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Thursday, May 9, 2013

Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress



Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

This report presents policy and oversight issues for Congress arising from (1) maritime territorial disputes involving China in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) and (2) an additional dispute over whether China has a right under international law to regulate U.S. and other foreign military activities in its 200-nautical-mile maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

China is a party to multiple maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, including, in particular, disputes over the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, and the Senkaku Islands in the ECS. Maritime territorial disputes involving China in the SCS and ECS date back many years, and have periodically led to incidents and periods of increased tension. The disputes have again intensified in the past few years, leading to numerous confrontations and incidents, and heightened tensions between China and other countries in the region, particularly Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

In addition to maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, China is involved in a dispute, particularly with the United States, over whether China has a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within China’s EEZ. The dispute appears to be at the heart of multiple incidents between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace in 2001, 2002, and 2009.

The issue of whether China has a right under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to regulate foreign military activities in its EEZ is related to, but ultimately separate from, the issue of maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS. The two issues are related because China can claim EEZs from inhabitable islands over which it has sovereignty, so accepting China’s claims to islands in the SCS or ECS could permit China to expand the EEZ zone within which China claims a right to regulate foreign military activities.

The EEZ issue is ultimately separate from the territorial disputes issue because even if all the territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS were resolved, and none of China’s claims in the SCS and ECS were accepted, China could continue to apply its concept of its EEZ rights to the EEZ that it unequivocally derives from its mainland coast—and it is in this unequivocal Chinese EEZ that most of the past U.S.-Chinese incidents at sea have occurred.

China depicts its maritime territorial claims in the SCS using the so-called map of the nine-dash line that appears to enclose an area covering roughly 80% of the SCS. China prefers to discuss maritime territorial disputes with other parties to the disputes on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis, and has resisted U.S. involvement in the disputes. Some observers believe China is pursuing a policy of putting off a negotiated resolution of maritime territorial disputes so as to give itself time to implement a strategy of taking incremental unilateral actions that gradually enhance China’s position in the disputes and consolidate China’s de facto control of disputed areas. China’s maritime territorial claims in the SCS and ECS appear to be motivated by a mix of factors, including potentially large undersea oil and gas reserves, fishing rights, nationalism, and security concerns.

The United States does not take a position (i.e., is neutral) regarding competing territorial claims over land features in the SCS and ECS. The U.S. position is that territorial disputes should be resolved peacefully—without coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force—and that claims

of territorial waters and EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. officials have stated that the United States has a national interest in the preservation of freedom of navigation as recognized in customary international law of the sea and reflected in UNCLOS. The United States, like most other countries, believes that coastal states under UNCLOS do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. If China’s position on the issue—that coastal states do have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs—were to gain greater international acceptance under international law, it could substantially affect U.S. naval operations not only in the SCS and ECS, but around the world.

Maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China in the SCS and ECS raise a number of policy and oversight issues for Congress, including the following:


  • the risk that the United States might be drawn into a crisis or conflict over a territorial dispute involving China, particularly since the United States has bilateral defense treaties with Japan and the Philippines; 
  • the risk of future incidents between U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft arising from U.S. military survey and surveillance activities in China’s EEZ; 
  • the impact of maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China on the overall debate on whether the United States should become a party to UNCLOS; 
  • implications for U.S. arms sales and transfers to other countries in the region, particularly the Philippines, which currently has limited ability to monitor maritime activity in the SCS on a real-time basis, and relatively few modern ships larger than patrol craft in its navy or coast guard; 
  • implications for the stationing and operations of U.S. military forces in the region, and for U.S. military procurement programs; 
  • implications for interpreting the significance of China’s rise as an economic and military power, particularly in terms of China’s willingness to accept international norms and operate within an international rules-based order; 
  • the impact on overall U.S. relations with China and other countries in the region; and 
  • the effect on U.S. economic interests, including oil and gas exploration in the SCS and ECS by U.S. firms, and on international shipping through the SCS and ECS, which represents a large fraction of the world’s seaborne trade. 

Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. political and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region and U.S. military operations in both the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere.

Legislation in the 113
th Congress concerning maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China in the SCS and ECS includes H.R. 772.

