Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

Jonathan Medalia
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

A ban on all nuclear tests is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties that entered into force between 1963 and 1990 limit, but do not ban, such tests. In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions. In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate, which rejected it in October 1999. In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said, “My administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” However, the Administration focused its efforts in 2010 on securing Senate advice and consent to ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). The Administration has indicated it wants to begin a CTBT “education” campaign with a goal of securing Senate advice and consent to ratification, but there were no hearings on the treaty in the 111th or 112th Congresses. As of December 2012, 183 states had signed the CTBT and 157, including Russia, had ratified it. However, entry into force requires ratification by 44 states specified in the treaty, of which 41 had signed the treaty and 36 had ratified. Seven conferences have been held to facilitate entry into force, most recently on September 23, 2011.

Nuclear testing has a long history, beginning in 1945. The Natural Resources Defense Council states that the United States conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, the Soviet Union 715, the United Kingdom 45, France 210, and China 45. (Of the U.K. tests, 24 were held jointly with the United States and are not included in the foregoing U.S. total.) The last U.S. test was held in 1992; Russia claims it has not tested since 1990. In 1998, India and Pakistan announced several nuclear tests. Each declared a test moratorium; neither has signed the CTBT. North Korea announced that it conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. Since 1997, the United States has held 27 “subcritical experiments” at the Nevada National Security Site, most recently in December 2012, to study how plutonium behaves under pressures generated by explosives. It asserts these experiments do not violate the CTBT because they cannot produce a self-sustaining chain reaction. Russia reportedly held some such experiments since 1998.

The Stockpile Stewardship Program seeks to maintain confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. Its budget is listed as “Weapons Activities” within the request of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous component of the Department of Energy. Congress addresses nuclear weapon issues in the annual National Defense Authorization Act and the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. The FY2012 appropriation for Weapons Activities was $7.214 billion. The FY2013 request is $7.577 billion; P.L. 112-175, making continuing appropriations for FY2013, provided funds at that rate through March 27, 2013. Congress also considers a U.S. contribution to a global system to monitor possible nuclear tests, operated by the CTBT Organization Preparatory Commission. The FY2013 request for that contribution is $33.0 million, plus $3.5 million as a special contribution to the organization. P.L. 112-175 provided funds for these contributions as well.

This report will be updated occasionally. This update reflects a U.N. resolution on the treaty, FY2013 continuing appropriations, and stockpile stewardship experiments. CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, by Jonathan Medalia, presents pros and cons in detail. CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated “Safeguards” and Net Assessments, by Jonathan Medalia, discusses safeguards— unilateral steps to maintain U.S. nuclear security consistent with nuclear testing treaties—and their relationship to the CTBT. CRS Report R42498, Energy and Water Development: FY2013 Appropriations, coordinated by Carl E. Behrens, provides details on stockpile stewardship.


Date of Report: January 2, 2013
Number of Pages: 64
Order Number: RL33548
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Military Medical Care: Questions and Answers

Don J. Jansen
Analyst in Defense Health Care Policy

Katherine Blakeley
Analyst in Foreign Affairs

The primary objective of the military health system, which includes the Defense Department’s hospitals, clinics, and medical personnel, is to maintain the health of military personnel so they can carry out their military missions and to be prepared to deliver health care during wartime. The military health system also covers dependents of active duty personnel, military retirees and their dependents, including some members of the reserve components. The military health system provides health care services through either Department of Defense (DOD) medical facilities, known as “military treatment facilities” or “MTFs” as space is available, or through private health care providers. The military health system currently includes some 56 hospitals and 365 clinics serving 9.7 million beneficiaries. It operates worldwide and employs some 58,369 civilians and 86,007 military personnel.

Since 1966, civilian care to millions of dependents and retirees (and retirees’ dependents) has been provided through a program still known in law as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), but more commonly known as TRICARE. TRICARE has four main benefit plans: a health maintenance organization option (TRICARE Prime), a preferred provider option (TRICARE Extra), a fee-for-service option (TRICARE Standard), and a Medicare wrap-around option (TRICARE for Life) for Medicare-eligible retirees. Other TRICARE plans include TRICARE Young Adult, TRICARE Reserve Select and TRICARE Retired Reserve. TRICARE also includes a pharmacy program and optional dental plans. Options available to beneficiaries vary by the beneficiary’s duty status and location.

This report answers several frequently asked questions about military health care, including

• How is the military health system structured? 
• What is TRICARE? 
• What are the different TRICARE plans and who is eligible? 
• What are the costs of military health care to beneficiaries? 
• What is the relationship of TRICARE to Medicare? 
• How does the Affordable Care Act affect TRICARE? 
• What are the long-term trends in defense health care costs? 
• What is the Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care fund, which funds TRICARE for Life? 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have also published important studies on the organization, coordination and costs of the military health system, as well as its effectiveness addressing particular health challenges. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs Home Page, available at http://www.health.mil/, may also be of interest for additional information on the military health system. .


