Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The Coast Guard’s FY2013 budget initiated a new project for the design and construction of a new polar icebreaker. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2013 budget requested $8 million in FY2013 acquisition funding to initiate survey and design activities for the ship, and projected an additional $852 million in FY2013-FY2017 for acquiring the ship. The Coast Guard’s FY2013 budget anticipated awarding a construction contract for the ship “within the next five years” and taking delivery on the ship “within a decade.”

The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2014 budget requests $2 million to continue survey and design activities for the ship, or $118 million less than the $120 million that was projected for FY2014 under the FY2013 budget. The Coast Guard’s FY2014 budget submission projects an additional $228 million in FY2015-FY2018 for acquiring the ship, including $128 million in FY2015- FY2017, or $604 million less than the $732 million that was projected for FY2015-FY2017 under the Coast Guard’s FY2013 budget submission. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2014 budget anticipates awarding a construction contract for the ship “within the next four years.”

Coast Guard polar icebreakers perform a variety of missions supporting U.S. interests in polar regions. The Coast Guard’s two existing heavy polar icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea— have exceeded their originally intended 30-year service lives. Polar Star was placed in caretaker status on July 1, 2006. Congress in FY2009 and FY2010 provided funding to repair it and return it to service for an additional 7 to 10 years of service; the repair work was completed and the ship was reactivated on December 14, 2012.

On June 25, 2010, the Coast Guard announced that Polar Sea had suffered an unexpected engine casualty; the ship was unavailable for operation after that. The Coast Guard placed Polar Sea in commissioned, inactive status on October 14, 2011. Section 222 of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012 (H.R. 2838/P.L. 112-213 of December 20, 2012) prohibits the Coast Guard from removing any part of Polar Sea and from transferring, relinquishing ownership of, dismantling, or recycling the ship until it submits a business case analysis of the options for and costs of reactivating the ship and extending its service life to at least September 30, 2022, so as to maintain U.S. polar icebreaking capabilities and fulfill the Coast Guard’s high latitude mission needs, as identified in the Coast Guard’s July 2010 High Latitude Study.

The Coast Guard’s third polar icebreaker—Healy—entered service in 2000. Compared to Polar Star and Polar Sea, Healy has less icebreaking capability (it is considered a medium polar icebreaker), but more capability for supporting scientific research. The ship is used primarily for supporting scientific research in the Arctic.

With the reactivation of Polar Star, the operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet consists of one heavy polar icebreaker (Polar Star) and one medium polar icebreaker (Healy). The new polar icebreaker for which initial acquisition funding is requested in the FY2013 budget would replace Polar Star at about the time Polar Star’s 7- to 10-year reactivation period ends.

The Coast Guard’s strategy document for the Arctic region, released on May 21, 2013, states that “The United States must have adequate icebreaking capability to support research that advances fundamental understanding of the region and its evolution,” and that “The Nation must also make a strategic investment in icebreaking capability to enable access to the high latitudes over the long-term.”


Date of Report: May 24, 2013
Number of Pages: 64
Order Number: RL34391
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Military Parents and Child Custody: State and Federal Issues

David F. Burrelli
Specialist in Military Manpower Policy

Michael A. Miller
US Air Force Fellow

The increased deployment of servicemembers beginning in 2001 as a result of Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom has raised difficult military child custody issues that in some cases potentially affect the welfare of military children as well as servicemembers’ ability to effectively serve their country. Approximately 142,000 members of the Armed Forces (active, Guard, and Reserve) are single custodians of minor children. Temporary duty assignments, mobilization, and deployments to areas that do not allow the military member’s dependent(s) to accompany them require the servicemember to have contingency plans providing for the care and well-being of their dependent(s) to include temporary custody arrangements if necessary. In some instances, custody battles have ensued when the military parent leaves for duty and the other parent decides to file for temporary or permanent custody of the child in the absence of the servicemember. Some servicemembers involved in such child custody cases have expressed concern that family courts in some states are using their military service against them in determining custodial arrangements. The issue addressed in this report is whether a federal child custody law is needed to protect servicemembers’ rights in custodial disputes.

