Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget, like the Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget, requests no funding for Military Construction (MilCon) projects required to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) at Mayport, FL. The Navy’s FY2013 budget deferred the Navy’s plan to homeport a CVN at Mayport, and the Navy’s FY2013-FY2017 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) contained no funding for MilCon projects required to homeport a CVN at Mayport. The Navy stated in its FY2013 budget submission: “Although the FY 2013 budget does not contain a construction project supporting the homeporting of a CVN in Mayport, FL, the Department [of the Navy] is committed to the requirement and policy to strategically disperse CVNs on each coast. This is a deferral at this time due to fiscal constraints.”

The Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are all homeported at Norfolk, VA. The Navy wants to establish a second Atlantic Fleet CVN home port by homeporting a CVN at Mayport. Prior to the submission of the FY2013 budget, Navy plans called for having Mayport ready to homeport a CVN in 2019. Transferring a CVN from Norfolk to Mayport would shift from Norfolk to Mayport the local economic activity associated with homeporting a CVN, which some sources estimate as being worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year.

The Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport is an issue of strong interest to certain Members of Congress from Florida and Virginia. Certain Members of Congress from Florida have expressed support for the Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing (as have DOD and the Navy) that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are worth the costs associated with moving a CVN to Mayport. Certain Members of Congress from Virginia have expressed skepticism regarding, or opposition to, the Navy’s desire to homeport a CVN at Mayport, arguing that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are questionable or uncertain, and that the funding needed to implement the proposal could achieve greater benefits if it were spent on other Navy priorities. .


Date of Report: April 26, 2013
Number of Pages: 74
Order Number: R40248
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Intelligence Identities Protection Act

Jennifer K. Elsea
Legislative Attorney

Concern that government documents obtained by WikiLeaks and disclosed to several newspapers could reveal the identities of United States intelligence agents or informants focused attention on whether the disclosure or publication of such information could give rise to criminal liability. This report summarizes the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (IIPA; P.L. 97-200), enacted by Congress in 1982 to address the unauthorized disclosure of information that exposes covert U.S. intelligence agents. The act, as amended, is codified at 50 U.S.C. Sections 421-426, and provides criminal penalties in certain circumstances for intentional, unauthorized disclosure of information identifying a covert agent, where those making such a disclosure know that the information disclosed identifies the covert agent as such and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal the covert agent’s foreign intelligence relationship to the United States. The act prescribes punishments for disclosing the identities of covert agents with increasing severity according to the level of access to classified information the offender exploited. Offenders without authorized access to classified information are subject to punishment only if they participated in a pattern of activity designed to discover and reveal the identities of covert agents and have reason to believe that such disclosure will harm U.S. intelligence operations.

The act also provides exceptions and defenses to prosecution, makes provision for extraterritorial application for offenders who are U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, includes reporting requirements to Congress, and sets forth definitions of the terms used in the act. Prosecutions are rare, despite some high-profile incidents involving the exposure of U.S. intelligence agents. Although some officials have expressed concern that the WikiLeaks disclosures could endanger the lives of persons who provided information to assist U.S. forces in Iraq or Afghanistan or to embassy officials, no prosecutions appear to have occurred related to those disclosures. There was, however, one prosecution brought related to the revelation of the identities of CIA interrogators. The 111th Congress increased the penalties for violations by persons with access to classified information (P.L. 111-259).


Date of Report: April 10, 2013
Number of Pages: 11
Order Number: RS21636
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Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress

Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs

Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended and regularly extended, provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military forces for two specified purposes—counterterrorism and stability operations—and foreign maritime security forces for counterterrorism operations. The Department of Defense (DOD) values this authority as an important tool to train and equip military partners. Funds may be obligated only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Through 2009, DOD used Section 1206 authority primarily to provide counterterrorism (CT) support. Since FY2010, Section 1206 authority has also been used to provide significant assistance to train and equip foreign military forces for military and stability operations in which U.S. forces participate. Currently, there is a cap of $350 million on Section 1206 obligations per fiscal year. This authority will expire in FY2014, unless extended.

Section 1206 allocations or notifications for the first seven years, FY2006-FY2012, have totaled nearly $1.8 billion. During this period, Section 1206 supported bilateral programs in 41 countries, 15 multilateral programs, and a global human rights program.

The FY2013 programs notified to Congress thus far total $163.5 million. These provide assistance to enable 10 European countries to participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, as well as assistance to five African countries.

Some Members have been concerned with several issues related to Section 1206 authority, both narrow and broad. Specific current concerns have included whether Section 1206 funds are being used appropriately and effectively. Some of these concerns have been partially addressed. For instance, DOD has created a new assessment mechanism and a new delivery process for Section 1206 programs. Congress, through the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112- 239, Section 1201), for the first time permits small-scale military construction assistance that some analysts view as crucial to improving sustainability.

Overarching issues include whether the authority should be expanded to provide training not only to military forces but also to a wide range of foreign security forces (currently, Section 1206 limits security force training to maritime security forces) and whether Congress should place Section 1206 train and equip (T&E) authority under the State Department with other T&E authorities. (Members have thus far refrained from codifying Section 1206 in permanent law, as requested by DOD.) Finally, some Members may wish to examine the status of Section 1206 in the context of broader security assistance reform. .


Date of Report: April 19, 2013
Number of Pages: 42
Order Number: RS22855
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Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2013 budget submission requested $8 million in FY2013 acquisition funding to initiate survey and design activities for a new polar icebreaker, and projected an additional $852 million for acquiring the ship in FY2014-FY2017, including $120 million in FY2014. The Coast Guard’s FY2013 budget anticipated awarding a construction contract for the ship “within the next five years” and taking delivery on the ship “within a decade.” The project to design and build a polar icebreaker was a new acquisition project initiated in the FY2013 budget.

