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Monday, November 4, 2013

Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Federal Aggravated Identity Theft


Charles Doyle
Senior Specialist in American Public Law

Aggravated identity theft is punishable by a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for two years or by imprisonment for five years if it relates to a terrorism offense. At least thus far, the government has rarely prosecuted the five-year terrorism form of the offense. The two-year offense occurs when an individual knowingly possesses, uses, or transfers the means of identification of another person, without lawful authority to do so, during and in relation to one of more than 60 predicate federal felony offenses (18 U.S.C. 1028A). Section 1028A has the effect of establishing a mandatory minimum sentence for those predicate felony offenses, when they involve identity theft.

A sentencing court has the discretion not to “stack” or pancake multiple aggravated identity theft counts and, as with other mandatory minimums, may impose a sentence of less than the mandatory minimum at the request of the prosecution based on the defendant’s substantial assistance.

More than half of the judges responding to a United States Sentence Commission survey felt the two-year mandatory minimum penalty was generally appropriate. The Commission’s report on mandatory minimum sentencing statutes is mildly complimentary of the provision.

Date of Report: October 22, 2013
Number of Pages: 14
Order Number: R42100
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Friday, November 1, 2013

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress


Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

As part of its action on the Navy’s FY2013 budget, Congress funded the procurement of three Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers, or one more than the two that the Navy had requested for FY2013. The Navy is examining whether, following the March 1, 2013, sequester on Department of Defense (DOD) funding, the third DDG-51 will be executable with current funding. If the Navy determines that it is executable without additional funding, it would be built on a schedule similar to what would be executed for a ship fully funded in FY2014. If the Navy determines that it is not executable with current funding, Congress would have the option of providing additional funding for the ship in FY2014 to make it executable.

The Navy’s FY2014 budget submission calls for procuring nine Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers in FY2014-FY2018, in annual quantities of 1-2-2-2-2. The three DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2014-FY2015, and the first of the two scheduled for procurement in FY2016, are to be of the current Flight IIA design. The Navy wants to begin procuring a new version of the DDG-51 design, called the Flight III design, starting with the second of the two ships scheduled for procurement in FY2016. The four DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2017-FY2018 are also to be of the Flight III design. The Flight III design is to feature a new and more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR).

As part of its action on the Navy’s FY2013 budget, Congress granted the Navy authority to use a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for DDG-51s to be procured FY2013-FY2017. The Navy awarded the contract on June 3, 2013. The Navy plans to use an engineering change proposal (ECP) to shift from the Flight IIA design to the Flight III design during this MYP contract. If the Flight III design is not ready to support the procurement of the first Flight III ship in FY2016, the Navy can delay issuing the ECP and shift the start of Flight III procurement to FY2017 or FY2018.

The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget requests $1,615.6 million to complete the procurement funding for the one DDG-51 requested for procurement in FY2014. The Navy estimates the total procurement cost of this ship at $1,729.7 million, and the ship has received $114.1 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding. The FY2014 budget also requests $388.6 million in AP funding for DDG-51s to be procured in future fiscal years. The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget also requests $231.7 million in procurement funding to help complete procurement costs for three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers procured in FY2007-FY2009, and $240.1 million in research and development funding for the AMDR.

Potential FY2013 issues for Congress concerning destroyer procurement include the following:

  • the impact on the DDG-51 and DDG-100 programs of the March 1, 2013, sequester on FY2013 funding and unobligated prior-year funding for the programs, including in particular the impact on the executability of the third DDG-51 procured in FY2013; 
  • the potential impact on the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs of a possible sequester later this year or early next year on FY2014 funding and unobligated prior-year funding for the programs; 
  • a shortfall in cruisers-destroyers that is projected for certain future years; 
  • whether the Flight III DDG-51 would have sufficient air and missile capability to adequately perform future air and missile defense missions;
  • whether the Flight III DDG-51 design would have sufficient growth margin for a projected 35- or 40-year service life; 
  • cost, schedule, and technical risk in the Flight III DDG-51 program; and 
  • the lack of an announced Navy roadmap for introducing into the cruiser-destroyer force integrated electric drive technology (which could, among other things, provide ample electrical power for supporting high-power solid state lasers) as well as technologies (such as those for substantially reducing ship crew size) for substantially reducing ship operating and support (O&S) costs.
Date of Report: October 22, 2013
Number of Pages: 41
Order Number: RL32109
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Social Security: What Would Happen If the Trust Funds Ran Out?


Christine Scott
Specialist in Social Policy

The Social Security trust funds are projected to become exhausted in 2033, according to the 2013 Social Security Trustees Report. If Congress does not act before then, the trust funds would be unable to pay full Social Security benefits on time. The Social Security Act does not specify what would happen to benefits if the trust funds became insolvent. However, it is clear that full Social Security benefits could not be paid on time because the Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits government spending in excess of available funds. After insolvency, Social Security would continue to receive tax income, from which approximately 77% of benefits could be paid. Either full benefit checks would be paid on a delayed schedule or reduced benefits would be paid on time. In either case, Social Security beneficiaries and qualifying applicants would remain legally entitled to full benefits and could take legal action to claim the balance of their benefits.

Social Security solvency could be restored by cutting Social Security’s spending, increasing its income, or some combination of the two. Over the long range (i.e., over the next 75 years), the Social Security trustees estimate that the trust funds have a shortfall of $9.6 trillion in present value terms, or 2.72% of taxable payroll. The sooner Congress acts to fill this gap, the smaller the changes to Social Security need to be, because earlier changes could be spread to a larger number of workers and beneficiaries over a longer period of time. If Congress waits until the moment of insolvency to act, the trust funds’ annual deficits could be eliminated with benefit cuts of about 23% in 2033 that will gradually rise to about 27% by 2087. Congress could also eliminate annual deficits by raising the Social Security payroll tax rate from 12.40% to 16.1% in 2033, then gradually increasing it to 17.2% by 2086. To maintain annual balance after 2086, larger benefit reductions or tax increases would be required.

Prompt action to restore Social Security solvency would be advantageous. The combined trust funds began to run annual cash-flow deficits in 2010. Cash-flow deficits require the redemption of government bonds accumulated in earlier years. Cash-flow deficits do not affect Social Security directly. However, if the non-Social Security portion of the federal budget is in deficit, redemption of trust fund bonds puts additional pressure on the overall federal budget. Earlier changes would allow workers and beneficiaries’ time to adjust their retirement plans. Finally, if Congress were to act today, the benefit cuts or tax increases necessary to restore solvency until 2087 would be smaller than those needed if Congress waited until the trust funds became insolvent to act.

Date of Report: October 21, 2013
Number of Pages: 16
Order Number: RL33514
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