Date of Report: April 26, 2013
Number of Pages: 92
Order Number: R42784
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Overview of the Appeal Process for Veterans’ Claims



Daniel T. Shedd
Legislative Attorney

Congress, through the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), provides a variety of benefits and services to veterans and to certain members of their families. These benefits include disability compensation and pensions, education benefits, survivor benefits, medical treatment, life insurance, vocational rehabilitation, and burial and memorial benefits. In order to receive these benefits, a veteran (or an eligible family member) must apply for them by submitting the necessary information to a local VA office. The local VA office will make an initial determination on the application for benefits. Any veteran who is not satisfied with the local VA’s determination is permitted to appeal the decision. This report provides a step-by-step breakdown of the appeal process for veterans’ claims.

After an appeal is filed, the local VA office will again review the claim. If the local VA office still denies the claim, the local VA office will prepare the claim file for the appeal and provide the claimant with a blank VA Form 9—a form that must be completed to make an appeal to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA). Claimants must follow specific procedures to request the appeal and must meet certain deadlines for submitting the proper information.

The claimant may choose to have a hearing with the BVA during the appeal process. There are three different types of hearings that the claimant may choose: (1) an in-person hearing with a BVA member, held in Washington, DC; (2) an in-person hearing with a BVA member, held at a local VA office; or (3) a teleconference hearing. The hearings with the BVA are informal and nonadversarial in nature. The claimant will be given the opportunity to explain the reasons for the appeal and to submit additional evidence during the hearing. The claimant may be represented during the appeal process.

After the BVA reaches a decision on the appeal, there are further options the claimant may pursue if he or she is still not satisfied with the BVA decision. A claimant may file a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC). The CAVC, an Article I court, has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the BVA. A claimant must submit a notice of appeal within 120 days of receiving the decision from the BVA. However, a recent Supreme Court decision, Henderson v. Shinseki, clarified that the 120-day deadline is not a “jurisdictional” deadline. Therefore, an appeal to the CAVC will not necessarily be dismissed for missing the deadline. However, the claimant must have a good reason for filing late, such as an inability to meet the deadline due to mental incapacity. This report will examine this case and discuss various acceptable reasons for missing the 120-day deadline.

The VA’s appeal process consistently receives congressional attention. In the 113
th Congress, legislation has been introduced that would require the VA to distribute appeal forms to claimants along with any notice of decision on a claim. In the 112th Congress, various pieces of legislation were proposed that would have altered the appeal process. These proposals ranged from extending the 120-day filing deadline with the CAVC to requiring CAVC judges to live within a certain distance of Washington, DC. The proposed legislation from the 113th and 112th Congresses is discussed in the Appendix to this report.


Date of Report: April 29, 2013
Number of Pages: 21
Order Number: R42609
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Wednesday, May 8, 2013

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress



Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget requests funding for the procurement of 8 new battle force ships (i.e., ships that count against the Navy’s goal for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 306 ships). The 8 ships include two Virginia-class attack submarines, one DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and one Mobile Landing Platform/Afloat Forward Staging Base (MLP/AFSB) ship. The Navy’s proposed FY2014-FY2018 five-year shipbuilding plan includes a total of 41 ships—the same number as in the Navy’s FY213-FY2017 five-year shipbuilding plan, and one less than the 42 ships that the Navy planned for FY2014-FY2018 under the FY2013 budget submission.

The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years. The Navy’s FY2014 30-year (FY2014-FY2043) shipbuilding plan, like the Navy’s previous 30-year shipbuilding plans in recent years, does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the Navy’s 306-ship goal over the long run. The Navy projects that the fleet would remain below 306 ships during most of the 30-year period, and experience shortfalls at various points in cruisers-destroyers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in recent years has estimated that the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan would cost more to execute than the Navy has estimated.

Proposed issues for Congress in reviewing the Navy’s proposed FY2014 shipbuilding budget, its proposed FY2014-FY20178 five-year shipbuilding plan, and its FY2014 30-year (FY2014- FY2043) shipbuilding plan include the following:


  • the impact on Navy shipbuilding programs of the March 1, 2013, sequester on FY2013 funding and unobligated prior-year funding; 
  • the potential impact on Navy shipbuilding programs of a possible sequester later this year or early next year on FY2014 funding and unobligated prior-year funding; 
  • the future size and structure of the Navy in light of strategic and budgetary changes; 
  • the sufficiency of the 30-year shipbuilding plan; and 
  • the affordability of the 30-year shipbuilding plan. 

