Kenya: Current Conditions and the Challenges Ahead

Ted Dagne
Specialist in African Affairs

Kenya, a nation of about 36.9 million people, has been an important ally of the United States for decades. Kenya moved from a one-party state to a multi-party democracy in 1992. Kenyans voted in record numbers in the country’s first multi-party election in almost 26 years. President Daniel arap Moi defeated opposition candidates by a small margin. In 1997, Kenya held its second multiparty elections, at the height of tensions between the opposition and the ruling party. President Moi was re-elected with 40% of the votes cast, while his nearest rival, Mwai Kibaki, won 31%. In the 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections, the opposition National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) defeated the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU). In the presidential election, NARC leader Kibaki defeated Uhuru Kenyatta, the leader of KANU.

On December 27, 2007, millions of Kenyans went to the polls in Kenya’s fourth multi-party elections, with the hope of strengthening the institutions of democracy and, most importantly in the view of many observers, of bringing change. An estimated 14.2 million (82% of the total eligible voters) Kenyans were registered to vote, while 2,547 parliamentary candidates were qualified to run in 210 constituencies, according to the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). Nine candidates competed in the presidential election. The opposition reportedly made significant gains in the parliamentary elections. The ECK, however, hastily declared President Kibaki as the winner of the elections. Kibaki was quickly sworn in as president, while international and domestic election observers declared the elections as rigged and deeply flawed.

Following the announcement of the election results, violence erupted in many parts of Kenya. More than 1,000 people have been killed and an estimated 350,000 reportedly displaced. In August 2008, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) released a report on the post-election violence. In early February, the opposition and the government began negotiations under the leadership of former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. The two parties agreed to work together to end the violence, improve humanitarian conditions, and write a new constitution within a year. In late February, the government and the opposition reached a powersharing arrangement. On March 18, 2008, the Kenya parliament unanimously approved the agreement. On April 3, 2008, the parties agreed on a 40-member cabinet. But important reforms agreed to by the parties have yet to be implemented. The initial United States government reaction to the December elections was considered by some international observers as contradictory and seen by some Kenyans as being one-sided in favor of President Kibaki. On December 30, the United States government reportedly congratulated President Kibaki. Senior Bush Administration officials visited Kenya in an effort to resolve the crisis and provided support to Kofi Annan’s mediation efforts. The Obama Administration has repeatedly pressed the government of Kenya to implement reforms agreed to by the parties in 2008. In September 2009, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Johnnie Carson sent a letter to 15 Kenyan officials warning them that reforms must be implemented. In April 2010, the Kenyan parliament passed a new draft constitution, and on August 4, 2010, Kenyans approved the new constitution. The next general elections are scheduled for 2012.


Date of Report: June 8, 2011
Number of Pages: 18
Order Number: RL34378
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Veterans and Homelessness

Libby Perl
Specialist in Housing Policy

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought renewed attention to the needs of veterans, including the needs of homeless veterans. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) reported that in FY2008 it assessed more than 1,500 veterans who served in the Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom theater of operations for participation in its Health Care for Homeless Veterans Program. Both male and female veterans have been overrepresented in the homeless population, and as the number of veterans increases due to these conflicts, there is concern that the number of homeless veterans could rise commensurately. The current economic downturn also has raised concerns that homelessness could increase among all groups, including veterans.

Congress has created numerous programs that serve homeless veterans specifically, almost all of which are funded through the Veterans Health Administration. These programs provide health care and rehabilitation services for homeless veterans (the Health Care for Homeless Veterans and Domiciliary Care for Homeless Veterans programs), employment assistance (Homeless Veterans Reintegration Program and Compensated Work Therapy program), and transitional housing (Grant and Per Diem program) as well as other supportive services. The VA also works with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to provide permanent supportive housing to homeless veterans through the HUD-VA Supported Housing Program (HUD-VASH). In the HUD-VASH program, HUD funds rental assistance through Section 8 vouchers while the VA provides supportive services. In addition, two newly enacted programs focus on homelessness prevention through supportive services: the VA’s Supportive Services for Veteran Families program and a VA and HUD homelessness prevention demonstration program.

Several issues regarding veterans and homelessness have become prominent, in part because of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. One issue is ending homelessness among veterans. In November 2009, the VA announced a plan to end homelessness within five years. Both the VA and HUD have taken steps to increase housing and services for homeless veterans. Funding for VA programs has increased in recent years (see Table 4) and Congress has appropriated funds to increase available units of permanent supportive housing through the HUD-VASH program. In each of the FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010 HUD appropriations acts, Congress provided funds sufficient to support more than 10,000 new vouchers per year, which have been distributed to housing authorities in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam. The FY2011 Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-10) provided an additional $50 million for HUD-VASH.

