Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations

Jonathan Medalia, Coordinator
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

Paul Belkin
Analyst in European Affairs

Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs

Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation

Derek E. Mix
Analyst in European Affairs

Mary Beth Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation

Jim Zanotti
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Seven nations—China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—possess nuclear weapons. North Korea tested a nuclear explosive device in 2006, and announced that it had conducted a test in 2009 and another in 2013. Israel is widely thought to have nuclear weapons. As an aid to Congress in understanding nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, and arms control matters, this report describes which agency is responsible for research and development (R&D) of nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear explosive devices, as distinct from the bombers and missiles that deliver them) in these nations and whether these agencies are civilian or military. It also traces the history of such agencies in the United States from 1942 to the present. This report will be updated annually, or more often as developments warrant.

In the United States, the Army managed the nuclear weapons program during World War II. Since 1946, weapons R&D has been managed by civilian agencies, at present by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency in the Department of Energy. Concerns about “the immediate and long-term issues associated with the NNSA,” however, led Congress to establish the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 112-239.

China’s nuclear weapons R&D is apparently under the direction of the military, collectively called the People’s Liberation Army.

France’s nuclear weapons R&D is supervised by the Ministry of Defense, which delegates the direction of these programs to the French Atomic and Alternative Energy Commission (CEA). However, as with NNSA in the United States, CEA is not a part of the Ministry of Defense. CEA also conducts nuclear programs in science and industry under the supervision of other ministries.

India’s nuclear weapons R&D appears to be controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy, which is under the direct control of the Prime Minister.

Israel’s nuclear program is under civilian control, but since Israel neither confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons, it classifies information on such weapons, including organizations responsible for R&D. The Israel Atomic Energy Commission reportedly has overall responsibility for Israel’s nuclear weapons program, and the Director General of that commission reports directly to the Prime Minister.

North Korea’s Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry is in charge of the day-to-day operation of the nuclear weapons program. Under it are nuclear-related organizations. Policy is decided by leader Kim Jong-un and other Communist Party and military leaders who advise him.

Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) supervises the functions and administration of all of Pakistan’s organizations involved in nuclear weapons R&D and employment, as well as the military services that operate the strategic forces. The Prime Minister is the chair of the NCA, and membership includes senior civilian and military leaders.

Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) is responsible for nuclear weapons R&D and production. It is a civilian agency, though it has many links to the military.

In the United Kingdom, a private company, AWE Management Limited, manages and operates the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), a government-owned, contractor-operated entity. The Ministry of Defence (MoD), which is headed by a civilian, controls the operations, policy, and direction of AWE and can veto actions of the company. The MoD provides most of the funding for AWE.

This update revises the section on Israel. The balance of the report is updated to February 2013.


Date of Report: May 1, 2013
Number of Pages: 15
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 24 at the end of FY2011 to 41 at the end of FY2018.

Under the Administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD operations, BMD-capable Aegis ships are operating in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran. On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that, as part of the EPAA, four BMD-capable Aegis ships are to be forward-homeported (i.e., based) at Rota, Spain, in FY2014 and FY2015. BMDcapable Aegis ships also operate in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. On March 15, 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced that it is dropping the fourth and final phase of the EPAA and canceling the development program for the Aegis SM-3 Block IIB interceptor missile that was to be deployed under that phase.

The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2014 budget requests a total of $2,087.2 million in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for Aegis Ashore sites that are to be part of the EPAA. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis BMD program.

Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following:

• the impact on the Aegis BMD program of the March 1, 2013, sequester on FY2013 funding and unobligated prior-year funding for the program; 
• the potential impact on the Aegis BMD program of a possible sequester later this year or early next year on FY2014 funding and unobligated prior-year funding for the program; 
• U.S. vs. European naval contributions to European BMD; 
• the lack of a target for simulating the endo-atmospheric (i.e., final) phase of flight of China’s DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile; 
• concurrency and technical risk in the Aegis BMD program.

Date of Report: April 24, 2013
Number of Pages: 57
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Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a relatively inexpensive Navy surface combatant equipped with modular “plug-and-fight” mission packages for countering mines, small boats, and dieselelectric submarines, particularly in littoral (i.e., near-shore) waters. Navy plans call for fielding a total force of 52 LCSs. Twelve LCSs were funded from FY2005 through FY2012. Another four (LCSs 13 through 16) were funded in FY2013, although funding for those four ships has been reduced by the March 1, 2013, sequester on FY2013 funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget requests $1,793.0 million for four more LCSs (LCSs 17 through 20).

Two very different LCS designs are being built. One was developed by an industry team led by Lockheed; the other was developed by an industry team that was led by General Dynamics. The Lockheed design is built at the Marinette Marine shipyard at Marinette, WI; the General Dynamics design is built at the Austal USA shipyard at Mobile, AL. LCSs 1, 3, 5, and so on are Marinette Marine-built ships; LCSs 2, 4, 6, and so on are Austal-built ships.

