Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke, Coordinator
Specialist in Naval Affairs

The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. On May 10, 2013, the Obama Administration released a national strategy document for the Arctic region.

Record low extents of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have focused scientific and policy attention on links to global climate change and projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within decades. These changes have potential consequences for weather in the United States, access to mineral and biological resources in the Arctic, the economies and cultures of peoples in the region, and national security.

The five Arctic coastal states—the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (of which Greenland is a territory)—are in the process of preparing Arctic territorial claims for submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The Russian claim to the enormous underwater Lomonosov Ridge, if accepted, would reportedly grant Russia nearly onehalf of the Arctic area. There are also four other unresolved Arctic territorial disputes.

The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on two trans-Arctic sea routes—the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Current international guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters are being updated.

Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow more exploration for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to onshore exploration activities. Increased oil and gas exploration and tourism (cruise ships) in the Arctic increase the risk of pollution in the region. Cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters will be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective strategies have yet to be developed.

Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic. The United States is currently meeting with other countries regarding the management of Arctic fish stocks. Changes in the Arctic could affect threatened and endangered species. Under the Endangered Species Act, the polar bear was listed as threatened on May 15, 2008. Arctic climate change is also expected to affect the economies, health, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples.

Two of the Coast Guard’s three polar icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea—have exceeded their intended 30-year service lives, and Polar Sea is not operational. The possibility of increased sea traffic through Arctic waters raises an issue concerning Arctic search and rescue capabilities. On May 12, 2011, representatives from the member states of the Arctic Council signed an agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime search and rescue in the Arctic.

The Arctic has increasingly become a subject of discussion among political leaders of the nations in the region. Although there is significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is also increasingly being viewed by some observers as a potential emerging security issue. In varying degrees, the Arctic coastal states have indicated a willingness to establish and maintain a military presence in the high north. U.S. military forces, particularly the Navy and Coast Guard, have begun to pay more attention to the region. On May 21, 2013, the Coast Guard released a strategy document for the Arctic.


Date of Report: May 24, 2013
Number of Pages: 106
Order Number: R41153
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Crime and Forfeiture

Charles Doyle
Senior Specialist in American Public Law

Forfeiture has long been an effective law enforcement tool. Congress and state legislatures have authorized its use for over two hundred years. Every year, it redirects property worth billions of dollars from criminal to lawful uses. Forfeiture law has always been somewhat unique. Legislative bodies, commentators and the courts, however, had begun to examine its eccentricities in greater detail because under some circumstances it could be not only harsh but unfair. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), P.L. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000), was a product of that reexamination.

Modern forfeiture follows one of two procedural routes. Although crime triggers all forfeitures, they are classified as civil forfeitures or criminal forfeitures according to the nature of the procedure which ends in confiscation. Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding. The property is the defendant in the case. Unless the statute provides otherwise, the innocence of the owner is irrelevant—it is enough that the property was involved in a violation to which forfeiture attaches. As a matter of expedience and judicial economy, Congress often allows administrative forfeiture in uncontested civil confiscation cases. Criminal forfeiture is an in personam proceeding, and confiscation is only possible upon the conviction of the owner of the property.

The Supreme Court has held that authorities may seize moveable property without prior notice or an opportunity for a hearing but that real property owners are entitled as a matter of due process to preseizure notice and a hearing. As a matter of due process, innocence may be irrelevant in the case of an individual who entrusts his or her property to someone who uses the property for criminal purposes. Although some civil forfeitures may be considered punitive for purposes of the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause, civil forfeitures do not implicate the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause unless they are so utterly punitive as to belie remedial classification.

The statutes governing the disposal of forfeited property may authorize its destruction, its transfer for governmental purposes, or deposit of the property or of the proceeds from its sale in a special fund. Intergovernmental transfers and the use of special funds are hallmarks of federal forfeiture. Every year federal agencies transfer hundreds of millions of dollars and property to state, local, and foreign law enforcement officials as compensation for their contribution to joint enforcement efforts.

This report is available in an abridged form, without citations, footnotes, or appendices, as CRS Report RS22005, Crime and Forfeiture: In Short, by Charles Doyle.