A second issue is the concern that veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan who are at risk of homelessness may not receive the services they need. Efforts are being made to coordinate services between the VA and Department of Defense to ensure that those leaving military service transition to VA programs. In addition, concerns have risen about the needs of female veterans, whose numbers are increasing. Women veterans face challenges that could contribute to their risks of homelessness. They are more likely to have experienced sexual trauma than women in the general population and are more likely than male veterans to be single parents. Few homeless programs for veterans have the facilities to provide separate accommodations for women and women with children.


Date of Report: June 15, 2011
Number of Pages: 45
Order Number: RL34024
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”Dirty Bombs”: Background in Brief

Jonathan Medalia
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

Congress has long sought, through legislation and oversight, to protect the United States against terrorist threats, especially from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are one type of CBRN weapon. Explosive-driven “dirty bombs” are an often-discussed type of RDD, though radioactive material can also be dispersed in other ways. This report provides background for understanding the RDD threat and responses, and presents issues for Congress.

Radioactive material is the necessary ingredient for an RDD. This material is composed of atoms that decay, emitting radiation. Some types and amounts of radiation are harmful to human health.

Terrorists have shown some interest in RDDs. They could use these weapons in an attempt to cause panic, area denial, and economic dislocation. While RDDs would be far less harmful than nuclear weapons, they are much simpler to build and the needed materials are used worldwide. Accordingly, some believe terrorists would be more likely to use RDDs than nuclear weapons. Key points include: 

• RDDs could contaminate areas with radioactive material, increasing long-term cancer risks, but would probably kill few people promptly. Nuclear weapons could destroy much of a city, kill tens of thousands of people, and contaminate much larger areas with fallout. 
• Cleanup cost after an RDD attack could range from less than a billion dollars to tens of billions of dollars, depending on area contaminated, decontamination technologies used, and level of cleanup required. 
• Terrorists would face obstacles to using RDDs, such as obtaining materials, designing an effective weapon, and avoiding detection. 

Governments and organizations have taken steps to prevent an RDD attack. Domestically, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued regulations to secure radioactive sources. The Department of Homeland Security develops and operates equipment to detect radioactive material. The National Nuclear Security Administration has recovered thousands of disused or abandoned sources. Some state and local governments have taken steps to prepare for an RDD attack. Internationally, the International Atomic Energy Agency has led efforts to secure radioactive sources. Its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources offers guidance for protecting sources. The G8 Global Partnership has secured sources in Russia and elsewhere. Other nations have taken steps to secure sources as well. Key points include: 

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission actions have done much to instill a security culture for U.S. licensees of radioactive sources post-9/11. 
• Many programs have sought to improve the security of radioactive sources overseas, but some incidents raise questions about security. 

Should prevention fail, federal, state, and local governments have taken many measures to respond to and recover from an RDD attack. The National Response Framework “establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response.” The federal government has expertise and equipment to use for recovery. Key points include:

• Government agencies have done much to prepare for and recover from an RDD attack. This work would help cope with other disasters. Conversely, planning for other disasters would help in the event of an RDD attack. 
• Response planning fell short in the wake of Katrina and the Gulf oil spill, raising questions about the effectiveness of planning to respond to an RDD attack. 

Issues for Congress include: 

• The priority for countering RDDs vs. other types of CBRN weapons. 
• The proper balance of effort for securing domestic vs. overseas radioactive sources. 
• Whether to establish a radiation detection system in cities; how to dispose of potentially large volumes of radioactive waste that could result from an RDD attack. 
• Whether to modify the pace of a program for implementing certain security enhancements for U.S. radioactive sources. 
• How to improve radiological forensics capability. 

This report is an abridged version of CRS Report R41890, “Dirty Bombs”: Technical Background, Attack Prevention and Response, Issues for Congress, by Jonathan Medalia.


Date of Report: June 24, 2011
Number of Pages: 19
Order Number: R41891
Price: $29.95

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“Dirty Bombs”: Technical Background, Attack Prevention and Response, Issues for Congress

Jonathan Medalia
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

Congress has long sought, through legislation and oversight, to protect the United States against terrorist threats, especially from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are one type of CBRN weapon. Explosive-driven “dirty bombs” are an often-discussed type of RDD, though radioactive material can also be dispersed in other ways. This report provides background for understanding the RDD threat and responses, and presents issues for Congress.

Radioactive material is the necessary ingredient for an RDD. This material is composed of atoms that decay, emitting radiation. Some types and amounts of radiation are harmful to human health.

Terrorists have shown some interest in RDDs. They could use them in an attempt to disperse radioactive material to cause panic, area denial, and economic dislocation. While RDDs would be far less harmful than nuclear weapons, they are much simpler to build and the needed materials are used worldwide. Accordingly, some believe terrorists would be more likely to use RDDs than nuclear weapons. Key points include: 

• RDDs could contaminate areas with radioactive material, increasing long-term cancer risks, but would probably kill few people promptly. Nuclear weapons could destroy much of a city, kill tens of thousands of people, and contaminate much larger areas with fallout. 
• Cleanup cost after an RDD attack could range from less than a billion dollars to tens of billions of dollars, depending on area contaminated, decontamination technologies used, and level of cleanup required. 
• Terrorists would face obstacles to using RDDs, such as obtaining materials, designing an effective weapon, and avoiding detection. 

