Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects

Dana A. Shea
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy

The potential for terrorist use of chemical agents is a noted concern highlighted by the Tokyo sarin gas attacks of 1995. The events of September 11, 2001, increased congressional attention towards reducing the vulnerability of the United States to such unconventional attacks. The possibility that terrorist groups might obtain insecure chemical weapons led to increased scrutiny of declared Libyan chemical weapon stockpiles following the fall of the Qadhafi regime. Experts have expressed similar concerns regarding the security and use of Syrian chemical weapons, reportedly including stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents. For analysis of chemical weapons in Syria, see CRS Report R42848, Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin.

Military planners generally organize chemical agents, such as chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals, into four groups: nerve agents (such as sarin and VX), blister agents (such as mustard gas), choking agents (such as chlorine and phosgene), and blood agents (such as hydrogen cyanide). While the relative military threat posed by the various chemical types has varied over time, terrorist use of these chemicals against civilian targets is viewed as a low probability, high consequence event.

Chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals cause a variety of symptoms in their victims. These symptoms depend on the chemical agent used, and a victim of chemical exposure may exhibit a combination of symptoms. Some chemical agents cause death by interfering with the nervous system. Some chemical agents inhibit breathing and lead to asphyxiation. Other chemical agents have caustic effects on contact. As a result, effective chemical attack treatment depends on identifying at least the type of chemical agent used. Additionally, chemical agents trapped on the body or clothes of victims may place first responders and medical professionals at risk.

Civilian protection from and detection of chemical agents is an area of federal concern. Whether terrorist groups are capable of using chemical agents as weapons of mass destruction is unclear. Some experts have asserted that the volumes of chemicals required to cause mass casualties makes that scenario unlikely. They claim that chemical terrorism is more likely to be small in scale. Other experts have suggested that there has been an increase in terrorist interest regarding chemical agents, and that this interest could lead to their use in terrorist attacks. Some experts assert that insecure stockpiles of military-grade chemical agents would lower the barrier to terrorist acquisition of chemical agents and thus increase the possibility that terrorists might use them. The change of regimes in Libya and Egypt and recent events in Syria have increased concern that such military-grade chemical agents might transition into terrorist hands and then be used to attack U.S. sites either domestically or abroad.


Date of Report: September 13, 2013
Number of Pages: 15
Order Number: R42862
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Rare Earth Elements in National Defense: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress

Valerie Bailey Grasso
Specialist in Defense Acquisition

Some Members of Congress have expressed concern over U.S. acquisition of rare earth materials composed of rare earth elements used in various components of defense weapon systems. Rare earth elements consist of 17 elements on the periodic table, including 15 elements beginning with atomic number 57 (lanthanum) and extending through number 71 (lutetium), as well as two other elements having similar properties (yttrium and scandium). These are referred to as “rare” because although relatively abundant in total quantity, they appear in low concentrations in the earth’s crust and extraction and processing is both difficult and costly.

From the 1960s to the 1980s, the United States was the leader in global rare earth production. Since then, production has shifted almost entirely to China, in part due to lower labor costs and lower environmental standards. Some estimates are that China now produces about 90- 95% of the world’s rare earth oxides and is the majority producer of the world’s two strongest magnets, samarium cobalt (SmCo) and neodymium iron boron (NeFeB) permanent, rare earth magnets. In the United States, Molycorp, a Mountain Pass, CA mining company, recently announced the purchase of Neo Material Technologies. Neo Material Technologies makes specialty materials from rare earths at factories based in China and Thailand. Molycorp also announced the start of its new heavy rare earth production facilities, Project Phoenix, which will process rare earth oxides from ore mined from the Mountain Pass facilities.

In 2010, a series of events and press reports highlighted what some referred to as the rare earth “crisis.” Some policymakers were concerned that China had cut its rare earth exports and appeared to be restricting the world’s access to rare earths, with a nearly total U.S. dependence on China for rare earth elements, including oxides, phosphors, metals, alloys, and magnets. Additionally, some policymakers had expressed growing concern that the United States had lost its domestic capacity to produce strategic and critical materials, and its implications for U.S. national security.

Pursuant to Section 843, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (P.L. 111-383) and S.Rept. 111-201 (accompanying S. 3454), Congress had mandated that the Secretary of Defense conduct an assessment of rare earth supply chain issues and develop a plan to address any vulnerabilities. DOD was required to assess which rare earths met the following criteria: (1) the rare earth material was critical to the production, sustainment, or operation of significant U.S. military equipment; and (2) the rare earth material was subject to interruption of supply, based on actions or events outside the control of the U.S. government. The seven-page report was issued in March 2012.