Date of Report: January 7, 2013
Number of Pages: 27
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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The question is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget.

Two DOD strategy and budget documents released in January 2012 state that U.S. military strategy will place a renewed emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, and that as a result, there will be a renewed emphasis on air and naval forces in DOD plans. Administration officials have stated that notwithstanding reductions in planned levels of U.S. defense spending, the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region will be maintained and strengthened.

Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.

China’s naval modernization effort, which began in the 1990s, encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and surface ships. China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, training, and exercises. Observers believe that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization effort has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. Observers believe that China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is increasingly oriented toward pursuing additional goals, such as asserting or defending China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing China’s view—a minority view among world nations—that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200- mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); protecting China’s sea lines of communications; protecting and evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign countries; displacing U.S. influence in the Pacific; and asserting China’s status as a major world power.

Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following: whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be large enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakers around the world; the Navy’s ability to counter Chinese ASBMs and submarines; and whether the Navy, in response to China’s maritime anti-access capabilities, should shift over time to a more distributed fleet architecture.


Date of Report: December 20, 2012
Number of Pages: 109
Order Number: RL33153
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Army Corps Supplemental Appropriations: Recent History, Trends, and Policy Issues

Charles V. Stern
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy

Nicole T. Carter
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy

Under its civil works program, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers plans, builds, operates, and maintains a wide range of water resources facilities. The Corps also plays a prominent role in responding to domestic natural disasters, in particular riverine and coastal flooding events. The Corps can assist in flood fighting at the discretion of its Chief of Engineers in order to protect life and property, principally when state resources are overwhelmed. The Corps is also authorized to protect and repair its own facilities in the event of flooding, and to operate a program, the Rehabilitation and Inspection Program (RIP), that funds the repair of participating nonfederal flood control works (e.g., levees, dams, dunes) damaged by flooding events. The Corps also undertakes a variety of other activities at the request of FEMA under the National Response Framework, which are outside the scope of this report.

In recent years a number of natural disasters have required Corps response and repair activities with costs running into the billions. Congress provided most of these funds through supplemental appropriations. Over the 25-year period from 1987-2012, Congress appropriated $26.9 billion in supplemental funding to the Corps. Congress provided the vast majority of this funding ($25.5 billion) through 12 supplemental appropriations acts between 2003 and 2012. This funding was approximately half of the amount provided to the Corps for regular appropriations over this same period ($50 billion).

Of the $26.9 billion, $22.2 billion (83%) was for responding to flooding and other natural disasters, with the majority of this funding related to Hurricane Katrina and the 2005 storm season ($16 billion). In addition to the disaster funding, Congress provided the Corps with nondisaster related supplemental funds, including $4.6 billion under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5) and $39 million for facility security and other expenditures.

Corps natural disaster supplemental appropriations have typically been for activities funded by two Corps accounts: Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies (FCCE; i.e., flood fighting, repairs to damaged nonfederal flood control projects) and Operations and Maintenance (O&M; i.e., repairs to Corps projects). Nonfederal cost-sharing for FCCE and O&M typically has not been required with some exceptions. Congress provided supplemental appropriations related to Hurricane Katrina beyond the FCCE and O&M accounts; it provided $5 billion for improvements through the Corps Construction account, primarily for additional flood protection in Louisiana. Most of this $5 billion was subject to cost sharing requirements; the bills’ text required either 65/35 federal/nonfederal cost sharing or cost sharing consistent with the original project. Louisiana is repaying over 30 years $1.5 billion of the $5 billion provided in the Construction account. Similar supplemental construction funding for significant flood protection improvements was not provided after Hurricane Ike in 2008 and the 2011 Midwest flooding or for most of the proposed post-Katrina work in Mississippi, or for earlier events such as Hurricane Andrew in 1992 or the 1993 Midwest flood. That is, Hurricane Katrina supplemental construction funding represented the exception rather than the norm.

Proponents of supplemental Corps construction funds for Sandy-impacted areas argue that these investments are significant to the recovery effort and that recent flooding brought to light flood risks warranting near-term attention. These proponents support lowering the nonfederal contribution typically required for Corps flood control projects from the 35% to 10% or less. Others argue that the annual appropriations process is the more appropriate forum for identifying nation-wide flood infrastructure investment priorities, and that post-disaster investments like
those in Sandy-impacted areas should be subject to the same project development and cost-share requirements and compete in the annual budget process as other Corps projects. The Corps has a backlog of more than $10 billion of authorized flood and storm damage reduction projects across the country, which compete for the roughly $1.1 billion in annual Corps flood control construction funds.

Date of Report: January 11, 2013
Number of Pages: 18
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