The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2014 budget requests $2 million to continue survey and design activities for a new Coast Guard polar icebreaker, or $118 million less than the $120 million that was projected for FY2014 under the FY2013 budget. The proposed FY2014 budget anticipates awarding a construction contract for the ship “within the next four years.”

Coast Guard polar icebreakers perform a variety of missions supporting U.S. interests in polar regions. The Coast Guard’s two existing heavy polar icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea— have exceeded their originally intended 30-year service lives. Polar Star was placed in caretaker status on July 1, 2006. Congress in FY2009 and FY2010 provided funding to repair it and return it to service for an additional 7 to 10 years of service; the repair work was completed and the ship was reactivated on December 14, 2012.

On June 25, 2010, the Coast Guard announced that Polar Sea had suffered an unexpected engine casualty; the ship was unavailable for operation after that. The Coast Guard placed Polar Sea in commissioned, inactive status on October 14, 2011. Section 222 of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012 (H.R. 2838/P.L. 112-213 of December 20, 2012) prohibits the Coast Guard from removing any part of Polar Sea and from transferring, relinquishing ownership of, dismantling, or recycling the ship until it submits a business case analysis of the options for and costs of reactivating the ship and extending its service life to at least September 30, 2022, so as to maintain U.S. polar icebreaking capabilities and fulfill the Coast Guard’s high latitude mission needs, as identified in the Coast Guard’s July 2010 High Latitude Study.

The Coast Guard’s third polar icebreaker—Healy—entered service in 2000. Compared to Polar Star and Polar Sea, Healy has less icebreaking capability (it is considered a medium polar icebreaker), but more capability for supporting scientific research. The ship is used primarily for supporting scientific research in the Arctic.

With the reactivation of Polar Star, the operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet consists of one heavy polar icebreaker (Polar Star) and one medium polar icebreaker (Healy). The new polar icebreaker for which initial acquisition funding is requested in the FY2013 budget would replace Polar Star at about the time Polar Star’s 7- to 10-year reactivation period ends. Potential issues for Congress regarding Coast Guard polar icebreaker modernization include the following:

• the impact on the project for a new polar icebreaker of the March 1, 2013, sequester on FY2013 funding; 
• the potential impact on the project for a new polar icebreaker of a possible sequester on FY2014 funding that might occur in late 2013 or early 2014 under the terms of the Budget Control Act of 2011;
• the sufficiency of the acquisition funding requested for FY2014 for the project for a new polar icebreaker; 
• the numbers and capabilities of polar icebreakers the Coast Guard will need in the future; 
• the disposition of Polar Sea; 
• whether the new polar icebreaker initiated in the FY2013 budget should be funded with incremental funding (as proposed in the Coast Guard’s Five Year Capital Investment Plan) or full funding in a single year, as normally required under the executive branch’s full funding policy; 
• whether new polar icebreakers should be funded entirely in the Coast Guard budget, or partly or entirely in some other part of the federal budget, such as the Department of Defense (DOD) budget, the National Science Foundation (NSF) budget, or both; 
• whether to provide future icebreaking capability through construction of new ships or service life extensions of existing polar icebreakers; and 
• whether future polar icebreakers should be acquired through a traditional acquisition or a leasing arrangement.

Date of Report: April 25, 2013
Number of Pages: 64
Order Number: RL34391
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Intelligence Issues for Congress

Marshall Curtis Erwin
Analyst in Intelligence and National Security

To address the challenges facing the U.S. intelligence community in the 21st century, congressional and executive branch initiatives have sought to improve coordination among the different agencies and to encourage better analysis. In December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) was signed, providing for a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with authorities to manage the national intelligence effort. The legislation also established a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Making cooperation effective presents substantial leadership and managerial challenges. The needs of diverse intelligence “consumers” must all be met, using many of the same systems and personnel. The DNI has substantial statutory authorities to address these issues, but the organizational relationships remain complex, especially for intelligence agencies that are part of the Defense Department. Members of Congress in their oversight role may seek to observe the extent to which effective coordination is accomplished.

The intelligence community, which comprises 17 agencies, has experienced a decade of budgetary growth. That era was typified by (1) institution building with embryonic organization such as the Office of the DNI and other new or evolving intelligence components, (2) information sharing and collaboration across those institutions, and (3) a focus on counterterrorism.

While those issues will remain areas of congressional interest, Members will likely confronted by a new set of intelligence challenges resulting from budgetary realities and from second-order effects stemming from post-9/11 changes. These include:

• Consolidation and redundancy. Intelligence collection systems are expensive and some critics suggest there have been elements of waste and unneeded duplication of effort. The Administration is considering long-term reductions with an emphasis on potentially redundant information technology systems. There is great concern, however, that any reductions be carefully made to avoid curtailing capabilities that have become integral to military operations and to policymaking in many areas. 
• Information security and management. The WikiLeaks disclosures that began in 2010 and other recent incidents of unauthorized disclosure of classified information have drawn considerable attention to the risks that widespread information sharing entails. Investigations into the 2009 Christmas day bombing attempt and the Fort Hood shooting also suggest analysts are now challenged to synthesize the large volumes of information being shared. 
• Intelligence support to counterterrorism and operations. The Administration’s targeting killing program raises legal, jurisdictional, and efficacy issues. Broader questions have also been raised about whether intelligence agencies have become too focused on counterterrorism to the detriment of other national security priorities and whether some of those functions should be transitioned to U.S. military control, allowing intelligence agencies to focus on traditional collection and analysis.

Date of Report: April 23, 2013
Number of Pages: 30
Order Number: RL33539
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