On March 13, 2012, President Obama announced that the United States had joined with Japan and the European Union to bring a World Trade Organization (WTO) joint dispute resolution case against China because of China’s restrictive policies on rare earths and other minerals. The three parties later asked the WTO to set up a panel after direct talks with China failed to resolve the issue. The dispute resolution panel was set up and panelists were appointed. The WTO has announced its dispute resolution panel will release a ruling on a case in November 2013.

Given DOD’s assessment of the supply and demand for rare earths for defense purposes, coupled with the recent announcement of Molycorp’s proposed acquisition of Neo Material Technologies, Congress may choose to use its oversight role to seek more complete answers to the following important questions:


• Given Molycorp’s purchase of Neo Material Technologies and the potential for the possible migration of domestic rare earth minerals to Molycorp’s processing facilities in China, how may this move affect the domestic supply of rare earth minerals for the production of U.S. defense weapon systems?

• Given that DOD’s assessment of future supply and demand was based on previous estimates using 2010 data, could there be new concern for a possible rare earth material supply shortage or vulnerability that could affect national security?

• Are there substitutes for rare earth materials that are economic, efficient, and available?

• Does dependence on foreign sources alone for rare earths pose a national security threat?

Congress may encourage DOD to develop a collaborative, long-term strategy designed to identify any material weaknesses and vulnerabilities associated with rare earths and to protect long-term U.S. national security interests.

Date of Report: September 17, 2013
Number of Pages: 39
Order Number: R41744
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Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Legislative and Executive Branch Initiatives

Alex Tiersky
Analyst in Foreign Affairs

The September 11, 2012, attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, prompted sustained congressional attention on the specific circumstances of the events in question, as well as broader questions regarding how U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities abroad are secured. Ensuring that the Department of State is better prepared for the possibility of similar attacks in the future has been a central congressional concern.

The Department of State undertook a number of measures in response to the attack, including immediate steps to bolster security at posts around the world; an investigation of the incident through an Accountability Review Board; and longer-term measures implementing the board’s recommendations, including requests for significantly greater funding than in recent years. Congress has conducted oversight through investigations by a number of committees and through a number of hearings. Members have also put forward legislative proposals on issues ranging from the composition of Accountability Review Boards to procedures for awarding local security guard force contracts.

In the 113th Congress, two wide-ranging bills incorporating many of these areas have been considered and approved by committees: H.R. 2848, the Department of State Operations and Embassy Security Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2014, and S. 1386, the Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty Embassy Security, Threat Mitigation, and Personnel Protection Act of 2013.

This report briefly summarizes and tracks congressional and State Department actions in response to the attack, and will be updated as necessary to reflect further developments and actions on ongoing policy proposals. Readers seeking background information on recent embassy attacks, State Department policies and procedures relevant to embassy security, or information on recent year embassy security funding trends should consult CRS Report R42834, Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues.


Date of Report: September 12, 2013
Number of Pages: 23
Order Number: R43195
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Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Statutes

Charles Doyle
Senior Specialist in American Public Law

Federal mandatory minimum sentencing statutes limit the discretion of a sentencing court to impose a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment or the death penalty. They have a long history and come in several varieties: the not-less-than, the flat sentence, and piggyback versions. Federal courts may refrain from imposing an otherwise required statutory mandatory minimum sentence when requested by the prosecution on the basis of substantial assistance toward the prosecution of others. First-time, low-level, non-violent offenders may be able to avoid the mandatory minimums under the Controlled Substances Acts, if they are completely forthcoming.

The most common imposed federal mandatory minimum sentences arise under the Controlled Substance and Controlled Substance Import and Export Acts, the provisions punishing the presence of a firearm in connection with a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense, the Armed Career Criminal Act, various sex crimes include child pornography, and aggravated identity theft.

Critics argue that mandatory minimums undermine the rationale and operation of the federal sentencing guidelines which are designed to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparity. Counter arguments suggest that the guidelines themselves operate to undermine individual sentencing discretion and that the ills attributed to other mandatory minimums are more appropriately assigned to prosecutorial discretion or other sources.

State and federal mandatory minimums have come under constitutional attack on several grounds over the years, and have generally survived. The Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause does bar mandatory capital punishment, and apparently bans any term of imprisonment that is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime for which it is imposed. The Supreme Court, however, has declined to overturn sentences imposed under the California three strikes law and challenged as cruel and unusual. Double jeopardy, ex post facto, due process, separation of powers, and equal protection challenges have been generally unavailing.

