Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke, Coordinator
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened concerns about the region's future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. On January 12, 2009, the George W. Bush Administration released a presidential directive, called National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 (NSPD 66/HSPD 25), establishing a new U.S. policy for the Arctic region. 

Record low extent of Arctic sea ice in 2007 focused scientific and policy attention on its linkage to global climate change, and to the implications of projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within decades. The Arctic has been projected by several scientists to be perennially ice-free in the late summer by the late 2030s. 

The five Arctic coastal states—the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (of which Greenland is a territory)—are in the process of preparing Arctic territorial claims for submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The Russian claim to the enormous underwater Lomonosov Ridge, if accepted, would reportedly grant Russia nearly onehalf of the Arctic area. There are also four other unresolved Arctic territorial disputes. 

The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in the coming years to increased commercial shipping on two trans-Arctic sea routes. Current international guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters are being updated, with a targeted completion date of 2010. 

Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow more exploration for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to onshore exploration activities. Increased oil and gas exploration and tourism (cruise ships) in the Arctic increase the risk of pollution in the region. Cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters will be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective strategies have yet to be developed. 

Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic. The United States is currently meeting with other countries regarding the management of Arctic fish stocks. Changes in the Arctic could affect threatened and endangered species. Under the Endangered Species Act, the polar bear was listed as threatened on May 15, 2008. Arctic climate change is also expected to affect the economies, subsistence, health, population, societies, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples. 

Two of the Coast Guard's three polar icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea—have exceeded their intended 30-year service lives. The Coast Guard since 2008 has been studying how many polar icebreakers, with what capabilities, should be procured as replacements for Polar Star and Polar Sea. The possibility of increased sea traffic through Arctic waters also raises an issue concerning Arctic search and rescue capabilities. 

The Arctic has increasingly become a subject of discussion among political leaders of the nations in the region. Although there is significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is also increasingly being viewed by some observers as a potential emerging security issue. In varying degrees, the Arctic coastal states have indicated a willingness to establish and maintain a military presence in the high north. U.S. military forces, particularly the Navy and Coast Guard, have begun to pay more attention to the region.

Date of Report: March 30, 2010
Number of Pages: 65
Order Number: R41153
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“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell:” The Law and Military Policy on Same-Sex Behavior

David F. Burrelli
Specialist in Military Manpower Policy

In 1993, new laws and regulations pertaining to homosexuality and U.S. military service came into effect reflecting a compromise in policy. This compromise, colloquially referred to as "don't ask, don't tell," holds that the presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in same-sex acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion which are the essence of military capability. Under this policy, but not the law, service members are not to be asked about nor allowed to discuss their "same-sex orientation." The law itself does not prevent service members from being asked about their sexuality. This compromise notwithstanding, the issue has remained politically contentious. 

Prior to the 1993 compromise, the number of individuals discharged for homosexuality was generally declining. Since that time, the number of discharges for same-sex conduct has generally increased until 2001. However, analysis of these data shows no statistically significant difference in discharge rates for these two periods. 

In recent years, several Members of Congress have expressed interest in amending "don't ask, don't tell." At least two bills would repeal the law and replace it with a policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation—H.R. 1283 and S. 3065—have been introduced in the 111th Congress. 

On March 25, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced changes in the department's enforcement of the 1993 law. Under these changes, Secretary Gates said only a general or flag officer would have the authority to separate someone who had engaged in homosexual conduct, that information provided by a third party must be given under oath, and that the information given to certain individuals—lawyers, psychotherapist, clergy, and domestic abuse counselors, for example—cannot be used in support of discharge proceedings. 

For more information, see CRS Report R40795, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": A Legal Analysis, by Jody Feder.

 

Date of Report: March 25, 2010
Number of Pages: 19
Order Number: R40782
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Guantanamo Detention Center: Legislative Activity in the 111th Congress

Anna C. Henning
Legislative Attorney

The detention of alleged enemy combatants at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, together with recent proposals to transfer some such individuals to the United States for prosecution or continued detention, has been a subject of considerable interest for Congress. Several authorization and appropriations measures enacted during the 111th Congress, and various pending bills, address the disposition and treatment of Guantanamo detainees. 

Recently legislative activity has focused on the possible transfer of Guantanamo detainees to the United States. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32) and five FY2010 measures place general restrictions on the use of federal funds to release or transfer a Guantanamo detainee into the United States. The relevant FY2010 measures include the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-83); the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84); the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-88); the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117); and the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-118). Each of the enacted laws provides an exception which permits transfers when effected 45 days after specified reporting requirements have been fulfilled. However, in most of the measures, the 45-day exceptions apply only to transfers for the purpose of prosecution or detention during legal proceedings. 

The public laws and pending proposals address additional issues related to the treatment and disposition of Guantanamo detainees. For example, Title XVIII of P.L. 111-84 establishes new procedures for military commissions. Section 552 of P.L. 111-83 requires that former Guantanamo detainees be included on the "No Fly List" in most circumstances and restricts their access to immigration benefits. 

This report analyzes relevant provisions in enacted legislation and selected pending bills. For more detailed explorations of the legal issues related to the potential closure of the detention facility and the transfer, release, and treatment of detainees, see CRS Report R40139, Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues, by Michael John Garcia et al., and CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia.

 

Date of Report: March 25, 2010
Number of Pages: 18
Order Number: R40754
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Strategic Arms Control After START: Issues and Options

Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

The United States and Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991; it entered into force in December 1994 and expired on December 5, 2009. They have just completed a new Treaty that would replace START, and plan to sign it on April 8. 