Since 2008, the Congress, led by Representative Michael Turner, has proposed federal military child custody legislation that would establish a national standard for litigating child custody cases in which the custodian is in military service. Although legislative efforts in the House have passed on several occasions (as part of the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act from FY 2008 thru FY 2013) and once as a stand-alone bill by voice vote in 2008 (H.R. 6048), all versions of the proposed legislation have failed to pass in the Senate. At the heart of the legislative debate is the potential conflict between the protection of the rights of servicemembers, which is arguably a federal responsibility, and jurisdiction over child custody issues, which traditionally falls within the purview of the States.

Proponents of federal child custody legislation argue the lack of uniform state laws in the treatment of deployed and deploying military parents complicate child custody matters and that the potential exists for state courts to use a servicemember’s deployment, or potential deployment, against them when making child custody determinations. Those proposing a national standard for determining military child custody cases argue such legislation would eliminate this possibility by prohibiting state courts from using deployment or the possibility of deployment against a servicemember when making child custody determinations. Opponents, however, argue that such legislation encroaches on the historical precedent of a state’s right to adjudicate family law matters, would ultimately place the legal rights of the servicemember above those of the best interest of the child, and is not necessary, given that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act already protects a servicemember’s rights in child custody proceedings. Nevertheless, both sides of the debate agree that no court should show a bias for a non-deploying parent or a prejudice against a military parent solely because of military service. However, both sides disagree on the extent to which deployment or the threat of deployment plays in determining the best interest of the child which is the ultimate criterion for determining child custody cases.

Congressional interest in federal legislation for military child custody cases stems from Congress’s authority to raise and support the standing armed forces of the U.S. and Congress’s authority to make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval Forces as well as to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.


Date of Report: May 31, 2013
Number of Pages: 41
Order Number: R43091
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Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues

Michael John Garcia
Legislative Attorney

Jennifer K. Elsea
Legislative Attorney

R. Chuck Mason
Legislative Attorney

Edward C. Liu
Legislative Attorney

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which granted the President the authority “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those ... [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” against the United States. Many persons subsequently captured during military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere were transferred to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for detention and possible prosecution. Although nearly 800 persons have been held at Guantanamo since early 2002, the substantial majority of Guantanamo detainees have been transferred to another country for continued detention or release. Those detainees who remain fall into three categories: (1) persons placed in non-penal, preventive detention to stop them from rejoining hostilities; (2) persons who face or are expected to face criminal charges; and (3) persons who have been cleared for transfer or release, whom the United States continues to detain pending transfer. Although the Supreme Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush that Guantanamo detainees may seek habeas corpus review of the legality of their detention, several legal issues remain unsettled.

In January 2009, President Obama issued an Executive Order to facilitate the closure of the Guantanamo detention facility within a year. This deadline was not met, but the Administration has repeatedly stated its intent to close the facility. In March 2011, President Obama issued a new Executive Order establishing a process to periodically review whether the continued detention of a lawfully held Guantanamo detainee is warranted, which resulted in some 80 detainees being cleared for release and transfer to a foreign country. Efforts to transfer these prisoners and close Guantanamo have been hampered by a series of congressional enactments limiting executive discretion to transfer or release detainees into the United States, including, most recently, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (2013 NDAA; P.L. 112-239) and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (2013 CAA; P.L. 113-6 ). By prohibiting funds from being used to transfer or release detainees into the United States, or to assist in the transfer or release of detainees into the country, these acts seem to ensure that the Guantanamo detention facility remains open at least through the 2013 fiscal year, and perhaps for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the measures appear to make military tribunals the only viable forum by which Guantanamo detainees could be tried for criminal offenses, as no civilian court operates within Guantanamo, unless efforts to close the facility are successfully renewed. Upon signing each of these measures into law, President Obama issued a statement describing his opposition to the restrictions imposed on the transfer of Guantanamo detainees, and asserted that his Administration will work with Congress to mitigate their effect.

The closure of the Guantanamo detention facility would raise a number of legal issues with respect to the individuals formerly interned there, particularly if those detainees are transferred to the United States. The nature and scope of constitutional protections owed to detainees within the United States may be different from the protections owed to aliens held abroad. The transfer of detainees to the United States may also have immigration consequences. This report provides an overview of major legal issues likely to arise as a result of executive and legislative action to close the Guantanamo detention facility. It discusses legal issues related to the transfer of Guantanamo detainees (either to a foreign country or into the United States), the continued detention of such persons in the United States, and the possible removal of persons brought into the country. It also discusses selected constitutional issues that may arise in the criminal prosecution of detainees, emphasizing the procedural and substantive protections that are utilized in different forums (i.e., federal courts, court-martial proceedings, and military commissions).