Governments and organizations have taken steps to prevent an RDD attack. Domestically, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued regulations to secure radioactive sources. The Department of Homeland Security develops and operates equipment to detect radioactive material. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has recovered thousands of disused or abandoned sources. Some state and local governments have taken steps to prepare for an RDD attack. Internationally, the International Atomic Energy Agency has led efforts to secure radioactive sources. Its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources offers guidance for protecting sources. The G8 Global Partnership has secured sources in Russia and elsewhere. A State Department program strengthens border security. Other nations and nongovernmental organizations have acted to secure sources as well. Key points include:

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission actions have done much to instill a security culture for U.S. licensees of radioactive sources post-9/11. 
• Many programs have sought to improve the security of radioactive sources overseas, but some incidents raise questions about security. 

Should prevention fail, federal, state, and local governments have taken many measures to respond to and recover from an RDD attack. The National Response Framework “establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response.” The federal government has resources for recovery. Key points include:

• Government agencies have done much to prepare for and recover from an RDD attack. This work would help cope with other disasters. Conversely, planning for other disasters would help in the event of an RDD attack. 
• Some experts have raised questions about the effectiveness of planning to respond to and recover from an RDD attack. 

This report raises several issues for Congress, including: 

• the priority for countering RDDs vs. other CBRN; 
• the priority given to securing domestic vs. overseas radioactive sources; 
• whether to establish a radiation detection system in cities; 
• how best to prepare for decontamination following an RDD attack; 
• how to dispose of potentially large volumes of waste generated by decontamination; 
• whether to modify certain personnel reliability standards; 
• whether to modify the pace of a program for implementing certain security enhancements for U.S. radioactive sources; and 
• how to improve radiological forensics capability. 

CRS Report R41891, ”Dirty Bombs”: Background in Brief, by Jonathan Medalia, is an abridged version of this report.


Date of Report: June 24, 2011
Number of Pages: 88
Order Number: R41890
Price: $29.95

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Defense: FY2012 Budget Request, Authorization and Appropriations

Pat Towell
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget

On May 26, 2011, the House approved H.R. 1540, the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act, by a vote of 322-96. In all, the bill authorizes $690.1 billion in discretionary funding for military activities of the Department of Defense and for nuclear weapons-related activities of the Department of Energy, an increase of $1.1 billion over the amount requested. Of the total, $553.0 billion is for the Department of Defense base budget, including military construction, $18.1 billion is for the Department of Energy, and $118.9 billion is for DOD overseas contingency operations. All of the net increase to the request is for overseas operations.

A major debate in the House concerned U.S. policy in Afghanistan. On May 26, by a relatively narrow vote of 204-215, the House rejected an amendment by Representative McGovern that would have required the President, within 60 days of enactment of the legislation, to transmit to Congress (1) “a plan with a timeframe and completion date for the accelerated transition of United States military and security operations in Afghanistan to the Government of Afghanistan” and (2) “a plan with a timeframe to pursue and conclude negotiations leading to a political settlement and reconciliation of the internal conflict in Afghanistan,” with participants in the negotiations to include “the Government of Afghanistan, all interested parties within Afghanistan, and with the observance and support of representatives of donor nations active in Afghanistan.”

The House-passed bill includes a number of provisions on other policy issues that may become matters of debate with the Senate. One provision would defer repeal of a 1993 statute barring homosexual persons from military service until the senior uniformed officer of each service certifies, in writing, that repeal would not degrade the combat readiness, cohesion or morale of units. The measure would add an additional hurdle to the reversal of DOD’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy.” Legislation passed last year requires that the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the President certify that the repeal is consistent with military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion and recruiting, and that DOD has prepared the necessary policies and regulations for implementing the repeal. Other provisions concerning nuclear weapons policy were specifically opposed in a White House Statement of Administration Policy.

The amounts provided for DOD in FY2012 will ultimately be determined in the annual defense appropriations bill and the appropriations bill for military construction and VA and related agencies. On May 24, the House Appropriations Committee formally approved the allocation of total discretionary appropriations to each of the Appropriations subcommittees under Section 302(b) of the Congressional Budget Act. For the so-called “base budget”—that is, excluding war costs—the 302(b) allocations would require an $8.9 billion reduction to the President’s request.

One June 14, 2011, the House Appropriations Committee approved by voice vote an FY2012 DOD Appropriations bill which reduced the President’s requested base budget by $8.9 billion. However, in the part of the bill that would fund war costs, the committee approved $842 million more than the President’s $117.8 billion request, as the 302(b) allocation allowed. Thus the net reduction to the President’s request for the entire DOD Appropriations bill as reported to the House would be $8.1 billion.


Date of Report: June 15, 2011
Number of Pages: 55
Order Number: R41861
Price: $29.95

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