Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

As part of its action on the Navy’s FY2013 budget, Congress funded the procurement of three Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers, or one more than the two that the Navy had requested for FY2013. The Navy is examining whether, following the March 1, 2013, sequester on Department of Defense (DOD) funding, the third DDG-51 will be executable with current funding. If the Navy determines that it is executable without additional funding, it would be built on a schedule similar to what would be executed for a ship fully funded in FY2014. If the Navy determines that it is not executable with current funding, Congress would have the option of providing additional funding for the ship in FY2014 to make it executable.

The Navy’s FY2014 budget submission calls for procuring nine Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers in FY2014-FY2018, in annual quantities of 1-2-2-2-2. The three DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2014-FY2015, and the first of the two scheduled for procurement in FY2016, are to be of the current Flight IIA design. The Navy wants to begin procuring a new version of the DDG-51 design, called the Flight III design, starting with the second of the two ships scheduled for procurement in FY2016. The four DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2017-FY2018 are also to be of the Flight III design. The Flight III design is to feature a new and more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR).

As part of its action on the Navy’s FY2013 budget, Congress granted the Navy authority to use a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for DDG-51s to be procured FY2013-FY2017. The Navy plans to use an engineering change proposal (ECP) to shift from the Flight IIA design to the Flight III design during this MYP contract. If the Flight III design is not ready to support the procurement of the first Flight III ship in FY2016, the Navy can delay issuing the ECP and the shift the start of Flight III procurement to FY2017 or FY2018.

The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget requests $1,615.6 million to complete the procurement funding for the one DDG-51 requested for procurement in FY2014. The Navy estimates the total procurement cost of this ship at $1,729.7 million, and the ship has received $114.1 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding. The FY2014 budget also requests $388.6 million in AP funding for DDG-51s to be procured in future fiscal years. The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget also requests $231.7 million in procurement funding to help complete procurement costs for three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers procured in FY2007-FY2009, and $240.1 million in research and development funding for the AMDR.

Potential FY2013 issues for Congress concerning destroyer procurement include the following:

• the impact on the DDG-51 and DDG-100 programs of the March 1, 2013, sequester on FY2013 funding and unobligated prior-year funding for the programs, including in particular the impact on the executability of the third DDG-51 procured in FY2013; 
• the potential impact on the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs of a possible sequester later this year or early next year on FY2014 funding and unobligated prior-year funding for the programs; 
• a shortfall in cruisers-destroyers that is projected for certain future years; 
• whether the Flight III DDG-51 would have sufficient air and missile capability to adequately perform future air and missile defense missions;
• whether the Flight III DDG-51 design would have sufficient growth margin for a projected 35- or 40-year service life; 
• cost, schedule, and technical risk in the Flight III DDG-51 program; and 
• the lack of an announced Navy roadmap for introducing into the cruiser-destroyer force integrated electric drive technology (which could, among other things, provide ample electrical power for supporting high-power solid state lasers) as well as technologies (such as those for substantially reducing ship crew size) for substantially reducing ship operating and support (O&S) costs. 

Date of Report: April 23, 2013
Number of Pages: 35
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Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Coast Guard’s program of record (POR) calls for procuring 8 National Security Cutters (NSCs), 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and 58 Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) as replacements for 90 aging Coast Guard cutters and patrol craft. The NSC, OPC, and FRC programs have a combined estimated acquisition cost of about $21.1 billion, and the Coast Guard’s proposed FY2014 budget requests a total of $716 million in acquisition funding for the three programs.

NSCs are the Coast Guard’s largest and most capable general-purpose cutters. They have an estimated average procurement cost of about $684 million per ship. The first three are now in service, the fourth and fifth are under construction, and the sixth has been funded. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2014 budget requests $616 million in acquisition funding for the seventh NSC.

OPCs are to be smaller, less expensive, and in some respects less capable than NSCs. They have an estimated average procurement cost of about $484 million per ship. The first OPC is to be procured in FY2017. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2014 budget requests $25 million in acquisition funding for the OPC program.

FRCs are considerably smaller and less expensive than OPCs. They have an estimated average procurement cost of about $73 million per boat. A total of 18 have been funded through FY2012, and the first five had been delivered as of March 25, 2013. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2014 budget requests $75 million in acquisition funding for two FRCs and associated program costs.