Funding levels and legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding programs are tracked in detail in other CRS reports.


Date of Report: April 23, 2013
Number of Pages: 80
Order Number: RL32665
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Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress



Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines since FY1998. The two Virginia-class boats requested for FY2014 are to be the 19th and 20th boats in the class, and the first two in a 10-boat Virginia class multiyear-procurement (MYP) contract for the period FY2014-FY2018. Congress granted authority for this MYP contract as part of its action on the FY2013 Department of Defense (DOD) budget. The Navy’s FY2013 budget submission had projected one Virginia-class boat in FY2014. Congress, as part of its action on the FY2013 DOD budget, added AP funding in FY2013 to support the procurement of a second Virginia-class boat in FY2014. The Navy’s inclusion of a second Virginia-class boat in FY2014 (which increases from 9 to 10 the number of boats in the FY2014-FY2018 MYP contract) follows through on this Congressional action.

The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget estimates the combined procurement cost of the two boats requested for FY2014 at $5,414.2 million. The two boats have received a total of $1,530.8 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding (although this figure may be reduced by the March 1, 2013, sequester), leaving another $3,883.4 million to complete the funding for the two boats.

The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget requests $5,285.3 million in procurement and AP funding for the Virginia class program. This figure includes:


  • $2,930.7 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of the first boat requested for FY2014, and to pay part of the procurement cost of the second boat requested for FY2014; 
  • $1,612.0 million in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future fiscal years; and 
  • $742.6 million in AP funding for Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) purchases (i.e., batch orders) of selected components of the 10 Virginia-class boats to be procured under the FY2014-FY2018 MYP contract. EOQ purchases are a regular feature of the first year or two or an MYP contract. 

The Navy is proposing to defer to FY2015 the remaining $952.7 million of the procurement cost of the second boat requested for FY2014. This would divide the procurement funding for the boat between two fiscal years (FY2014 and FY2015)—a funding profile sometimes called split funding. In recent instances where split funding has been used to fund Navy ships, the funding has been appropriated using a funding method called incremental funding, under which Congress takes a positive action to approve each of the two annual funding increments. For the second Virginia-class boat requested for FY2014, however, the Navy is proposing to use a different funding method called advance appropriations, which is a form of full funding that resembles a legislatively locked in form of incremental funding. Under advance appropriations (which is not to be confused with advance procurement [AP] funding), the FY2015 funding increment for the boat would be legislatively locked into place (i.e., it would be “automatic”), and Congress would need to take action to stop that increment from being appropriated. Although the Navy in recent years has occasionally expressed interest in using advance appropriations for funding ships, there is little precedent in recent years for funding Navy ships with advance appropriations.

DOD and the Navy are considering whether to build Virginia-class boats procured in FY2019 and subsequent years with an additional mid-body section, called the Virginia Payload Module
(VPM), that contains four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes that the boats would use to store and fire additional Tomahawk cruise missiles or other payloads, such as large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Building Virginia-class boats with the VPM might increase their unit procurement costs by about 15%-20%, and would increase the total number of torpedo-sized weapons (such as Tomahawks) that they could carry by about 76%.

The Navy’s FY2013 30-year SSN procurement plan, if implemented, would not be sufficient to maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently over the long run. The Navy projects under that plan that the SSN force would fall below 48 boats starting in FY2022, reach a minimum of 43 boats in FY2028-FY2030, and remain below 48 boats through FY2034.

Potential issues for Congress regarding the Virginia-class program include the following:


  • the impact on the Virginia-class program of the March 1, 2013, sequester on FY2013 funding and unobligated prior-year funding for the program; 
  • the potential impact on the Virginia-class program of a possible sequester later this year or early next year on FY2014 funding and unobligated prior-year funding for the program; 
  • whether to use traditional (i.e., single-year) full funding, incremental funding, or (as the Navy proposes) advance appropriations for funding the second of the two boats requested for procurement in FY2014; 
  • the Virginia-class procurement rate more generally in coming years, particularly in the context of an SSN shortfall projected for FY2025-FY2034 and the larger debate over future U.S. defense strategy and defense spending; and 
  • Virginia-class program issues raised in a December 2012 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). 

The Navy’s Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine program is discussed in CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. .

Date of Report: April 24, 2013
Number of Pages: 28
Order Number: RL32418
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