“Dirty Bombs”: Technical Background, Attack Prevention and Response, Issues for Congress

Jonathan Medalia
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

Congress has long sought, through legislation and oversight, to protect the United States against terrorist threats, especially from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are one type of CBRN weapon. Explosive-driven “dirty bombs” are an often-discussed type of RDD, though radioactive material can also be dispersed in other ways. This report provides background for understanding the RDD threat and responses, and presents issues for Congress.

Radioactive material is the necessary ingredient for an RDD. This material is composed of atoms that decay, emitting radiation. Some types and amounts of radiation are harmful to human health.

Terrorists have shown some interest in RDDs. They could use them in an attempt to disperse radioactive material to cause panic, area denial, and economic dislocation. While RDDs would be far less harmful than nuclear weapons, they are much simpler to build and the needed materials are used worldwide. Accordingly, some believe terrorists would be more likely to use RDDs than nuclear weapons. Key points include: 

• RDDs could contaminate areas with radioactive material, increasing long-term cancer risks, but would probably kill few people promptly. Nuclear weapons could destroy much of a city, kill tens of thousands of people, and contaminate much larger areas with fallout. 
• Cleanup cost after an RDD attack could range from less than a billion dollars to tens of billions of dollars, depending on area contaminated, decontamination technologies used, and level of cleanup required. 
• Terrorists would face obstacles to using RDDs, such as obtaining materials, designing an effective weapon, and avoiding detection. 

Governments and organizations have taken steps to prevent an RDD attack. Domestically, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued regulations to secure radioactive sources. The Department of Homeland Security develops and operates equipment to detect radioactive material. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has recovered thousands of disused or abandoned sources. Some state and local governments have taken steps to prepare for an RDD attack. Internationally, the International Atomic Energy Agency has led efforts to secure radioactive sources. Its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources offers guidance for protecting sources. The G8 Global Partnership has secured sources in Russia and elsewhere. A State Department program strengthens border security. Other nations and nongovernmental organizations have acted to secure sources as well. Key points include:

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission actions have done much to instill a security culture for U.S. licensees of radioactive sources post-9/11. 
• Many programs have sought to improve the security of radioactive sources overseas, but some incidents raise questions about security. 

Should prevention fail, federal, state, and local governments have taken many measures to respond to and recover from an RDD attack. The National Response Framework “establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response.” The federal government has resources for recovery. Key points include:

• Government agencies have done much to prepare for and recover from an RDD attack. This work would help cope with other disasters. Conversely, planning for other disasters would help in the event of an RDD attack. 
• Some experts have raised questions about the effectiveness of planning to respond to and recover from an RDD attack. 

This report raises several issues for Congress, including: 

• the priority for countering RDDs vs. other CBRN; 
• the priority given to securing domestic vs. overseas radioactive sources; 
• whether to establish a radiation detection system in cities; 
• how best to prepare for decontamination following an RDD attack; 
• how to dispose of potentially large volumes of waste generated by decontamination; 
• whether to modify certain personnel reliability standards; 
• whether to modify the pace of a program for implementing certain security enhancements for U.S. radioactive sources; and 
• how to improve radiological forensics capability. 

CRS Report R41891, ”Dirty Bombs”: Background in Brief, by Jonathan Medalia, is an abridged version of this report.


Date of Report: June 24, 2011
Number of Pages: 88
Order Number: R41890
Price: $29.95

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