Potential oversight issues for Congress regarding the NSC, OPC, and FRC programs include the following:

• the impact on the NSC, OPC, and FRC programs of the March 1, 2013, sequester on FY2013 funding; 
• the potential impact on the NSC, OPC, and FRC programs of a possible sequester on FY2014 funding that might occur in late 2013 or early 2014 under the terms of the Budget Control Act of 2011; 
• the adequacy of the Coast Guard’s planned NSC, OPC, and FRC procurement quantities; 
• the lack of a request in the Coast Guard’s proposed FY2014 budget for acquisition funding for long lead time materials (LLTM) to support the procurement of an eighth NSC in FY2015 or a subsequent year; 
• the Coast Guard’s FY2014 request for acquisition funding for two (rather than six) FRCs; 
• delays, cost growth, and testing issues in the FRC program; 
• the $25 million in acquisition funding requested for FY2014 for the OPC program, which is one-half of the $50 million that was projected for FY2014 under the Coast Guard’s FY2013 budget submission; 
• the Coast Guard’s acquisition strategy for the OPC; 
• the potential for using multiyear procurement (MYP) in acquiring new cutters; 
• whether 8 NSCs, 25 OPCs, and 58 FRCs is the best mix of cutters that could be procured for roughly the same total amount of acquisition funding; and 
• the adequacy of information available to Congress to support review and oversight of Coast Guard procurement programs, including cutter procurement programs.

Date of Report: April 26, 2013
Number of Pages: 52
Order Number: R42567
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The Violence Against Women Act: Overview, Legislation, and Federal Funding

Lisa N. Sacco
Analyst in Illicit Drugs and Crime Policy

In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA, P.L. 103-322). The act was intended to change attitudes toward domestic violence, foster awareness of domestic violence, improve services and provisions for victims, and revise the manner in which the criminal justice system responds to domestic violence and sex crimes. The legislation created new programs within the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Health and Human Services (HHS) that aimed to reduce domestic violence and improve response to and recovery from domestic violence incidents. VAWA primarily addresses certain types of violent crime through grant programs to state, tribal, and local governments; nonprofit organizations; and universities. VAWA programs target the crimes of intimate partner violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking.

In 1995, the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) was created administratively within DOJ to administer federal grants authorized under VAWA. In 2002, Congress codified the OVW as a separate office within DOJ. Since its creation, the OVW has awarded more than $4.7 billion in grants. While the OVW administers the majority of VAWA authorized grants, other federal agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (in HHS) and the Office of Justice Programs (in DOJ), also manage VAWA grants.

Since its passage in 1994, VAWA has been modified and reauthorized several times. In 2000, Congress reauthorized the programs under VAWA, enhanced federal domestic violence and stalking penalties, added protections for abused foreign nationals, and created programs for elderly and disabled women. In 2005, Congress again reauthorized VAWA. In addition to reauthorizing the programs under VAWA, the legislation enhanced penalties for repeat stalking offenders; added additional protections for battered and/or trafficked foreign nationals; and created programs for sexual assault victims and American Indian victims of domestic violence and related crimes; and created programs designed to improve the public health response to domestic violence.

In February 2013, Congress passed legislation (Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013; P.L. 113-4) that reauthorizes most of the programs under VAWA, among other things. The VAWA reauthorization also amends and authorizes appropriations for the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, enhances measures to combat trafficking in persons, and amends VAWA grant purpose areas to include sex trafficking. Moreover, VAWA 2013 gives Indian tribes authority to enforce domestic violence laws and related crimes against non-Indian individuals, and establishes a nondiscrimination provision for VAWA grant programs. The reauthorization also includes new provisions to address the rape kit backlog in states. A description of the reauthorization is provided in this report.


Date of Report: April 24, 2013
Number of Pages: 41
Order Number: R42499
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Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues

Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

Prompt global strike (PGS) would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or “fleeting targets” at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs.

Many analysts believe that the United States should use long-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads for the PGS mission. These would not substitute for nuclear weapons in the U.S. war plan but would provide a “niche” capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. DOD is considering a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities.

The Air Force and Navy have both considered deploying conventional warheads on their longrange ballistic missiles. The Navy sought to deploy conventional warheads on a small number of Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In FY2008, Congress rejected the requested funding for this program, but the Navy has continued to consider the possibility of deploying intermediate-range technologies for the prompt strike mission. The Air Force and DARPA are developing a hypersonic glide delivery vehicle that could deploy on a modified Peacekeeper landbased ballistic missile—a system known as the Conventional Strike Missile (CSM). In FY2008, Congress created a single, combined fund for the conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) mission. This fund is supporting research and development into the Air Force CSM and two possible hypersonic glide vehicles. Congress appropriated $174.8 million for CPGS capability development in FY2012. DOD requested $110.4 million in FY2013, but Congress appropriated $200 million in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6).