Date of Report: May 13, 2013
Number of Pages: 92
Order Number: 97-139
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Terrorism Risk Insurance: Issue Analysis and Overview of Current Program

Baird Webel
Specialist in Financial Economics

Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, insurance coverage for losses from such attacks was normally included in general insurance policies without specific cost to the policyholders. Following the attacks, such coverage became very expensive if insurers offered it at all. Because insurance is required for a variety of economic transactions, it was feared that the absence of insurance against terrorism loss would have a wider economic impact. Private terrorism insurance was largely unavailable for most of 2002, and some have argued that this adversely affected parts of the economy.

Congress responded to the disruption in the terrorism insurance market by passing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA; P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322). TRIA created a temporary three-year Terrorism Insurance Program in which the government would share some of the losses with private insurers should a foreign terrorist attack occur. This program was extended in 2005 (P.L. 109-144, 119 Stat. 2660) and 2007 (P.L. 110-160, 121 Stat. 1839). The amount of government loss sharing depends on the size of the insured loss. In general terms, for a relatively small loss, private industry covers the entire loss. For a medium-sized loss, the federal role is to spread the loss over time and over the entire insurance industry; the government assists insurers initially but then recoups the payments through a broad levy on insurance policies afterwards. For a large loss, the federal government would cover most of the losses, although recoupment is possible in these circumstances as well. Insurers are required to make terrorism coverage available to commercial policyholders, but TRIA does not require policyholders to purchase terrorism coverage. The prospective government share of losses has been reduced over time compared with the initial act, but the 2007 reauthorization expanded the program to cover losses stemming from acts of domestic terrorism. The TRIA program is currently slated to expire at the end of 2014.

The specifics of the current program are as follows: (1) a single terrorist act must cause $5 million in damage to be certified for TRIA coverage; (2) the aggregate insured loss from certified acts of terrorism must be $100 million in a year for the government coverage to begin; and (3) an individual company must meet a deductible of 20% of its annual premiums for the government coverage to begin. Once these thresholds are passed, the government covers 85% of insured losses due to terrorism. If aggregate insured losses due to terrorism do not exceed $27.5 billion, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to recoup 133% of the government coverage by the end of 2017 through surcharges on property/casualty insurance policies. If the losses exceed $27.5 billion, the Secretary has discretion to apply recoupment surcharges, but is not required to do so.

Since TRIA’s passage, the private industry’s willingness and ability to cover terrorism risk have increased. According to industry surveys, prices for terrorism coverage have generally trended downward, and approximately 60% of commercial policyholders have purchased coverage over the past few years. This relative market calm has been under the umbrella of TRIA coverage, and it is unclear how the insurance market would react to the expiration of the federal program.

In the 113th Congress, Representative Michael Grimm has introduced H.R. 508 to extend the TRIA program’s expiration date five years until the end of 2019. The bill has been referred to the House Committee on Financial Services, who has yet to take further action in this Congress. The committee’s Subcommittee on Insurance, Housing, and Community Opportunity held a hearing on TRIA during the 112th Congress.


Date of Report: May 8, 2013
Number of Pages: 15
Order Number: R42716
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Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues

Alex Tiersky
Analyst in Foreign Affairs

Susan B. Epstein
Specialist in Foreign Policy

The United States maintains about 285 diplomatic facilities worldwide. Attacks on such facilities, and on U.S. diplomatic personnel, are not infrequent. The deaths of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. personnel in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012, along with attacks on U.S. embassies in Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen, drew renewed attention to the challenges facing U.S. diplomats abroad, as well as to the difficulty in balancing concerns for their security against the outreach required of their mission. Congress plays a key role in shaping the response to these challenges, such as by providing resources for diplomatic security and examining security breaches overseas.

The inability to provide perfect security, especially against the evident threat of mob violence, has focused particular scrutiny on the deployment of diplomatic personnel in high-threat environments. The Department of State currently maintains a presence in locations faced with security conditions that previously would likely have led State to evacuate personnel and close the post.