Date of Report: May 30, 2013
Number of Pages: 62
Order Number: R40139
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Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

This report presents policy and oversight issues for Congress arising from (1) maritime territorial disputes involving China in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) and (2) an additional dispute over whether China has a right under international law to regulate U.S. and other foreign military activities in its 200-nautical-mile maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

China is a party to multiple maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, including, in particular, disputes over the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, and the Senkaku Islands in the ECS. Maritime territorial disputes involving China in the SCS and ECS date back many years, and have periodically led to incidents and periods of increased tension. The disputes have again intensified in the past few years, leading to numerous confrontations and incidents, and heightened tensions between China and other countries in the region, particularly Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

In addition to maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, China is involved in a dispute, particularly with the United States, over whether China has a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within China’s EEZ. The dispute appears to be at the heart of multiple incidents between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace in 2001, 2002, and 2009.

The issue of whether China has a right under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to regulate foreign military activities in its EEZ is related to, but ultimately separate from, the issue of maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS. The two issues are related because China can claim EEZs from inhabitable islands over which it has sovereignty, so accepting China’s claims to islands in the SCS or ECS could permit China to expand the EEZ zone within which China claims a right to regulate foreign military activities.

The EEZ issue is ultimately separate from the territorial disputes issue because even if all the territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS were resolved, and none of China’s claims in the SCS and ECS were accepted, China could continue to apply its concept of its EEZ rights to the EEZ that it unequivocally derives from its mainland coast—and it is in this unequivocal Chinese EEZ that most of the past U.S.-Chinese incidents at sea have occurred.

China depicts its maritime territorial claims in the SCS using the so-called map of the nine-dash line that appears to enclose an area covering roughly 80% of the SCS. China prefers to discuss maritime territorial disputes with other parties to the disputes on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis, and has resisted U.S. involvement in the disputes. Some observers believe China is pursuing a policy of putting off a negotiated resolution of maritime territorial disputes so as to give itself time to implement a strategy of taking incremental unilateral actions that gradually enhance China’s position in the disputes and consolidate China’s de facto control of disputed areas. China’s maritime territorial claims in the SCS and ECS appear to be motivated by a mix of factors, including potentially large undersea oil and gas reserves, fishing rights, nationalism, and security concerns.

The United States does not take a position (i.e., is neutral) regarding competing territorial claims over land features in the SCS and ECS. The U.S. position is that territorial disputes should be resolved peacefully—without coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force—and that claims
of territorial waters and EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. officials have stated that the United States has a national interest in the preservation of freedom of navigation as recognized in customary international law of the sea and reflected in UNCLOS. The United States, like most other countries, believes that coastal states under UNCLOS do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. If China’s position on the issue—that coastal states do have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs—were to gain greater international acceptance under international law, it could substantially affect U.S. naval operations not only in the SCS and ECS, but around the world.

Maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China in the SCS and ECS raise a number of policy and oversight issues for Congress, including the following:

• the risk that the United States might be drawn into a crisis or conflict over a territorial dispute involving China, particularly since the United States has bilateral defense treaties with Japan and the Philippines; 
• the risk of future incidents between U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft arising from U.S. military survey and surveillance activities in China’s EEZ; 
• the impact of maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China on the overall debate on whether the United States should become a party to UNCLOS; 
• implications for U.S. arms sales and transfers to other countries in the region, particularly the Philippines, which currently has limited ability to monitor maritime activity in the SCS on a real-time basis, and relatively few modern ships larger than patrol craft in its navy or coast guard; 
• implications for the stationing and operations of U.S. military forces in the region, and for U.S. military procurement programs; 
• implications for interpreting the significance of China’s rise as an economic and military power, particularly in terms of China’s willingness to accept international norms and operate within an international rules-based order; 
• the impact on overall U.S. relations with China and other countries in the region; and 
• the effect on U.S. economic interests, including oil and gas exploration in the SCS and ECS by U.S. firms, and on international shipping through the SCS and ECS, which represents a large fraction of the world’s seaborne trade. 

Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. political and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region and U.S. military operations in both the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere.

Legislation in the 113th Congress concerning maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China in the SCS and ECS includes H.R. 772.

Date of Report: May 16, 2013
Number of Pages: 95
Order Number: R42784
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