The 20 LCSs procured or scheduled for procurement in FY2010-FY2015 (LCSs 5 through 24) are being procured under a pair of 10-ship, fixed-price incentive (FPI) block buy contracts that the Navy awarded to Lockheed and Austal USA on December 29, 2010.

The LCS program has become controversial due to cost growth, design and construction issues with the lead ships built to each design, concerns over the ships’ ability to withstand battle damage, and concerns over whether the ships are sufficiently armed and will be able to perform their stated missions effectively. Some observers, citing one or more of these issues, have proposed truncating the LCS program to either 24 ships (i.e., stopping procurement after procuring all the ships covered under the two block buy contracts) or to some other number well short of 52. Other observers have proposed down selecting to a single LCS design (i.e., continuing production of only one of the two designs) after the 24th ship.

In response to criticisms of the LCS program, the Navy has acknowledged certain problems and stated that it was taking action to correct them, disputed other arguments made against the program, and maintained its support for continuing the program. Reported comments from some Navy officials suggest that the Navy might be open to changing the design of one or both LCS variants after the 24th ship or perhaps down selecting to a single LCS design after the 24th ship.

Issues for Congress concerning the LCS program include the following:

• the impact on the LCS program of the March 1, 2013, sequester on FY2013 funding and unobligated prior-year funding for the program; 
• the potential impact on the LCS program of a possible sequester later this year or early next year on FY2014 funding and unobligated prior-year funding for the program; 
• whether to truncate the LCS program to 24 ships or some other number well short of 52; 
• whether to down select to a single LCS design after the 24th ship; 
• technical risk in the LCS program; and
• what defense-acquisition policy lessons, if any, the LCS program may offer to policymakers

Date of Report: April 23, 2013
Number of Pages: 71
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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The question is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget.

Two DOD strategy and budget documents released in January 2012 state that U.S. military strategy will place a renewed emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, and that as a result, there will be a renewed emphasis on air and naval forces in DOD plans. Administration officials have stated that notwithstanding reductions in planned levels of U.S. defense spending, the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region will be maintained and strengthened.

Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.

China’s naval modernization effort, which began in the 1990s, encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and surface ships. China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, training, and exercises. Observers believe that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization effort has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. Observers believe that China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is increasingly oriented toward pursuing additional goals, such as asserting or defending China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing China’s view—a minority view among world nations—that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200- mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); protecting China’s sea lines of communications; protecting and evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign countries; displacing U.S. influence in the Pacific; and asserting China’s status as a major world power.

Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following: whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be large enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakers around the world; the Navy’s ability to counter Chinese ASBMs and submarines; and whether the Navy, in response to China’s maritime anti-access capabilities, should shift over time to a more distributed fleet architecture.


Date of Report: April 26, 2013
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Juvenile Justice Funding Trends

Kristin M. Finklea
Specialist in Domestic Security

Although juvenile justice has always been administered by the states, Congress has had significant influence in the area through funding for grant programs administered by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) of 1974, P.L. 93-415, was the first comprehensive juvenile justice legislation passed by Congress. Since 1974, the act has undergone several key amendments, including a significant reorganization enacted by P.L. 107-273 in 2002. The juvenile justice appropriation includes funding allocated within the purview of the JJDPA, as well as other grant programs that are administered by OJJDP but that are not within the JJDPA.

After the restructuring of juvenile justice grant programs in 2002, their funding, which had generally been above $500 million, began to decline. For FY2010, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) provided $424 million for juvenile justice programs within DOJ. This was the largest amount appropriated to juvenile justice programs since FY2003. For FY2011, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10) provided $275 million for juvenile justice programs, and for FY2012, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-55) provided $262.5 million for juvenile justice programs.

On March 26, 2013, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6). This act provides $279.5 million for juvenile justice programs for FY2013. Of note, Section 3001 of the act provides for a series of rescissions of FY2013 budget authority. Discretionary non-security (as defined at 2 U.S.C. §900(c)(4)(A)) accounts—including the juvenile justice account within DOJ’s broader Office of Justice Programs account—were subject to a 1.877% rescission. Further, Section 3004 of the act is intended to eliminate any amount by which the new budget authority provided in the act exceeds the FY2013 discretionary spending limits in Section 251(c)(2) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, as amended by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25) and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2

012 (P.L. 112-240). Section 3004 requires the percentages to be increased if the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates that additional rescissions are needed to avoid exceeding the limits. Subsequent to the enactment of P.L. 113-6, OMB calculated that additional rescissions, including 0.2% of non-security budget authority, would be required.

After applying these rescissions, CRS calculates that P.L. 113-6 provides $273.7 million in postrescission funding for juvenile justice programs for FY2013. Of note, this calculated FY2013 funding level does not reflect any reductions that resulted from the sequestration ordered by President Obama on March 1, 2013, pursuant to the BCA.


Date of Report: April 23, 2013
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