Under reciprocal treaty obligations, host nations are obligated to provide security for the diplomatic facilities of sending states. However, instances in which host nations have been unable or not fully committed to fulfilling this responsibility have sometimes left U.S. facilities vulnerable, especially in extraordinary circumstances. U.S. facilities therefore employ a layered approach to security including not only the measures taken by a host country, but also additional, U.S.-coordinated measures, to include armed Diplomatic Security agents, hardened facilities, U.S.-trained and/or contracted local security guards, and sometimes U.S. Marine Security Guard detachments (whose principal role is securing classified information).

The rapid growth in the number of U.S. civilians deployed in high-risk environments of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan spurred significant investment in recent years in the Department of State’s capacity to provide security in dangerous areas through its Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). However, it simultaneously placed unprecedented burdens on DS’s capability to carry out this mission successfully there and in other challenging locations. With greater focus on these frontline states, funds for other U.S. facilities could be strained.

Most of the funding for the protection of about U.S. missions abroad is provided through Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) within the State Department’s Diplomatic & Consular Programs (D&CP) account and through Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU) within the Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance (ESCM) account. The total security funding requested for FY2012 was about $2.9 billion and the amount enacted was about $2.6 billion.

In the wake of the Benghazi attack, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton convened an Accountability Review Board (ARB), which released a report on its findings on December 19, 2012; Secretary Clinton pledged to fully implement all 29 of the ARB’s recommendations. As the ARB was deliberating, the Department took a number of initial steps to bolster security, including an internal reorganization. The Department of State also requested additional funding from Congress to improve its security measures.

Congressional activity in the 112th Congress on this issue included a number of hearings on the attack, as well as a report by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, including a number of findings and recommendations. The 113th Congress has provided
additional resources for diplomatic security needs, continued to investigate the circumstances around the attack and the U.S. response, and begun consideration of a number of related legislative proposals.

Date of Report: May 7, 2013
Number of Pages: 31
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Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2013

Barbara Salazar Torreon
Information Research Specialist

This report lists hundreds of instances in which the United States has used its Armed Forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict or for other than normal peacetime purposes. It was compiled in part from various older lists and is intended primarily to provide a rough survey of past U.S. military ventures abroad, without reference to the magnitude of the given instance noted. The listing often contains references, especially from 1980 forward, to continuing military deployments, especially U.S. military participation in multinational operations associated with NATO or the United Nations. Most of these post-1980 instances are summaries based on presidential reports to Congress related to the War Powers Resolution. A comprehensive commentary regarding any of the instances listed is not undertaken here.

The instances differ greatly in number of forces, purpose, extent of hostilities, and legal authorization. Eleven times in its history the United States has formally declared war against foreign nations. These 11 U.S. war declarations encompassed 5 separate wars: the war with Great Britain declared in 1812; the war with Mexico declared in 1846; the war with Spain declared in 1898; the First World War, during which the United States declared war with Germany and with Austria-Hungary during 1917; and World War II, during which the United States declared war against Japan, Germany, and Italy in 1941, and against Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania in 1942.

Some of the instances were extended military engagements that might be considered undeclared wars. These include the Undeclared Naval War with France from 1798 to 1800; the First Barbary War from 1801 to 1805; the Second Barbary War of 1815; the Korean War of 1950-1953; the Vietnam War from 1964 to 1973; the Persian Gulf War of 1991; global actions against foreign terrorists after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States; and the war with Iraq in 2003. With the exception of the Korean War, all of these conflicts received congressional authorization in some form short of a formal declaration of war. Other, more recent instances often involve deployment of U.S. military forces as part of a multinational operation associated with NATO or the United Nations. For additional information, see CRS Report RS21405, U.S. Periods of War and Dates of Current Conflicts, by Barbara Salazar Torreon. 

The majority of the instances listed prior to World War II were brief Marine or Navy actions to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests. A number were actions against pirates or bandits. Covert actions, disaster relief, and routine alliance stationing and training exercises are not included here, nor are the Civil and Revolutionary Wars and the continual use of U.S. military units in the exploration, settlement, and pacification of the western part of the United States.


Date of Report: May 3, 2013
Number of Pages: 39
Order Number: R42738
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