The United States Sentencing Commission’s Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (2011) recommends consideration of amendments to several of the statutes under which federal mandatory minimum sentences are most often imposed.

Lists of the various federal mandatory minimum sentencing statutes are appended, as is a bibliography of legal materials. This report is available in an abridged version as CRS Report RS21598, Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Statutes: An Abbreviated Overview, without the citations to authority, footnotes, or appendixes that appear here.


Date of Report: September 9, 2013
Number of Pages: 125
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State Marijuana Legalization Initiatives: Implications for Federal Law Enforcement

Lisa N. Sacco
Analyst in Illicit Drugs and Crime Policy

Kristin Finklea
Acting Section Research Manager and Specialist in Domestic Security

Marijuana is the most commonly used illicit drug across the world, including in the United States. In 2012, an estimated 18.9 million individuals in the United States aged 12 or older (7.3% of this population) had used marijuana in the past month. The rate of reported marijuana use in 2012 was significantly higher than those rates reported prior to 2007. Mirroring this increase in use, marijuana availability in the United States has also increased. This growth has been linked to factors such as rising marijuana production in Mexico, decreasing marijuana eradication in Mexico, and increasing marijuana cultivation in the United States led by criminal networks including Mexican drug trafficking organizations.

Along with the uptick in the availability and use of marijuana in the United States, there has been a general shift in public attitudes toward the substance. In 1969, 12% of the surveyed population supported legalizing marijuana; today, more than half (52%) of surveyed adults have expressed opinions that marijuana should be legalized. And, 60% indicate that the federal government should not enforce its marijuana laws in states that allow the use of marijuana.

The federal government—through the Controlled Substances Act (CSA; P.L. 91-513; 21 U.S.C. §801 et. seq.)—prohibits the manufacture, distribution, dispensation, and possession of marijuana. Over the last few decades, some states have deviated from an across-the-board prohibition of marijuana. Evolving state-level positions on marijuana include decriminalization initiatives, legal exceptions for medical use, and legalization of certain quantities for recreational use. Notably, in the November 2012 elections, voters in Washington State and Colorado voted to legalize, regulate, and tax the recreational use of small amounts of marijuana. These latest moves have spurred a number of questions regarding their potential implications for related federal law enforcement activities and for the nation’s drug policies on the whole. Among these questions is whether or to what extent state initiatives to decriminalize, or even legalize, the use of marijuana conflict with federal law.

In general, federal law enforcement has tailored its efforts to target criminal networks rather than individual criminals; its stance regarding marijuana offenders appears consistent with this position. While drug-related investigations and prosecutions remain a priority for federal law enforcement, the Obama Administration has suggested that efforts will be harnessed against large-scale trafficking organizations rather than on recreational users of marijuana. In an August 2013 memorandum, Deputy Attorney General Cole stated that while marijuana remains an illegal substance under the Controlled Substances Act, the Department of Justice would focus its resources on the “most significant threats in the most effective, consistent, and rational way.” The memo outlined eight enforcement priorities including preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors and preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law into other states. Some may question whether state-level laws and regulations regarding marijuana prohibition—in particular those that clash with federal laws—may adversely impact collaborative law enforcement efforts and relationships. Currently, there is no evidence to suggest that the operation of these collaborative bodies will be impacted by current state-level marijuana decriminalization or legalization initiatives. Data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission seem to indicate a federal law enforcement focus on trafficking as opposed to possession offenses. Of the federal drug cases with marijuana listed as the primary drug type (28% of total drug cases sentenced), over 98% involved a sentence for drug trafficking in 2012.


A number of criminal networks rely heavily on profits generated from the sale of illegal drugs— including marijuana—in the United States. As such, scholars and policymakers have questioned whether or how any changes in state or federal marijuana policy in the United States might impact organized crime proceeds and levels of drug trafficking-related violence, particularly in Mexico. In short, there are no definitive answers to these questions; without clear understanding of (1) actual proceeds generated by the sale of illicit drugs in the United States, (2) the proportion of total proceeds attributable to the sale of marijuana, and (3) the proportion of marijuana sales controlled by criminal organizations and affiliated gangs, any estimates of how marijuana legalization might impact the drug trafficking organizations are purely speculative.

Given the differences between federal marijuana policies and those of states including Colorado and Washington, Congress may choose to address state legalization initiatives in a number of ways, or choose to take no action. Among the host of options, policymakers may choose to amend or affirm federal marijuana policy, exercise oversight over federal law enforcement activities, or incentivize state policies through the provision or denial of certain funds.

Date of Report: September 9, 2013
Number of Pages: 13
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