When Congress reviews the budget requests for CPGS weapons, it may question DOD’s rationale for the mission, reviewing whether the United States might have to attack targets promptly at the start of or during a conflict, when it could not rely on forward-based land or naval forces. It might also review whether this capability would reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons or whether, as some critics have asserted, it might upset stability and possibly increase the risk of a nuclear response to a U.S. attack. This risk derives, in part, from the possibility that nations detecting the launch of a U.S. PGS weapon would not be able to determine whether the weapon carried a nuclear or conventional warhead. Congress has raised concerns about this possibility in the past.

Although the Air Force Conventional Strike Missile is a key contender for the CPGS mission, the Air Force may not be able to deploy this system until later in this decade, as the hypersonic glide vehicle has not yet had a successful test flight. Hence, Congress may review other weapons options for the PGS mission. These include not only ballistic missiles and boost-glide systems, but also bombers, cruise missiles, and possibly scramjets or other advanced technologies.

Finally, Congress is likely to question how the New START Treaty, signed by the United States and Russia in April 2010, would affect U.S. plans for the CPGS mission. Warheads deployed on boost-glide systems would not be affected by the treaty because these are new types of strategic offensive arms. But those deployed in existing types of reentry vehicles on existing types of ballistic missiles would count against the treaty limits


Date of Report: April 26, 2013
Number of Pages: 46
Order Number: R41464
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Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget requests $1,083.7 million for continued research and development work on the Ohio replacement program (ORP), a program to design and build a new class of 12 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace the Navy’s current force of 14 Ohioclass SSBNs. The Ohio replacement program is also known as the SSBN(X) program.

Under the Navy’s FY2012 budget, the first Ohio replacement boat was scheduled to be procured in FY2019, and Ohio replacement boats were to enter service on a schedule that would maintain the Navy’s SSBN force at 12 boats. The Navy’s FY2013 budget deferred the procurement of the first Ohio replacement boat by two years, to FY2021. The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget maintains FY2021 as the procurement date for the lead boat. As a result of the deferment of the procurement of the lead boat from FY2019 to FY2021, the Navy’s SSBN force will drop to 11 or 10 boats for the period FY2029-FY2041. The Navy says the decline to 11 or 10 boats during this period will be acceptable in terms of meeting strategic nuclear deterrent mission requirements because none of the 11 or 10 boats during that period will be encumbered by lengthy maintenance actions.

The Navy in 2011 estimated the average procurement cost of boats 2 through 12 in the Ohio replacement program at $5.6 billion each in FY2010 dollars, and is working to reduce that figure to a target of $4.9 billion each in FY2010 dollars. Even with this cost-reduction effort, observers are concerned about the impact the Ohio replacement program will have on the Navy’s ability to procure other types of ships at desired rates in the 2020s and early 2030s. The Navy in April 2012 estimated the procurement cost of the lead ship in the program at $11.7 billion in constant FY2012 dollars, including $4.5 billion in detailed design and nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the entire class, and $7.2 billion in hands-on construction costs for the ship itself.

Potential oversight issues for Congress for the Ohio replacement program include the following:

• the impact on the program of the March 1, 2013, sequester on FY2013 funding and unobligated prior-year funding for the program; 
• the potential impact on the program of a possible sequester later this year or early next year on FY2014 funding and unobligated prior-year funding for the program; 
• the likelihood that the Navy will be able to reduce the average procurement cost of boats 2-12 in the program to the target figure of $4.9 billion each in FY2010 dollars; 
• the accuracy of the Navy’s estimate of the procurement cost of each SSBN(X); 
• the prospective affordability of the Ohio replacement program and its potential impact on funding available for other Navy shipbuilding programs; and 
• the question of which shipyard or shipyards will build SSBN(X)s. 

This report focuses on the Ohio replacement program as a Navy shipbuilding program. CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf, discusses the SSBN(X) as an element of future U.S. strategic nuclear forces in the context of strategic nuclear arms control agreements.


Date of Report: April 24, 2013
Number of Pages: 41
Order Number: R41129
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