog in Vietnam.

Date of Report: March 19, 2013
Number of Pages: 115
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