Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Consistent with a proposal announced by the Navy in July 2008, the Administration’s FY2010 defense budget proposed ending procurement of DDG-1000 (Zumwalt) class destroyers with the third ship, which was authorized and partially funded in FY2009, and restarting procurement DDG-51 (Arleigh Burke) class Aegis destroyers, which were last procured in FY2005. The proposed FY2010 defense budget requested procurement funding to complete the cost of the third DDG-1000 and to procure one DDG-51, and advance procurement funding for two more DDG- 51s that the Navy wants to procure in FY2011.

The Navy’s plans for destroyer procurement in FY2012 and beyond have been unclear. The Navy since July 2008 has spoken on several occasions about a desire to build a total of 11 or 12 DDG-51s between FY2010 and FY2015, but the Navy also testified to the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 16, 2009, that it is conducting a study on destroyer procurement options for FY2012 and beyond that is examining design options based on either the DDG-51 or DDG-1000 hull form. A January 2009 memorandum from the Department of Defense acquisition executive called for such a study. A November 2009 press report stated that the study was begun in late Spring 2009, that it was nearing completion, that it examined options for equipping the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 designs with an improved radar, and that preliminary findings from the study began to be briefed to “key parties on Capitol Hill and in industry” in October 2009.

On December 7, 2009, it was reported that the Navy wants to cancel its planned CG(X) cruiser and instead procure an improved version of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyer. The improved DDG-51 that the Navy reportedly now wants to procure would be considerably less expensive to procure than the CG(X). The improved DDG-51 would have more AAW and BMD capability than the current DDG-51 design, but less AAW and BMD capability than what was envisioned for the CG(X). Potential issues for Congress arising from the Navy’s reported new plan include the following:

• Is there an adequate analytical basis for canceling the CG(X) and instead procuring improved DDG-51s? Should an analysis of alternatives (AOA) or the equivalent of an AOA be performed before committing to this course of action?

• Is there adequate stability in Navy planning for acquisition of surface combatants?

• Would an improved DDG-51 be an adequate substitute for the CG(X)?

• What would be the potential operational implications of a Navy equipped with improved DDG-51s instead of CG(X)s?

• What would be the potential industrial-base consequences of canceling the CG(X) and instead procuring improved DDG-51s?

• What would be some potential alternatives to canceling the CG(X) and instead procuring improved DDG-51s?


Date of Report: December 23, 2009
Number of Pages: 67
Order Number: RL32109
Price: $29.95
Document available electronically as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail congress@pennyhill.com or call us at 301-253-0881.