START counts each deployed ICBM, SLBM, and bomber as a single delivery vehicle under the Treaty limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles and attributes an agreed number of warheads to each deployed delivery vehicle. This attribution rule provides the total number of warheads that count under the 6,000 warhead limit in the Treaty. To verify compliance with START, each side monitors the numbers and locations of ballistic missiles, launchers and heavy bombers deployed by the other country. The parties use a wide variety of means to collect information—or monitor—these forces and activities. Some of these monitoring systems, such as overhead satellites, operate outside the territories of the treaty parties. They have also been required to exchange copious amounts of data on locations, operations, and technical characteristics of the treaty-limited items. This verification regime has allowed the parties to remain confident in each other's compliance with the Treaty. 

The United States and Russia began to discuss their options for arms control after START in mid- 2006. During the Bush Administration, they were unable to agree on a path forward. Neither side wanted to extend START in its current form, as some of the Treaty's provisions have begun to interfere with some military programs on both sides. Russia wants to replace START with a new Treaty that would further reduce deployed forces while using many of the same definitions and counting rules in START. The United States initially did not want to negotiate a new treaty, but, under the Bush Administration, would have been willing to extend, informally, some of START's monitoring provisions. In 2008, the Bush Administration agreed to conclude a new Treaty, with monitoring provisions attached, but this Treaty would resemble the far less formal Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that the two sides signed in 2002. In December 2008, the two sides agreed that they wanted to replace START before it expired, but acknowledged that this task would have to be left to negotiations between Russia and the Obama Administration. President Obama and President Medvedev agreed at their meeting on April 2, 2009, to pursue "new and verifiable reductions" in their strategic offensive arms. The two sides have just completed negotiations on new START Treaty. 

The United States and Russia could have chosen from a number of options for the future of their arms control relationship. They have allowed START to lapse while negotiating a new Treaty, but they could have extended START for five years during this process. They could also have extended START, then amended it to ease some of the outdated provisions. Instead of negotiating a new Treaty, they could have pursued less formal arrangements to manage their nuclear forces. Moreover, if a new treaty includes further reductions in nuclear weapons, it could use some START definitions and counting rules or the less formal Moscow Treaty declarations.


Date of Report: March 26, 2010
Number of Pages: 40
Order Number: R40084
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International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress

John Rollins
Acting Section Research Manager/Specialist in Terrorism and National Security

Liana Sun Wyler
Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics

The involvement of insurgent and extremist groups in criminal activity is an issue that has been a concern of U.S. administrations for decades. In recent years, some observers have claimed that interactions between international terrorists and criminals are increasing. If true, expanded links between criminal and terrorist networks could increase U.S. vulnerability to attack by terrorist groups with enhanced criminal capabilities and financial resources. An expanded range of combined criminal and terrorist activity could also affect the global economy and U.S. foreign policy goals, undermining licit international commerce and the promotion of good governance and rule of law. Threats posed by a crime-terrorism nexus may be particularly challenging, as the scale and nature of their cooperation are believed to vary widely and limited anecdotal evidence largely serves as the basis for current understanding of the problem. 

U.S. efforts to combat the relationship between crime and terrorism are a subset of broader policy responses to transnational crime and international terrorism individually. While numerous U.S. strategies and programs are designed to combat international terrorism and transnational crime separately, fewer efforts focus specifically on addressing the confluence of the two. Those efforts that do exist focus mainly on (1) human smuggling and clandestine terrorist travel, (2) money laundering and terrorist financing, and (3) narcoterrorism links between drug traffickers and terrorists. Many of these efforts, including the creation of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, the reorganization of the Treasury Department's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and the expanded extraterritorial jurisdiction authority to investigate and prosecute international narcoterrorism cases, occurred in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Congress played a large role in such efforts, holding at least eight hearings specifically on some aspect of criminal-terrorist interactions between the end of 2000 and 2005. Legislation that has expanded and adjusted agency authorities, resources, and responsibilities related to the crime terrorism nexus includes the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56), the Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 107-458), the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-177), and appropriations-related legislation through the 111th Congress for various U.S. agencies, including the Departments of State and Defense. 

This report provides a primer on the confluence of transnational terrorist and criminal groups and related activities abroad. It evaluates possible motivations and disincentives for cooperation between terrorist and criminal organizations, variations in the scope of crime-terrorism links, and the types of criminal activities—fundraising, material and logistics support, and exploitation of corruption and gaps in the rule of law—used by terrorist organizations to sustain operations. This report also discusses several international case studies to illustrate the range of crime-terrorism convergence and non-convergence, including Dawood Ibrahim's D-Company; the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); the 2004 Madrid bombers; the Taliban; Hezbollah; Al Qaeda; the 2005 London bombers; Al-Shabaab; as well as known or alleged crime-terrorism facilitators such as Viktor Bout, Monzer Al Kasser, and Abu Ghadiyah. Policy considerations discussed in this report include possible tensions between counterterrorism and anti-crime policy objectives, implications for U.S. foreign aid, gaps in human intelligence and analysis, the value of financial intelligence in combating the crime-terrorism nexus, impact of digital and physical safe havens and ungoverned spaces, implications for nuclear proliferation, and effects of crime terrorism links in conflict and post-conflict zones. Unless otherwise noted, this report does not address potential crime-terrorism links in the domestic or border environment.


Date of Report: March 18, 2010
Number of Pages: 56
Order Number: R41004
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