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Monday, April 8, 2013

Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress



Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a relatively inexpensive Navy surface combatant equipped with modular “plug-and-fight” mission packages. The Navy wants to field a force of 55 LCSs. Twelve LCSs have been funded through FY2012, and the FY2013-FY2017 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) calls for procuring 16 more, in annual quantities of 4-4-4-2-2.

The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget requests $1,785.0 million in procurement funding for the four LCSs requested for FY2013. The Navy’s proposed budget also requests $102.6 million in procurement funding for LCS mission modules.

There are two very different LCS designs—one developed by an industry team led by Lockheed, and another developed by an industry team that was led by General Dynamics. The Lockheed design is built at the Marinette Marine shipyard at Marinette, WI; the General Dynamics design is built at the Austal USA shipyard at Mobile, AL. LCSs 1, 3, 5, and so on are Marinette Marinebuilt ships; LCSs 2, 4, 6, and so on are Austal-built ships.

The 20 LCSs procured or scheduled for procurement in FY2010-FY2015—LCSs 5 through 24— are being acquired under a pair of 10-ship block buy contracts. Congress granted the Navy the authority for the block buy contracts in Section 150 of H.R. 3082/P.L. 111-322 of December 22, 2010, and the Navy awarded the block buy contracts to Lockheed and Austal USA on December 29, 2010. The contracts are both fixed-price incentive (FPI) block-buy contracts.

The LCS program has encountered controversy from time to time over the years over various program-related issues. Some observers, citing these issues, potential future Navy operations, and potential future constraints on defense spending, have proposed truncating the number of LCSs to be procured. In response to criticisms of the LCS program, the Navy over the years has acknowledged certain problems and stated that it was taking action to correct them, disputed other arguments made against the program, and maintained its support for the program and for procuring a total of 55 LCSs.

Current issues for Congress concerning the LCS program include the LCS’s prospective mission performance and cost-effectiveness, the combat survivability of the LCS, hull cracking and engine problems on LCS-1, and corrosion on LCS-2.



Date of Report: March 27, 2013
Number of Pages: 105
Order Number: RL33741
Price: $29.95

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Friday, April 5, 2013

Balloons of the Civil War



This historical study investigates the military effectiveness and combat power of Civil War balloons. The categories inherent to military effectiveness include timeliness, accuracy, usefulness, operational considerations, and logistics. Limited by available material, especially those documenting Confederate efforts, this book highlights the history of ballooning prior to the Civil War, and focuses on the Union balloon operations during the initial fall and winter of 1861-2, the Peninsular campaign, and Chancellorsville. The analysis of the measures of effectiveness from these three periods indicates the Union balloon corps amply validated its worth. War, however, is more then just science. In this case, the "art" of warfare better explains the collapse of Thaddeus Lowe's organization after Chancellorsville. The first two modern implications of this case study involve both the unfavorable impact of personality, and the commander's influence on the assimilation of new technology. Are we better today at bringing on line the benefits associated with technology? The final point links tot he concept of battle command. With the massive infusion of information available tot he modern commander, are we still sending him to the lions without a whip?


Date of Report: March 6, 2013
Number of Pages: 164
Order Number: G1327
Price: $5.95

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Ground Dog Day: Lessons Don't Have to be Relearned in the Use of Dogs in Combat



Currently, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan involve the US fighting insurgents. The nature of the fight in highly populated areas negates traditional American strengths in technology and mechanization. One of the potential tools in this fight is the expanded use of military working dogs (MWD), also called war dogs or K-9s. The increased use of dogs on the battlefield has the potential to save lives. The problem is that this lesson seems to have to be relearned with every prolonged conflict the US enters. The delay by the military leadership recognizing dogs’ utility on the battlefield has historically cost US servicemen’s lives.

The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether lessons that have been learned could be applied to the current MWD program to enhance the effectiveness of using dogs in combat. The intent is not to convince the reader that every lesson or particular conclusion or recommendation presented is the final solution to creating a “perfect” MWD program. The aim, instead, is to offer a spectrum of options or alternative methods that may be of use to those involved in MWD programs and to suggest areas for further research and exploration.


Date of Report: March 11, 2013
Number of Pages: 139
Order Number: G1326
Price: $5.95

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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress



Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The question is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget.

Two DOD strategy and budget documents released in January 2012 state that U.S. military strategy will place a renewed emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, and that as a result, there will be a renewed emphasis on air and naval forces in DOD plans. Administration officials have stated that notwithstanding reductions in planned levels of U.S. defense spending, the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region will be maintained and strengthened.

Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.

China’s naval modernization effort, which began in the 1990s, encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and surface ships. China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, training, and exercises. Observers believe that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization effort has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. Observers believe that China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is increasingly oriented toward pursuing additional goals, such as asserting or defending China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing China’s view—a minority view among world nations—that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200- mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); protecting China’s sea lines of communications; protecting and evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign countries; displacing U.S. influence in the Pacific; and asserting China’s status as a major world power.

Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following: whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be large enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakers around the world; the Navy’s ability to counter Chinese ASBMs and submarines; and whether the Navy, in response to China’s maritime anti-access capabilities, should shift over time to a more distributed fleet architecture.



Date of Report: March 21, 2013
Number of Pages: 115
Order Number: RL33153
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Thursday, April 4, 2013

Special Operations Forces and the Military Working Dog

This book examines the potential for military working dogs to support Special Operations Forces (SOF). Modern technology has not eliminated the operational prospective for the military employment of dogs. Canine olfactory superiority, advanced hearing, and ability to detect movement offer significant military employment potential. Military working dogs can be trained for scouting, patrolling, building and ship searches, countermine, counterdrug and tracking. When used properly, dogs are an inexpensive and efficient force multiplier.

Qualitative research using correlational data comprises the monograph’s methodology. Military working dog capabilities, limitations, and historical employment will be discussed and then compared to Special Operation Forces principal missions and collateral activities.

The conclusion demonstrates that dogs have a wider role to perform in today’s operational environment and that military working dogs can augment and complement SOF operations. Nearly every SOF mission can benefit from the inclusion of dogs— particularly in support of Stability and Support Operations conducted in developing countries that cannot employ or sustain complex and technologically sophisticated equipment. Military working dogs are a proven, low technology, combat and combat support capability and may have a future role in support of Special Operations Forces.

Date of Report: March 13, 2013
Number of Pages: 58
Order Number: G1325
Price: $5.95


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